The Golden Rule

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, February 4, 2016

The Golden Rule

Jesus famously set out the Golden Rule as follows: "Do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and Prophets" (Matthew 7:12).

We Westerners tend to take the Golden Rule for granted. Philosophically, though, the rule deserves close examination. Let's look at three positive points, an important assumption, plus a problem.

First positive point: Jesus said it. Because Jesus is God come to earth as a human being, the Golden Rule is hugely important, full stop.

Second positive point: the Golden Rule is hugely important for doing ethics. To know that what you want for yourself is what others want for themselves too, and thus what you ought to do, is important moral knowledge.

Third positive point: the Golden Rule is not just found in Christianity. Others such as Confucius and Rabbi Hillel have set out negative versions of it. Significantly, though, the Golden Rule goes beyond negative versions—don't do to others what you don't want done to yourself—to the now-standard positive version—do to others what you do want them to do to you.

As important as these positive points are, there's also an assumption that should be examined, especially if we are looking at Jesus' statement of the Golden Rule. (I think this assumption is a positive, too, but I'll let the reader decide.)

What's the assumption behind Jesus' Golden Rule? The assumption can be discerned from Jesus' context, i.e., the worldview Jesus holds.

The assumption is that Jesus is the God described in Genesis, i.e., the God who created human beings in God's own image. This means that the "others" described in "Do to others what you would have them do to you" include all human beings. Everyone. Not just those in my tribe, and not just those who share my religion. Everyone. Infidels included.

(If I understand Muhammad and the Qur'an correctly, Muhammad's positive version of the Golden Rule applies only to those who are Muslim.)

Moreover, Jesus' worldview holds that "others" include especially "the least of these." The least of these are human beings made in the image of God yet who are hungry, thirsty, lonely, unclothed, ill, or imprisoned—i.e., the poor and needy.

Today, the poor and needy include orphans, the disabled, the abused, the unborn, the struggling single parent, the elderly, the sick, the starving, the enslaved and trafficked, the refugee, tsunami victims, the persecuted, the homeless, the lonely, the depressed, the sexually abused and confused—the list is long.

In other words, the context of Jesus' espousal of the Golden Rule presupposes the view that because people reflect the Imago Dei, people—all people—have real and great moral worth, and equally so. This underwrites universal human rights.

So what could possibly be the problem with the Golden Rule? The problem arises from an ill-informed understanding of the Golden Rule (an ill-informed understanding on our part, not God's).

The Golden Rule prescribes consistency between my desires for myself and my actions toward others. So far, so good. But, as I tend to forget, my desires could be defective.

The truth is that my desires often are defective. I could be a masochist, i.e., a person who likes being abused physically. So for me to do to others what I want them to do to me puts a stamp of approval on my self-abuse and abuse of others.

Or I could I like adulterous (etc.) sex. So because I like adulterous (etc.) sex, I should engage others in such sex.

Or I could want others to kill me. So I should kill others.

Get the picture?

The reality of defective desires shows that Jesus' understanding of the Golden Rule presupposes a moral framework—i.e., the moral law which the Golden Rule summarizes—to govern my desires. (Jesus also intensifies the moral law when He tells us not only not to commit adultery or murder but also not even to indulge in thoughts about such things.)

To love self and others truly, then, we need God's grace to transform our desires into holy desires.

Enter the Good News: by accepting Jesus as Lord we can be transformed by the Holy Spirit.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

For further reading: 

• The Bible

Is moral realism odd?

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, November 27, 2014

Is moral realism odd?

In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, British atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie (1917-1981) argued famously that allegedly real moral properties are so odd (strange, mysterious, "queer") that this oddness counts against their reality. Because supposed objective (real, mind-independent) moral values are so unlike the facts of the physical world, we should doubt such values exist.

Below I set out three of Mackie's reasons for thinking objective moral values are odd, and in my replies I argue that Mackie's reasons fail.

1. Moral facts are not perceived as physical facts are perceived.

Reply: So what? It turns out that the abstract realm is not perceived as physical facts are perceived either, yet such perception doesn't count against the reality of the abstract realm.

Think of a triangle that has one 90 degree angle. Now recall (from geometry class) that for any such triangle, where c is the length of the hypotenuse (the side opposite the 90 degree angle) and where a and b are the lengths of the other two sides, we know that a² + b² = c² is true.

Significantly, the truth of the Pythagorean Theorem is not perceived as physical facts are perceived (e.g., by examining a particular object or group of objects and then making an inductive generalization). Rather, we examine the idea of a right triangle and discern logical implications via rational intuition—yet we do not dismiss the truth of Pythagoras's insight into reality.

I submit that the perception of moral facts is of a similar order. According to C.S. Lewis, we "just see" objective moral values. (And these are embedded in the fabric of reality as mathematical principles are.)

2. Moral properties are not "out there" like physical properties are.

Reply: Really? Let's say that a live kitten is dipped into gasoline and then, for fun, put to flame. Does the moral horror stem merely from our subjectivity (our taste or preference) and not from "out there" in the external world as the heat from the flame is "out there" in the external world? Is the moral property of evil wholly subjective—not real, not "out there"? Let's do the same to a human child.

Surely, the value or intrinsic worth of a kitten or human person is real and is known (intuited) to be real when it's violated (though, it seems to me, a human being has much greater value than a cat). The wrongness of violating either creature is understood by the facts at hand: it is an actual being or bearer of value, flames will destroy this being or bearer of value in a very painful way, so torching/ torturing for fun is objectively wrong. We know this.

3. Moral properties, if real like physical properties, would be inert: they would lack action-guiding force.

Reply: Not so. The property may be inert in the sense that it's simply there. But we who submit our will to the objective good intuit the property as a reason to act (especially if the bearer of the property is being violated).

At this juncture, Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1711) might charge that I am committing the mistake of deriving an "ought" from an "is" (i.e., I'm leaping to a prescriptive statement from a descriptive statement, without justification).

In response, it should be noted that we can derive an "ought" from an "is" if the thing described in the "is" or fact statement is an actual moral property or value. If it's true—i.e., a fact—that X has objective moral value (real worth), then it follows logically from that fact that X ought to be respected, i.e., not violated or destroyed.

Are moral properties so odd as to not be real, as Mackie thinks? I'm not persuaded.

Surely, in view of our deep moral intuitions concerning the truth of human worth, the good of treating animals humanely, and the good of caring for the environment, it would be odd to think that moral properties are not real.

Now the metaphysical question arises: What—or Who—grounds this moral reality?

(Hendrik van der Breggen teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

For further thought:

• C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man
• C. S. Lewis, Miracles (chapter 5)
• Hendrik van der Breggen, "Miracles, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science" (Ph.D. diss., University of Waterloo, 2004), chapter 2 (esp. pp. 160-162; also see the whole chapter for my overall argument for thinking objective moral values exist)
• William Lane Craig, "Where do objective morals originate in the universe?" (5 minute YouTube video)
• William Lane Craig, "God is the best explanation of objective morals and duties in the world" (2 minute YouTube video)
• William Lane Craig, "Moral values are objective regardless of how we come to know them" (2.5 minute YouTube video)

A comment (which is too large and too important for the comment section):

The passage below is from the book What is a person? (U of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 442-444) written by University of Notre Dame sociologist Christian Smith. Smith's work (what he calls "critical realist personalism") supports the moral realist view that human beings truly have objective moral value (a.k.a. human dignity) and we know this.

What is it that most powerfully justifies moral commitments to things such as human rights, freedom of speech, the abolition of slavery, religious liberty, universal education, due process, racial nondiscrimination, the prohibition of torture and genocide, outrage against rape, the freedom of conscience, protections against starvation, and care for refugees? Not a utilitarian calculation. Not a social contract. Not the interests of the wealthy and powerful. Not the findings of naturalistic, positivistic, empiricist social science. What justifies these moral commitments is the recognition of the natural dignity of persons, which is ontologically real, analytically irreducible, and phenomenologically apparent. In naming the real about humans in this way we continue to pull back together fact and value, the is and the ought….

In all of this, we must acknowledge that not all people or cultures or philosophies have recognized or understood the fact of human dignity or often treated ordinary people with dignity. Quite the contrary. History is replete with failures to understand, affirm, and respect human dignity. Treating humans as possessing the dignity that is rightfully theirs by virtue of the ontology of personhood may be the exception, not the rule in human history…. How can we affirm real, objective, universal human dignity in the face of such massive misrecognition and violation of it? Does this not suggest that the idea of human dignity is actually a recent cultural invention of dubious ontology and relative value? No, I think not. Nothing whatsoever in a realist theory requires that people recognize and understand something in order for it truly to exist. Bacteria and germs existed and wreaked havoc on human bodies for most of history without anyone realizing they were real—it was not until the nineteenth century that the germ theory of disease became widely known and accepted. The objectively real moral fact that slavery is a categorical evil was likewise not widely appreciated throughout most of human history, yet in the United States people's common erroneous moral understanding of slavery until the nineteenth century did not mean that slavery was not evil. It was evil—whether or not anyone realized it. Human dignity does not become real 'for us' simply because we start believing in it, any more than our heliocentric solar system became real when people started believing in it. It always was true. What needed to happen was simply for people to conform their hitherto mistaken minds to what was already true about the real. This was the case with Copernican astronomy. This is the case with human dignity. … [T]here are certain 'institutional facts' that are real social things and made so precisely by people believing in them, through 'social construction'—things like money, representative government, and sports. But human dignity is not an institutional fact. Dignity is, in Searle's terms, a 'brute fact' of ontological reality that is a characteristic and ineliminable property of emergent personhood. Dignity is rooted in the nature of things personal [i.e., human beings], not in ideas or discourse. So the fact that not all people or cultures or philosophies have recognized or understood or respected human dignity does not touch the question of its existence.

This nevertheless compels us to recognize the historically conditioned nature of humanity's awareness of its own dignity. The recognition of human dignity has not been a historical constant. Various people, cultures, and philosophies have at different times throughout history explicitly articulated the reality of personal dignity. But the clear understanding of the inalienable, universal nature of human personal dignity that emerged in the twentieth century—especially in the wake of Nazi Germany and World War II—and that is now expressed in many national constitutions, the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was the outcome of long historical developments shaped by a variety of different religious, ethical, philosophical, and cultural traditions unfolding over time. Like most of human knowledge about people and the world, knowledge of human dignity has also been historically dynamic and progressive. People today can say more about dignity that really is true than they used to be able to say—just like we can say more now about physics, medicine, ocean life, the brain, the moral status of child labor, and the origins of the cosmos than we could centuries ago.

Lady Gaga and moral reasoning

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, September 5, 2013

Lady Gaga and moral reasoning

Lady Gaga's popular song “Born This Way” celebrates various diversities as good, including sexual diversity—homosexuality, bisexuality, and transgender sexuality. Why? Because, according to Gaga, this is how one is formed at birth, and, according to Gaga, “God makes no mistakes.”

                 

Is this good moral reasoning? I think not. I have two arguments: one theological, one philosophical.

First, the theological argument. If we're talking about the Christian God, i.e., the God described in the Bible, then it's true that God makes no mistakes. But we should also notice that on this view the first human beings that God created used their freedom to choose against God—they sinned.

(Note: Only if this freedom were perfect, i.e., only if God made no mistakes in creating this freedom, could the first humans have the power to choose against God.)

The result: the human race has "fallen." That is, we are now morally broken—we have an inclination to sin—and this inclination has been passed down to us from our ancestors.

This means that we are born with propensities not only for good, but also for evil. We are born self-centered, and we tend to reject the good.

In other words, even though we might be born with diverse inclinations (and even though on the Christian view God loves us in spite of any inclinations we have), being born this way this doesn't mean God automatically accepts and affirms our acting on any or all of these inclinations. Significantly, the God of the Bible calls us to (a) turn away from our sinful inclinations and behaviours, plus (b) accept Jesus—God come to earth as a human being—as Lord.

We should agree with Lady Gaga, then, that "God makes no mistakes," but we should also disagree with Lady Gaga by realizing that being "born this way" doesn't automatically mean that "this way" always meets with God's moral approval.

Second, here is some philosophical reasoning—which applies whether one believes in the Christian God or not.

Lady Gaga rightly encourages us to respect and accept all people, regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. After all, each person has intrinsic moral worth (because, as Christians would say, each person is made in the image of God). So far, so good.

But here Lady Gaga's thinking needs some qualification. We should keep in mind that respecting and accepting all people doesn’t automatically also mean that we should accept and affirm all the behaviours of all people. Nor does it also mean that we should accept and affirm all their (our) dispositions and urges to behave in various ways.

Why not? Because not all behaviours are good—some behaviours are harmful to one’s self and/or others.

Think about serial rapist and murderer Ted Bundy. He may have been born with his peculiar sexual propensities and urges. But, surely, Bundy's behaviour is bad.

Pedophiles have propensities and urges, too. So do people who are prone to alcoholism, temper tantrums, lying, thievery, greed, gossip, gluttony, etc. (It's possible that we've been born with, say, a genetic predisposition that inclines us in these diverse directions, though the biological situation is probably more complex than this; and no doubt there are social factors, too.)

Clearly, the appeal to “born this way” as a moral justification of a propensity or urge requires further argument. We should ask: Is acting out on a propensity or urge good for one's self or others? Or not?

Is it sin? Or not?

With all due respect to Lady Gaga, “born this way” doesn't mean we ought to act this way.

Postscripts

• For help for those who struggle with sexuality issues, see the website for Restored Hope Network. For a look at some science-based arguments that question the wisdom of promoting sex—heterosexual sex as well as non-heterosexual sex—at an early age, see Miriam Grossman's book You're Teaching My Child WHAT? A Physician Exposes the Lies of Sex-Ed and How They Harm Your Child. On the Bible and homosexuality, see Joe Dallas's book The Gay Gospel? How Pro-Gay Advocates Misread the Bible. For a secular argument that questions the wisdom of same-sex sex, see my column "Is promoting same-sex sex wise?" (see too my critics' arguments plus my replies).

• For further reading (about Lady Gaga's moral philosophy): Douglas Groothuis, "Discerning and Responding to Gaga's Worldview," Christian Research Journal 34:6 (2011), 14-17.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Euthyphro Dilemma: God is irrelevant to ethics?

Socrates (469-399 BC)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, May 9, 2013

Euthyphro Dilemma: God is irrelevant to ethics?

Some philosophers object to the idea that the Christian God is the basis of ethics because of what's called the Euthyphro dilemma, taken from the work of the ancient philosopher Plato (c. 429-347 BC).

(Euthyphro is a character in one of Plato’s dialogues by the same name wherein Socrates, who was Plato's teacher and whom Plato greatly admired, questions Euthyphro’s understanding of the relationship between the gods and moral value.)

The question raised by the Euthyphro dilemma is this: Does God will something because it is good, or is it good because God wills it? Both options, it is alleged, make God irrelevant to ethics.

On the one hand, if God wills something because it is good, then this would imply that there is a standard of goodness which is independent of God. The goodness of the thing is why God wills it, which means that even God is subservient to the good. So we don’t need God for ethics.

On the other hand, if something is good because God wills it, then this would make God's will seem morally ungrounded and capricious. God's will would make an action good, so whatever God wills would be right. But this means that God could will, say, child abuse and rape, and so child abuse and rape would be right. Of course, we already know that such behaviours are evil. So we (again) don't need God for ethics.

Either way, according to the Euthyphro dilemma, God isn’t the foundation of ethics. Or so the objection goes.

Is the objection reasonable? Answer: No.

It turns out that there is a third option which allows us to escape the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma: i.e., God is the standard of good and God wills something because doing so is an expression of God’s essentially good nature.

At this juncture, it may help to remember Plato's metaphysical understanding of reality. Plato distinguishes between The Good, i.e., the absolute Form (idea/ideal), and a demiurge, i.e., a god-like being (craftsman/artisan). On Plato's view, the demiurge is distinct from and subservient to The Good; the demiurge is a part of the cosmos; and the demiurge's role is to add pre-existent eternal forms/ structures to the formless stuff of the cosmos.

According to the Christian conception of God, however, God is significantly unlike Plato's demiurge. Rather, God is the Creator of the cosmos (including all its stuff, formless or not) and God also is The Good. This means that, contrary to the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, goodness is not independent of God.

Moreover, according to the Christian view of God, God’s will is subject to and reflects God's own unchangeably good nature. God can only do and will that which is in accordance with His own nature, which is perfect goodness itself. This means that, contrary to the second horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, God's will is not morally ungrounded or capricious.

Contemporary Christian philosopher William Lane Craig (in his book On Guard) clarifies: “[M]oral values are not independent of God because God’s own character defines what is good. God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so on. His nature is the moral standard defining good and bad.”

Craig continues: “[God's] commands necessarily reflect His moral nature. Therefore, they’re not arbitrary.”

Craig adds: “When the [critic] demands, ‘If God were to command child abuse [or rape], would we be obligated to abuse our children [or commit rape]?” he’s asking a question like ‘If there were a square circle, would its area be the square of one of its sides?’ There is no answer because what it supposes is logically impossible.”

Therefore, the solution to the Euthyphro objection is that God wills the good because God is good, which means that independent of God no standard of goodness exists nor is God’s will arbitrary.

In other words, the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma—so God remains relevant to ethics.

(Note: To say that God remains relevant to ethics is not to say that a person who doesn't believe in God can't be moral or can't have knowledge of objective moral values. Rather, it is to say that God provides moral values with an objective/real metaphysical ground. Philosophically, this is significant.)

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College.The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence. )

P.S. Here is a very short video of William Lane Craig on the Euthyphro Dilemma with The One Minute Apologist:

The virtue of self-control (with God's help)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, January 10, 2013

The virtue of self-control (with God's help)

The other day I saw an internet poster of the movie star Johnny Depp. The caption read: "You can close your eyes to the things you don't want to see, but you can't close your heart to the things you don't want to feel." Mr. Depp is a fine actor, but I disagree with his philosophical quip.

Please bear with me as I explain.

Sure, I can close my eyes to what I don't want to see, literally or figuratively. That is, I can shut my actual eyelids over my eyeballs if, say, I don't want to see the bloody scene on television. Or I can shut my figurative eyelids to the plight of others by, say, not helping people who don't have clean drinking water or food.

But, we should ask: Is it true that I must feel those things I don't want to feel? In other words, we should ask: Has Johnny Depp never made an effort to develop his moral character?

Think about it. I feel a desire to see pornographic images. Must I continue to feel that desire? Answer: No. I can starve this desire to death. How? By not feeding it.

In other words, I can train my heart to tell my feelings when to get off the bus. It's called self-control—an old-fashioned moral virtue.

Think about it some more. I feel a desire to have a cigarette. Must I continue to feel that desire? Answer: No, I can kill the desire by not indulging it.

I feel a desire to get drunk. Must I continue to feel that desire? Answer: No, I can dry up the desire by not fueling it.

I feel hatred toward my neighbour. Must I keep my heart open to that hatred? Must I nurture that hatred? Answer: No, I can decide to engage in actions of love—actions that end up blessing my neighbour and changing my heart.

I speak from experience here.

Before I accepted Jesus of Nazareth as Lord (God), I would often succumb to pornographic images (Playboy magazines and the like), but now I don't. My heart has become closed to this trash.

I was also an addicted cigarette smoker for about 15 years, but managed to quit. I've had about three puffs over the past two decades, but the desire now is a phantom, easily dismissed from my heart.

I also used to drink alcohol often and often got drunk. In fact, I was in the grip of alcoholism. Moreover, in the depths of my being I couldn't imagine my life without alcohol. But now my heart is closed to alcohol. The feeling to drink to excess has dried up via a life of choosing (with God's help) not to drink to excess.

Allow me to get even more personal. A few years ago I seriously thought about killing my neighbour (who lived in the basement suite). His music and video games had kept me from sound sleep for nearly three months, in spite of my many requests of him to turn down the volume.

Late one sleepless night, I entertained the idea of stabbing my neighbour with a kitchen carving knife. I indulged the idea, even mentally rehearsing the physical steps. I hated him, and I wanted to murder him.

But then, in a flash of sanity, I prayed for help. I immediately had the sense that I should act as if I love my neighbour even when my heart's desire was to murder him. (I also recalled having read this strategy for moral action in a book by C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, in a section called "Let's Pretend.")

Interestingly, a few minutes later my neighbour knocked on my door seeking medical attention for a wound to his hand. I forced myself to clean and bandage his hand. I then noticed that he was shaking. It turned out that he hadn't eaten since the previous day. So I fixed him a sandwich and gave him a glass of milk. As he ate, I began to feel a love for this fellow, a love I believe came from God—a love that overwhelmed and replaced the feeling of murderous hatred in my heart.

In other words, I was able, with God's help, to close my heart to what I didn't want to feel, and I was able, with God's help, to open my heart to what God wanted me to feel.

I'm sure that the desire or temptation to lust, smoke, get drunk, or hate will return to my heart, and I'm sure that I will sometimes stumble. But I also have a growing assurance that, with God's help, I can resist the temptations—and that I will walk more often than stumble.

Johnny Depp is a fine actor, to be sure. But his philosophical quip is deeply mistaken, for which I am deeply grateful—and for which, I strongly suspect, my neighbour is deeply grateful too. (Thanks be to God!)

I pray that God would continue to work in me in the New Year, and I pray that God would help my readers to grow in Him too.

Happy New Year!

(Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., teaches ethics at Providence University College. He believes that objective [i.e., real] moral truth exists and that part of discerning objective moral truth involves developing those virtues which dispose us to act in accordance with such truth. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

On Utilitarianism

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, November 15, 2012

On Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is a theory of ethics that appeals to many people today. I will explain utilitarianism plus look as some pros and cons. Although this view of ethics has some important insights, I will argue that it’s incomplete and therefore deeply problematic.

According to utilitarianism, the rightness or goodness of an act (or rule) is to be understood wholly in terms of its consequences: an act is right insofar as it maximizes the utility or happiness for the greatest number.

Historically, two important proponents of utilitarianism are Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Whereas Bentham measured happiness hedonistically (i.e., in terms of maximizing pleasures and the avoiding pain), Mill emphasized the intellectual quality of the happiness. Bentham is famous for the quip, "Pushpin is as good as poetry" (i.e., any pleasure will do), whereas Mill is famous for the quip, “Better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (i.e., some pleasures are better than others).

Utilitarianism has some positive features.

An act's consequences for others are important, to be sure, so it’s good to account for these consequences. Utilitarianism seems to put a much needed check on self-centered theories such as ethical egoism (the view that what is right or good is primarily what maximizes my self-interest or preferences).

Also, that right actions often do have positive long-term consequences seems to fit well with our moral intuitions.

Also, utilitarianism seems to promise general flourishing and the amelioration of suffering. Moreover, according to the contemporary utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer, such flourishing and amelioration apply not only to people, but also to animals.

So far, so good.

Utilitarianism, however, has three serious problems, the last of which is the theory's Achilles' heel.

First, utilitarianism faces a practical calculation problem. Though perhaps not an insurmountable problem, calculating relevant the future consequences of an act to make a decision poses a serious difficulty.

The following sorts of questions need to be answered: Do we include only intended consequences, or do we include actual consequences? How far into the future do we go—one year? two? forty-seven?—and why that far?

Also, what about the added difficulty that to make an informed decision we need to be able to calculate the future consequences for all the alternate possible courses of action so we can make a comparison? Perhaps the wisdom of past experience will help here, but it seems that some sort of omniscience is needed.

Second, utilitarianism faces the problem of justifying the nature of "utility" or "happiness." As we've seen, Bentham defines it as maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, whereas Mill defines it in "higher" terms having to do with intellect. However, although it is possible for individuals roughly to rank their own preferences on an internal sort of scale, it is difficult if not impossible to have a common scale between individuals.

I may assert that my neighbour's top preference is three notches below my bottom preference; my neighbour may assert the opposite; and there seems that there is not much else that can be done. So individuals have varying subjective preferences concerning utility or happiness. And, we must ask: Whose subjective preference best speaks for animals?

Whichever way the notion of utility or happiness is defined, a further question arises: What justifies this notion? Interestingly, such a justification would require a non-utilitarian argument.

Third, and most importantly, utilitarianism faces the problem of justice. Contemporary philosopher Sean O’Connell helpfully explains:

“The standard version of the most powerful objection to utilitarianism runs like this: utilitarianism gives no direction for the fair or just distribution of happiness throughout a group of individuals affected by a rule or an act. All that seems to matter is the aggregate happiness produced by different acts or rules. If the aggregate happiness of all those affected is increased by some act or rule, even if it requires that someone is made very unhappy by it, or (more strongly) is treated unjustly by it, then the act or rule in question seems to be what utilitarianism recommends."

O'Connell adds: "[U]tilitarianism seems to require that one adopt any rule or action that maximizes utility, even though the act or rule may be ethically repugnant or morally unacceptable. Cases can be easily imagined in which torture, lying, murder, or adultery would certainly maximize the sum of happiness or reduce unhappiness.”

Consider, for example, the human rights problems of the former Soviet Union: millions of lives were sacrificed to usher in the goal of the classless society wherein the greatest happiness would obtain for the greatest number. This was utilitarianism in action.

Also, consider how slavery, human trafficking, abortion, infanticide, physician-assisted suicide, and even self-inflicted suicide can easily be justified on utilitarian grounds. (Pause and think about this. Sensitize yourself to the morally chilling direction utilitarianism points us.)

In other words, on utilitarianism the end (goal) may be taken to justify any means.

In other words (again), utilitarianism's main problem seems very much to stem from its failure to recognize our pre-theoretic intuition that each human being has objective moral value (real intrinsic worth) which should not be violated.

Significantly, utilitarianism in general has no account/foundation for the great moral worth—and equal moral worth—of each human being. What is worse, on Singer's utilitarianism, when Singer fails to recognize human worth as intrinsically greater than the worth of a non-human animal, Singer’s utilitarianism threatens to equalize the worth of all animals by reducing the worth of human beings.

From the point of view of our pre-theoretic moral intuitions, and from the point of view that human beings are made in the image of God, this shortcoming makes utilitarianism an incomplete ethical theory. It also makes utilitarianism morally dangerous.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Are we ignoring a philosophical lesson from history?

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

(The Carillon, May 31, 2012)

Are we ignoring a philosophical lesson from history?

Part of my job as a philosophy professor is to teach a course on ethics once a year, so I regularly examine various ethics books that may be helpful to my students, and I pay attention to discussions of issues relating to life and death.

In fact, I've been thinking about and attending to topics relating to ethics for years—going back even into my childhood. I remember nervously giving a speech on Adolf Hitler to a grade 8 class when I was in grade 6, and I remember part of my preparation involved looking at William L. Shirer's book The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. (My parents had an extensive home library. They also survived the Nazi occupation of The Netherlands.)

Over the years I have noticed a trend in Canada, a trend towards an acceptance of the philosophical view that there is such a thing as human life not worthy to be lived.

If the reader hasn't noticed this, then I urge him/her to think of the growing acceptance in the medical profession of death as a solution to various problems. Think of the prevalence of abortion; think of the recent slippage into the acceptance of what some thinkers call "post-birth abortion"; think of the present movement to promote the legalization of physician-assisted suicide for the elderly and terminally ill.

Think, too, of the growing acceptance of the ethic of utilitarianism, the ethic that what is right is what maximizes the utility or happiness/pleasure for the greatest number. Significantly, the utilitarian ethic tends not to be connected with the more traditional view (in the West) that human life per se is sacred or has objective (intrinsic) moral worth.

Couple this growing acceptance of utilitarianism with the present generation's penchant for popular movies that positively portray so-called mercy killing.

Think of the Academy Award winning Million Dollar Baby, in which Clint Eastwood is an old boxing coach who kills his young female boxing student, played by Hillary Swank, because she has become quadriplegic. Or think of the Emmy Award winning You Don't Know Jack, which treats euthanasia proponent Jack Kevorkian (1928-2011, a.k.a. "Dr. Death"), played by Al Pacino, as if he—Kevorkian—were a saint.

Keep in mind that in these films the emotion-laden pros of euthanasia are emphasized without a sustained careful examination of the cons. Keep in mind too that a characteristic of propaganda is that it usually doesn't present pros AND cons, or if it presents any cons, it presents them weakly.

I don't mean to sound alarmist, but I am troubled. I suspect that we have not learned our philosophical lessons from history.

Consider the following passage from Dr. Leo Alexander (1905-1985), medical advisor to the U.S. Chief of Counsel at the Nuremberg Trials, trials in which representative Nazis were convicted of crimes against humanity (this passage is from Dr. Alexander's paper "Medical Science Under Dictatorship," which appeared in New England Journal of Medicine, July 14, 1949):

 "Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evident to all who investigated them that they had started from small beginnings. The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived."

Dr. Alexander continues: "This attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the severely and chronically sick. Gradually the sphere of those to be included in the category was enlarged to encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted, and finally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize that the infinitely small wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude toward the nonrehabilitatable sick."

Dr. Alexander also points out that the German people were encouraged in this "subtle shift" by movies depicting euthanasia in a positive light. Alexander writes: "Lay opinion was not neglected in this [pro-euthanasia] campaign. Adults were propagandized by motion pictures, one of which, entitled 'I Accuse,' deals entirely with euthanasia. This [1941] film depicts the life history of a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis; in it her husband, a doctor, finally kills her to the accompaniment of soft piano music rendered by a sympathetic colleague in an adjoining room."

Significantly, in the 2010 film You Don't Know Jack, when Dr. Jack Kevorkian assists with the suicides of some of his patients (at least 130 assisted killings in total), there usually is a sympathetic colleague in the room, and throughout the movie we are treated to beautiful musical accompaniments by the likes of Johann Sebastian Bach.

I don't believe that there is a Nazi Party on Canada's horizon (thank goodness). But I do believe that some of the deep philosophical principles of what Pope John Paul II (1920-2005) called the culture of death are becoming prevalent in our society.

We should remind ourselves and our children that medical, social, and psychological problems require medical, social, and psychological solutions—not killing.

P.S. For further related reading, please check Apologia archives on abortion and physician-assisted suicide.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Is the fetus a human being?

Carla's and my son Brahm shortly after his birth. According to Canadian law, our son wasn't a human being before his birth.
APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, May 10, 2012)

Is the fetus a human being?

Tory MP (Kitchener Centre) Stephen Woodworth has filed motion M-312 requesting that our government form a special committee to study Canada’s Criminal Code definition of the term "human being." From the point of view of informed critical thinking, I believe that Mr. Woodworth's request is most appropriate.

Presently, section 223 (1) of Canada’s Criminal Code states the following: “A child becomes a human being…when it has completely proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother, whether or not (a) it has breathed; (b) it has an independent circulation; or (c) the navel string is severed.”

I submit that the Code's understanding of human being runs contrary to fact as well as contrary to reason.

Consider the following facts and reasoning:

1. At conception the human sperm unites with the human egg, thereby generating the existence of an embryo, which is a new life form.

2. This new life form is no longer a sperm life form nor is it an egg life form: it is something substantively different, i.e., a different substance/being, a different living entity—it's a new, genetically distinct, self-governing dynamic organism.

3. The new life form is, biologically speaking, a human life form—it’s not canine, feline, reptilian, or floral.

4. The new life form contains all the essential biological material (outside of nourishment needs) and all the genetic information required for complete tissue and organ development as well as maturation.

5. With nourishment, time, and protection, the new life form at conception grows into the fetus. (“Fetus” is Latin for unborn offspring or young one.) The fetus is but a chronological-developmental extension of the embryo.

6. At about 22 days after conception, a heart begins to beat.

7. Within about 6-8 weeks, brain waves are detectable.

8. Changes after the 10th week are primarily changes in size.

9. With continued nourishment and protection, at about 9 months the fetus, or unborn infant, becomes the born infant.

10. The fetus, the infant, the toddler, the adolescent, and the adult are, biologically, essentially whatever their previous developmental stages are and are simply chronological-developmental extensions of these stages. The biological essence, that is, the fundamental/essential biological nature of being human—of human being—is present throughout the chronological-developmental span of the human life form, from conception to old age.

(Note: Careful language use is important here. The embryo, i.e., the union of the sperm and egg at conception, the fetus/unborn infant, the born infant, the toddler, the adolescent, and the adult are each a human being with potential, not a potential human being. The sperm and egg prior to conception are best described as a potential human being, because together they have the capacity to become a human being. However, and significantly, at conception we have a human being with potential, i.e., a human being with the capacity to become the subsequent developmental stages of the being that it is.)

Therefore, contrary to what section 223 (1) of Canada's Criminal Code says, when a child proceeds from the body of its mother, it does not become a human being. Why not? Because it already is a human being!

Surely, in the name of truth and reason—and in the name of humanity’s most vulnerable—we should support MP Stephen Woodworth’s request that our government form a special committee to study Canada’s Criminal Code definition of human being.

Surely, too, Canada’s law should include all human beings in its definition of human being.

P.S. In future columns I will address the problematic objection that the unborn human being isn't a "person." For now, please keep in mind that a law which purports to describe human beings should describe human beings accurately, which section 223 (1) of Canada's Criminal Code fails to do.

Note: For my additional columns on abortion, please check the archives.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

for the BIBLE tells me so

Apologia, etc.
Critical Review
By Hendrik van der Breggen



For the Bible Tells Me So, produced & directed by David Karslake (New York: First Run Features, 2007)

Recently I watched For the Bible Tells Me So, a documentary about religion and homosexuality in the U.S. The film well depicts the suffering some gays face and the struggles some Christian families encounter when a family member is gay, and thus the film presents some truly legitimate concerns. In fact, several of the concerns are heart-wrenching injustices. The abuse of homosexuals and the hate-mongering directed toward homosexuals are unjust—and all the more so when done in the name of Christ. Surely, followers of Christ should show genuine love to all persons, including persons who self-identify as gay or lesbian. Injustices done in the name of Christ hurt people whom Christ loves dearly. I, and no doubt many other Christians, find such injustices deeply troubling.

Having said this—and without making light of this at all—I wish to note that the film also has serious shortcomings. The documentary is misleading in at least four significant ways, which, as a Christian who is an academic, I find deeply troubling too.

First, the film poorly reports the science relevant to homosexuality. For example, the twin studies the film presents are dubious. According to the film, when one identical twin is gay the other is gay "up to 70% of the time," thereby (allegedly) demonstrating the role of genes in determining homosexuality. But, it turns out, more recent and more careful scientific investigation tells us that the actual percentage is somewhere between 11 and 20%. (For substantiation of this point, see my first recommended reading by Yarhouse below.) If science is to be taken seriously, it should be presented accurately.

(Ironically, in communicating its exaggerated report of the twin studies the film employs a cartoon featuring a character named "Christian" who displays a negative attitude toward science.)

Second, by using a cartoon the film unfairly represents those persons who successfully leave homosexuality: "We're still gay," whispers a lesbian cartoon character standing on a conveyor belt after coming out of an Ex-Gay Ministry machine. But, the careful viewer should ask: Where are the live interviews with people from ex-gay ministries such as Exodus International and National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH)? Where is the respected (if not infamous) Spitzer report concerning persons who have changed their orientation to a significant degree? Is the film suppressing the voices of ex-gays?

If one doubts the existence of ex-gays, one should see (for starters) the cover story of World magazine, December 17, 2011. This story features Alan Chambers, a long time ex-gay who is presently president of Exodus International. Joe Dallas, a previous president of Exodus International and author of The Gay Gospel? (Harvest House, 1996/2007), is another ex-gay who should be considered. Apparently, there are many ex-gays whose voices the film ignores.

(Are ex-gays rejected twice—first because of their homosexuality, and again because they are no longer gay? If the first is an injustice, then the second would seem to be an injustice too.)

Third, the film mistakenly suggests that all persons who are not pro-gay are homophobic. To be sure, some people are homophobic, that is, some people have an irrational fear of, or hatred for, homosexuals. But, it needs to be emphasized, many people who are not pro-gay are not homophobic. Why? Because they have reasonable concerns.

Some reasonable concerns about same-sex sexual behaviour stem from findings in the health sciences. For evidence, see the medical section of the Christian Medical and Dental Associations' statement on homosexuality (scroll to bottom for references). (CMDA is a Christian group, but the studies to which they appeal come from various secular scientific sources.) See too NARTH's medical issues page.

Moreover, some reasonable concerns stem from principled moral positions having to do with gay-related social issues such as same-sex marriage.

For evidence, take at look at the arguments of Margaret Somerville, professor of law at McGill University. See Somerville's essay, “What about the Children?”, in Daniel Cere and Douglas Farrow, editors, Divorcing Marriage: Unveiling the Dangers in Canada’s New Social Experiment (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); and see Somerville’s essay, “The other ‘rights question’ in same-sex marriage” at the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law and Culture.

By ignoring such reasonable concerns, the film gives the impression that disagreement on same-sex issues is fueled only by homophobia, not sober-minded rational concern. This impression is neither true, nor fair to critics, nor does it contribute positively to informed discussion.

Fourth, the film weakly and unfairly presents the hermeneutical/ interpretive issues involved in reading the Bible carefully. The film suggests that those persons who disagree with gay revisionists should be dismissed as "biblical literalists" or as having merely a "5th grade understanding." In fact, however, many who disagree with gay revisionist interpretations of Scripture do not always take texts literally and are highly educated.

Why didn't the film interview experts in Biblical scholarship pertaining to homosexuality who strongly disagree with gay revisionism, are not "biblical literalists," and have high academic credentials? I'm thinking here of Harvard and Princeton educated Robert A. J. Gagnon, PhD, author of The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics (Abingdon, 2001). Another important scholar is Andrews University’s Richard M. Davidson, PhD, author of Flame of Yahweh: Sexuality in the Old Testament (Hendrickson, 2007). The film is supposed to be taking the Bible seriously, isn't it?

There are more than four problems with the documentary, but these are sufficient for illustrating the grounds for my concern.

Where For the Bible Tells Me So is good, which is in many places, especially its depiction of the struggles of gay individuals in their Christian family contexts, it is really good; but where it is bad, which is in many places too, such as those I’ve presented above, it is really bad. The danger in this film is that the emotionally-charged good parts will probably jam (block, interfere with) those bad parts where careful thinking and background information are required, thereby letting poor reasoning and falsehoods slip by unchecked. As summary descriptors of the film, the words “propaganda” and “manipulation” come to mind, though these words are too strong. Probably a better word is "unbalanced."

My recommendation: See the film, take the good parts of its message to heart, but think very very carefully as you do—and maybe even do some research first.

P.S. A helpful, more-detailed review of For the Bible Tells Me So can be found at psychologist Mark Yarhouse's blog Limning the Psyche. A helpful resource for Christians dealing with gay issues on a more personal level can be found in Mark Yarhouse's book, Homosexuality and the Christian: A Guide for Parents, Pastors, and Friends (Bethany House, 2010).

P.P.S. Here are some additional Apologia columns that address homosexuality:
1. Homophobia, bigotry, intolerance?
2. It's all society's fault?
3. Born gay?
4. The ad hominem fallacy

UPDATE: Exodus International has closed its doors and Robert Spitzer, the author of the Spitzer report, has changed his mind. For further insight into these events, see my January 14, 2014, Apologia column: Three clarifications concerning 2013's news.

Physician-Assisted Suicide is a Slippery Slope

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, December 1, 2011)

Physician-assisted suicide is a slippery slope

The question of whether physician-assisted suicide (PAS) should be legal in Canada is presently before the B.C. Supreme Court. I have argued previously that PAS is problematic (The Carillon, Aug. 18 and Sept. 29). Today I will sketch an argument for thinking that legalizing PAS puts us on a dangerous slippery slope.

What follows is based on an argument from Paul Chamberlain's excellent book Final Wishes (Wipf & Stock 2009). (Chamberlain teaches apologetics and philosophy at Trinity Western University in Langley, British Columbia.) According to Chamberlain, there is a non-fallacious slippery slope logically connected to the legalization of PAS for the terminally ill.

Chamberlain's case hinges on the notion of patient autonomy coupled with the observation that reasons for one action sometimes also justify other actions which are unintended.

In the context of legalized PAS for the terminally ill, patient autonomy becomes understood in terms of the following fundamental principle: the sufferer has the right to choose PAS to end his/her suffering.

Significantly, accepting PAS as a legal right on the basis of this fundamental principle opens up and justifies a host of new situations in which persons suffer and may request PAS. These situations include not only (a) the terminally ill but also (b) the non-terminally ill, (c) the elderly, (d) the disabled, (e) the parent suffering the loss of a child, (f) the person suffering chronic back pain, (g) the depressed teenager, and (h) so on.

So, if we accept PAS in the case of the terminally ill on the basis of the principle behind patient autonomy—i. e., the principle that the sufferer has the right to choose PAS to end his/her suffering—then logic and law will demand that we accept PAS in other cases.

Of course, we can try to set up so-called legal safeguards to limit PAS to the terminally ill, but our courts will do what courts do—they will promote consistency. But consistency demands that all of the above-mentioned suffering persons, if they request PAS (and if they hire a good lawyer), can be quite reasonably seen to have the right to PAS too. Indeed (or so the argument would go), if we have already accepted patient autonomy as a legal justification for PAS, how can we deny them PAS?

Yes, the new situations are different. But their differences are incidental, if not irrelevant. Why? Because at the core of each of these new situations we have a sufferer who requests PAS. Moreover, consistency requires that PAS's fundamental justifying principle—i.e., that the sufferer has the right to choose PAS to end his/her suffering—will carry more legal weight than the situational differences. The principle is, after all, fundamental (i.e., basic and more important).

The result: Legal acceptance of PAS for the terminally ill will put gobs of grease onto the path that leads to death as a legally permissible solution to the suffering of the non-terminally ill, the elderly, the disabled, the parent suffering the loss of a child, the person suffering chronic back pain, the depressed teenager, and so on.

In other words, the legal acceptance of PAS puts us on a slippery slope that embraces death as a solution to medical, social, and psychological problems.

We should pray that the B.C. Supreme Court realizes that medical, social, and psychological problems require medical, social, and psychological solutions—not killing.

P.S. For other arguments against the wisdom of legalizing physician-assisted suicide, see my Apologia columns On Putting Down Pets and People, Look at Pros and Cons, and  ET CETERA.

P.P.S. For further examination of slippery slope arguments in general, see my Apologia columns Slippery Slope Arguments (Part 1) and Slippery Slope Arguments (Part 2).

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Abortion in the news (part 2)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, November 9, 2011)

Abortion in the news (part 2)

Last time I mentioned that I was dismayed at some of the so-called "pro-choice" arguments I've noticed in the public discussion of abortion. Here is yet another "pro-choice" argument that deserves criticism.

Actually, this "pro-choice" argument is an argument that focuses on the people who are critical of abortion. This argument tells the pro-life proponent that before she can legitimately defend the right to life of the unborn child, she should (a) adopt all unwanted children, (b) give resources to women who are contemplating abortion, plus (c) make the world a more just place. Otherwise, or so the argument goes, defenders of the pro-life position can be ignored.

Baylor University philosopher Francis Beckwith nicely sets out this argument plus offers a helpful assessment, so I quote Beckwith at length.

Beckwith writes: "This argument [i.e., the "pro-choice" argument against pro-life people and their pro-life view] can be distilled into the following assertion: unless the pro-life advocate is willing to help bring up the children she does not want aborted, she has no right to prevent a woman from having an abortion."

Beckwith again (but now in assessment mode): "As a principle of moral action, this seems to be a rather bizarre assertion. It begs the question by assuming that the unborn are not human persons."

Beckwith adds: "Wouldn't we consider the murder of a couple's children unjustified even if we were approached by the parents with the ultimatum, 'Unless you adopt our three children by noon tomorrow, we will put them to death'? The fact that we may refuse to adopt these children does not mean that their parents are justified in killing them. The issue, once more, is whether the unborn are human persons."

Beckwith adds: "Although the pro-life movement does have a moral duty to help those in need, especially unwed mothers (and there are enough organizations dedicated to this ministry to show that the pro-lifers do practice what they preach), the point that I am making is that the unborn do not suddenly become nonpersons and not entitled to protection simply because individual pro-lifers are not currently involved in works of mercy."

Beckwith again: "Personal attacks against pro-lifers are attempts to avoid the question of whether the unborn are human persons….We should simply remind our attackers that such assaults have no bearing on the question of whether or not abortion is unjustified homicide."

Clearly, then, for justice to prevail, truth must prevail.

It seems to me that knowledge of truth about the unborn child's humanity is an important step towards justice for the most vulnerable of the vulnerable—the least of the least of these.

P.S. The above quotes are from Francis J. Beckwith’s little book, Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life (College Press, 2000), 62-63. Beckwith’s book is a fine resource for those who wish to think critically about the abortion issue. A fine resource for those facing a crisis pregnancy is the Crisis Pregnancy Centre of Winnipeg.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)