Showing posts with label Atheism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Atheism. Show all posts

March 27, 2010

Criticisms of Atheistic Neo-Darwinian Ethics

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, March 25, 2010

Criticisms of Atheistic Neo-Darwinian Ethics

Atheistic neo-Darwinist evolutionary accounts of ethics tend to emphasize one of two features: (a) the survival of the fittest, or (b) co-operation. Thinking people should examine both accounts. Let’s do this in four steps.

1. Let’s first see what two prominent atheistic neo-Darwinists have to say about ethics in general.

Richard Dawkins writes: “The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.” [River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life (London: Phoenix Press, 1995), 133; italics added for emphasis.]

Michael Ruse writes: “The position of the modern evolutionist...is that humans have an awareness of morality...because such an awareness is of biological worth. Morality is a biological adaptation, no less than our hands and feet and teeth.... Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. I can appreciate that when somebody says "love thy neighbour as thyself," they think they are referring above and beyond themselves.... Nevertheless...such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction...and any deeper meaning is illusory....” [Michael Ruse, “Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics,” in The Darwinian Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1989), 262, 268-269; italics added for emphasis.]

In other words, these prominent atheistic neo-Darwinists allege that there is no real right, wrong, good, or evil. Rather, our sense/ feeling of "objective morality" evolved into being because it produced survival benefits. Real right and wrong, real good and evil—these are merely useful fictions.

2. Let’s now look at the survival-of-the-fittest emphasis of atheistic neo-Darwinian ethics. On this view the right or good is whatever helps my group (or me) survive.

The problems with this view are obvious. If good and evil, right and wrong, are not real, i.e., are not in any deep sense true and binding on all, and if the governing principle of life is survival of the fittest, then it follows logically that genocide is acceptable if it promotes the survival of my group.

Also, it follows that ruthless imperialism is acceptable if it’s in my group’s interest. Also, it follows that ruthless egoism is acceptable if it’s in my self-interest and I can get away with it. In other words, might makes right.

But, surely, we know that, morally, might doesn’t make right. Significantly, this moral knowledge counts against the survival of the fittest neo-Darwinian view of ethics.

3. Okay, now let’s look at the co-operation emphasis of atheistic neo-Darwinian ethics. This is also known as tit-for-tat morality. The idea is that our sense of right and wrong, good and evil, comes from our Darwinian past in which reciprocal altruism occurred: “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”. Morals arose from agreements (explicit or implicit). And agreements arose from our enlightened self-interest, to ensure our survival and allow us to get what we want.

Serious problems arise for the co-operation view, too.

First, the co-operation view discounts our deepest intuitions about real right and wrong as mere suggestions for living, i.e., as useful “rules of thumb,” which evolved. Second, it dismisses our deepest intuition about the intrinsic moral worth of humans as mere useful illusion. Third, once we are “enlightened” (i.e., once our consciousness is raised by our awareness of the truth of atheistic neo-Darwinian evolution), it reduces morality to enlightened self-interest (reciprocal altruism), which reduces to contractarian ethics (ethics by agreement).

But contractarian ethics are hugely problematic. Here are some of the problems: Nothing is really wrong except breaking an agreement (but that’s okay if you pay out); people outside the agreement (“social club”) are not morally relevant (unless they can provide tit for tat, i.e., reciprocate in some way in your favour or not in your favour); plus we end up with moral relativism (i.e., morals depend on our various “social clubs” or individual preferences, which means that obviously evil regimes and individuals are merely doing what is “right for them,” period).

[See my previous Apologia columns for additional criticisms of contractarian ethics and moral relativism.]

4. To make matters worse for atheistic neo-Darwinian ethics, both the survival of the fittest and the co-operation emphases have trouble accounting for high altruism (i.e., the virtue of self sacrifice). High altruism is alleged by some to be due to an evolutionary misfiring.

Misfiring or not, once we realize (in our atheistic neo-Darwinian “enlightened” consciousness) that the urge to self-sacrifice is merely an evolved instinct—i.e., just a useful evolutionary illusion/trick, nothing more—we begin to wonder whether self-sacrifice is virtuous at all.

But such thoughts don’t sit well with our deep pre-theoretic first-order moral intuitions (i.e., our moral-rational insights prior to succumbing to atheistic neo-Darwnian ethical theory). The neo-Darwinian explanation, which is a second-order ethical theory, must compete with the first-order moral experience that it purports to debunk—but the first-order moral experience isn’t easily dislodged.

In plain English: The atheistic neo-Darwinian theory of ethics threatens to explain away what we know morally, but runs amok philosophically because of what we know morally.

Atheistic neo-Darwinian ethics? Go figure.


Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

March 12, 2010

Atheistic Darwinian Evolution and Ethics

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, March 11, 2010

Atheistic Darwinian evolution and ethics

In my previous column I quoted serial killer Ted Bundy, who asked: "Why is it more wrong to kill a human animal than any other animal, a pig or a sheep or a steer?"

Bundy’s answer: It isn’t. In fact, according to Bundy, it’s not wrong to kill humans at all if it gives you pleasure, because morals are wholly subjective, i.e., just a matter of feeling or taste, nothing more.

On the blog version of this column, an atheist proponent of Darwinian evolution answered Bundy’s question as follows: “That's too easy, Doc. We evolved by preserving our species.”

This particular atheist’s answer is a typical response of many persons who are atheistic evolutionists. Here’s my reply (which I set out in my blog, worth repeating here):

I’m not convinced that it’s as easy as you say. I think that, yes, the value we place on human life would help us evolve (assuming an unguided, wholly naturalistic evolutionary process) by being useful in guiding actions that help preserve us.

However, now, once we realize that we have simply evolved (wholly purposelessly, by natural selection acting on genetic mutation) it would seem that we should also realize that standards of right and wrong, i.e., our values, are mere guidelines for the preservation of our group. That is, we should realize that ethics aren’t about an objective good that is deeply real or deeply binding; ethics are merely a set of helpful rules that culture has handed down to us to help us survive.

In other words, as atheist philosopher Michael Ruse writes, “Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction...and any deeper meaning is illusory.” So ethics, it seems to me, could vary from culture to culture, if the principles and values help a group or society, one way or another, to survive.

But things become problematic at this juncture. Enter: the evil regime problem that I mention in my column. That is, we end up having no deeply real good or deeply binding basis for disagreement with groups led by the likes of Hitler, Idi Amin, Pol Pot, etc. After all, they are merely doing what helps them survive. Their values primarily concern their survival, not ours.

Enter, too, the evil individual problem that I also mention in my column. That is, we end up having no deeply real good or deeply binding basis for disagreement with the likes of individuals such as Karla Homolka, Ted Bundy, etc.

Ethics, it seems, end up being reduced to personal preference and power, and we have no grounds for criticism other than our personal preference and power. Morality reduces to might makes right.

Phillip Johnson (a lawyer and Darwin critic) has an insightful comment that’s relevant here: “[M]any people have made an effort to build ethical systems out of an evolutionary background—one of the things that has evolved is the human need to form societies; societies need rules; we as rational beings can recognize the need for rules.

“You can even see how certain rules and standards like promise-keeping, for example, or parents caring for children, would enable a tribe to provide better and to do better in competition with other tribes. And so you can get a grounding for ethics in that sense in the evolutionary process itself.”

So far, so good. But Johnson quickly (and rightly) adds the following: “[T]he problem [with evolutionary/ survivalist ethics] is that while promise-keeping can be justified on an evolutionary basis, so equally can genocide, you see, because what genocide just is is the replacement of one gene pool with another. You wipe out the tribe down the way and your gene pool survives....”

It seems to me that we find genocide and serial killing wrong because we have a deep moral intuition (i.e., moral/rational insight) of the following objective truth: that people have real intrinsic moral worth. And I am very inclined to think that people in general, whether atheist or theist or whatever, can and generally do recognize this worth.

I have found that a couple of my good friends who are atheist/agnostic tend to agree with me on this. We agree that people have real intrinsic moral worth and deserve respect (i.e., shouldn’t be tortured for fun, murdered, raped, etc.); where we differ is in how to explain that worth. We differ on how to account for it, not on that it is the case. I tend to think it’s due to being made in God’s image; my atheist friends disagree.

My friends who are atheists/agnostics and I have a deep disagreement here, to be sure. But there’s also some very important common ground. I believe that this common ground allows us to work together and respect each other and others as we work to maintain and protect and encourage what’s good and excellent in our world.

Nevertheless, a philosophical problem remains, and its implications should be faced squarely. My belief that people are made in God’s image reinforces my intuition (moral-rational insight) that all people have real intrinsic moral worth. However, the atheistic neo-Darwinian view that people are accidents of a purposeless nature undermines and weakens the intuition (moral-rational insight) that all people have real intrinsic moral worth.

After all (and again), as the atheistic evolutionist Michael Ruse makes clear, “Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction...and any deeper meaning is illusory.” Ruse means that the intuition that people have real intrinsic moral value is false.

Shouldn’t the atheistic survivalist-evolutionary view, then, tend to favor, morally speaking, the fittest and strongest? Shouldn’t the atheistic survivalist-evolutionary view, then, reinforce the subjective pleasures (the enlightened self-interest) of the powerful?

In other words, the atheistic survivalist-evolutionary view seems to provide strong philosophical support for Ted Bundy’s subjectivist view of ethics. And this is troubling.

Please let me be clear. I haven’t argued that atheists are bad or cannot be good (in fact, most of the atheists I know impress me as caring, good people). Rather, I have argued that atheism—especially when wed to neo-Darwinian evolution—lacks the philosophical resources to lend credence to the moral judgment that some actions which violate or destroy people are truly bad and some actions which help people flourish are truly good.

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

March 12, 2009

Does God exist?

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, March 12, 2009)

Does God exist?

Advertisements on the sides of buses in Calgary, Toronto, and elsewhere read as follows: THERE’S PROBABLY NO GOD. NOW STOP WORRYING AND ENJOY YOUR LIFE. Although I respect my atheist neighbours and friends, and although I will defend their right freely to express their worldview positions without fear of persecution—as I hope they would do for me—I nevertheless disagree with their position (their position about God, that is; not the bits about worry and enjoyment).

I think the evidence favours God’s existence. In defence of my position, here is a sketch of a cumulative case argument from science, ethics, and history (to be further defended in subsequent Apologia columns).

First, a clarification is in order. A cumulative case argument consists of a collection of sub-arguments that, individually, may not provide strong or decisive support for a conclusion, but jointly do—just as one strand of string may not be strong enough to lift a heavy load but several interwoven strands are.

Okay, here are the sub-arguments (also sketches thereof).

1. Various findings from science point to God.

The big bang posits a beginning of the universe. This, together with the principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause, strongly suggests that the universe has a cause. Moreover, this cause, because it is the cause of all matter/energy, space, and time, would be physically transcendent (i.e., immaterial), temporally transcendent (i.e., eternal), and very powerful (perhaps all powerful).

In addition, the exquisite fine-tuning of the universe’s conditions for life suggests that the aforementioned cause is highly intelligent. Also, life’s blueprint—DNA’s code/language—smacks of an intelligent cause.

Furthermore, the fact that the universe operates according to mathematical/rational principles and the fact that our minds can understand many of these deep principles (a feat immensely beyond what is needed for mere survival)—these facts make good sense on the view that a rational Mind created both the universe and us.

2. Our experience of morality points toward God.

That all people have real worth (and so shouldn’t be murdered, tortured, or otherwise abused) is well explained by the doctrine that people are made in God’s image.

Also, the fact that we have free will to make moral (or immoral) choices makes sense on the hypothesis that God gave us the mental capacity/freedom to choose (or reject) the good.

3. Several historical facts point to God.

Shortly after Jesus’ death, various individuals and groups of individuals claim to have seen, touched, and conversed with the resurrected Jesus in various locations over several weeks. Also, the lives of these individuals were transformed into an irrepressible witness to Jesus’ bodily resurrection.

Because of what we know about dead bodies, a resurrection, if it happened, would be best explained as supernaturally caused. This means (especially in view of the previous evidence suggesting God’s existence) that Jesus’ actual resurrection shouldn’t be ruled out prior to historical investigation. The result: Jesus’ miraculous—i.e. God-caused—resurrection is strongly suggested by, plus makes good sense of, the historical evidence.

Therefore, bus ads or no bus ads, it’s reasonable to think that God—the God revealed by Jesus Christ—exists.

For further reading on God’s existence (for believers and non-believers), I recommend Chad Meister’s Building Belief (Baker 2006) and William Lane Craig’s Reasonable Faith (Crossway 2008).

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.)

December 30, 2008

Christmas, Evolution, and Narnia

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, January 1, 2009; published December 30, 2008)

Christmas, Evolution, and Narnia

One of this season’s popular gift DVDs may be Prince Caspian, part of C. S. Lewis’s Chronicles of Narnia.

Lewis (1898-1963) is famous as a writer of children’s fantasy. What many Narnia fans might not know, however, is that Lewis, an Oxford and Cambridge University professor, was persuaded by J.R.R. Tolkien and others to believe that, in the Christmas story, the ancient myth of a dying and rising God became fact.

According to the Christmas story, God came to earth as a human being named Jesus. But, Lewis learned, the Christmas story isn’t complete without Easter. About thirty years after Jesus’ birth, Jesus revealed God’s radical love for us by suffering and dying on a cross, thereby taking the punishment for our sins onto Himself and granting us a pardon. Two days after the crucifixion, Jesus rose from the grave—a glorious sign to help us accept God’s gift of grace, by faith.

Lewis presented arguments for the literal truth of the Christmas-Easter story in his book Miracles.

Intriguingly, one of Lewis’s arguments in Miracles is relevant to contemporary discussions of evolution and intelligent design, when “evolution” is understood atheistically.

Here’s the argument (modified by University of Notre Dame philosopher Alvin Plantinga). Evolutionary theory on the assumption of an unguided, unplanned process of genetic mutation and natural selection guarantees at most that we behave in ways conducive to immediate survival.

Significantly, immediate survival only requires immediately useful skills in foraging, fighting, fleeing, and reproducing.

This means that the reliability of our belief formation very probably does not extend to deep theories about nature, especially if they’re not related to immediate survival. Therefore, if atheistic evolutionary theory is true, then our beliefs about logic (beyond rudimentary logic) and mathematics and science—especially deep scientific theories—should be, very probably, dubious.

But now an epistemological (knowledge) problem arises for atheistic evolution: It is a deep scientific theory, which, if true, very probably shouldn’t be believed to be true.

Go figure.

But another problem also arises. We know much, much more than what’s required for mere immediate survival (think of particle physics, lasers, etc.).

So?

Well, it turns out that our knowledge of physics, lasers and the like is suggestive evidence for thinking that our brains and senses are intelligently designed (for truth seeking). This means that when we discuss evolution and its philosophical implications, the apparent evidence of intelligent design which arises from our ability to reason and do science in the first place should be considered.

It also means that we should ponder what Lewis called “deeper magic,” that is, God’s redemption plan for humanity, established before time and space began, but revealed in history, paradoxically, by a baby in a manger.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.)

December 11, 2008

Who designed the designer? (Part 2)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, December 11, 2008)

Who designed the designer? (Part 2)

The question—Who designed the designer?—is set out by Richard Dawkins (in The God Delusion) as an objection to God’s existence.

According to Dawkins, explaining nature’s improbable complexity (that is, nature’s apparent design) by appealing to a designer is to appeal to something more improbable than nature, because the designer would have to be more complex than what it explains. Moreover, the designer would have to be explained by the designer’s designer, and so on. Thus, according to Dawkins, God’s existence is highly improbable.

Here is another reason for thinking that this objection fails: it’s based on a false assumption.

Dawkins assumes that the complexity of a designer makes a designer hypothesis improbable. But consider this: Intelligent cause/designer explanations are accepted in science even if the designer is complex—e.g., in archeology (to explain cave paintings and arrowheads), in cryptography (to explain codes), and in forensic science (to explain whodunnit). In fact, in these sciences the designer is even more complex than the objects or phenomena explained, yet the designer hypothesis is legitimate.

If (for argument’s sake) we were to accept Dawkins’ assumption as true, then, to be logically consistent, the aforementioned explanations would not be legitimate. But they are legitimate. So Dawkins’ assumption—that the complexity of a designer makes a design hypothesis improbable—is false.

At this juncture, Dawkins might object (as he does in The God Delusion) that it is not reasonable to make a design inference in a more general or ultimate way, i.e., from the evidence of the physical universe to an intelligent designer such as God.

Why not? Because, according to Dawkins, ultimate causes should be simple and non-intelligent, as in neo-Darwinian evolution, where causes are non-intelligent as well as simpler than their complex effects.

Significantly, however (and unnoticed by Dawkins), this is in effect to assume that simple unintelligent causes constitute what is ultimately real. But if we are actually trying to let the universe’s evidence of apparent design (instead of our assumptions) tell us whether or not there is an ultimately real intelligent designer, then Dawkins’ assumption is at issue!

In other words, Dawkins incurs the fallacy of question-begging (a.k.a. circular reasoning): he assumes as proven that which is at issue, and he unwittingly sneaks this assumption into his argument.

Dawkins, then, assumes the outcome of his investigation right from the start, instead of letting the evidence of the investigation decide the outcome. God or no God, this is a logical sin.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.)

November 27, 2008

Who designed the designer? (Part 1)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, November 27, 2008)

Who designed the designer? (Part 1)

The question—Who designed the designer?—has been famously set out by Richard Dawkins (in The God Delusion) as an objection to God’s existence.

According to Dawkins, explaining nature’s improbable complexity (that is, nature’s apparent design) by appealing to a designer is to appeal to something more improbable than nature, because the designer would have to be more complex than what it explains. Moreover, the designer would have to be explained by an even more complex and improbable explanation—i.e. the designer’s designer—and so on. Thus, Dawkins thinks, God’s existence is highly improbable.

Here is one reason (of several) for thinking that Dawkins’ objection fails: It’s irrelevant.

The issue of the complexity and origin of a designer simply has no bearing on the process of determining whether something is designed.

Consider the science known as SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence). In SETI the intelligent design hypothesis is allowed to explain ET’s communications (if they were to occur). Moreover—and significantly—whether the alleged message is truly a message from ET depends not at all on our knowledge of ET’s complexity or origin, but solely on whether the message displays design.

How do we discern design? Think about some long words in a Scrabble game, or consider some sophisticated computer software. Or imagine, say, the discovery of strange complex machinery on Mars. Or recall the messages from outer space in the movie Contact.

The way to discern evidence of whether something is designed (or not) is to determine whether the thing satisfies two criteria: (1) that its existence is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes alone, given what we know from empirical experience of the capacities of non-intelligent causes; and (2) that it is strongly analogous to things we know (also) from empirical experience to be designed by intelligent causes. (So this is an argument based on what we know; this isn’t an argument from ignorance or gaps in our knowledge.)

Who designed the designer? Perhaps the designer just is (and always has been). Or not. Perhaps the designer is complex (more complex than what it has designed). Or not.

The point is this: We are not required to understand the nature of a designer (i.e., whether it is complex or not) or even the origin of a designer (whether it has a designer or not) to determine—rationally and empirically—that something has been designed. We just need evidence of design.

Therefore, as an alleged block to discerning a designer from its designed effects, Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection is beside the point. It’s a logical blunder.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, located in Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada.)