Jagmeet Singh, abortion, and illogic

Green Party Leader Elizabeth May, Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau, Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer, People's Party of Canada Leader Maxime Bernier, Bloc Québécois Leader Yves-François Blanchet and NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh at federal leaders debate in Gatineau, Quebec (October 7, 2019). Photo credit: SEAN KILPATRICK/POOL/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES (via Montreal Gazette)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

October 17, 2019

Jagmeet Singh, abortion, and illogic

The topic of abortion came up at the Canadian federal leaders’ debate (October 7, 2019), and logic took a beating.

NDP leader Jagmeet Singh stated the following: “A man has no place in a discussion around a woman’s right to choose. Let’s be very clear on that.”

Apparently, Liberal leader Justin Trudeau and Green leader Elizabeth May agreed with Singh, whereas Conservative leader Andrew Scheer didn't. Because of the poor format of the debate—and poor moderation—I didn't get clear on what the other leaders thought.

So let’s (at least) be very clear on Mr. Singh's claim.

There are two logical problems—serious logical problems.

Problem 1

Mr. Singh commits the ad hominem fallacy, the mistake in reasoning which occurs when an arguer is attacked instead of his/her arguments.

Some instances of the ad hominem fallacy are easy to spot. Consider the following:

“Einstein is Jewish, therefore his theory of relativity should be rejected.”

“Your doctor is a woman, therefore don’t believe what she says about prostate cancer.”

Clearly, in the above arguments the premise (i.e., the bit before “therefore”) is not relevant to the conclusion (the bit after “therefore”).

But some instances of the ad hominem fallacy are not so easy to spot.

Consider (again) Mr. Singh's claim: “A man has no place in a discussion around a woman’s right to choose [abortion].”

Significantly, Singh is dismissing as illegitimate all arguments that men might present on the topic of abortion merely because the arguer is a man. That is, Singh is dismissing a view because of a characteristic of the arguer (i.e., his sex) rather than via a careful examination of the arguer’s argument (i.e., its merits or lack thereof).

But this is to attack the messenger instead of the message, which is a logical sin—the ad hominem fallacy.

Problem 2

Mr. Singh’s claim is also self-refuting.

A self-refuting claim includes itself in its field of reference but fails to satisfy its own criteria of truthfulness or rational acceptability.

Here is an example: “There are no truths.” Hmmm. If it's true, then it's not true. It self-refutes.

Another example (spoken by me): “I cannot speak a word of English.” Get the picture?

Back to our NDP leader. According to Mr. Singh, “A man has no place in a discussion around a woman’s right to choose [abortion].”

Let's think: a MAN is saying that a MAN’s voice doesn’t count on an issue, i.e., the issue HE is talking about. Well, if this is true, then Mr. Singh—a man—has no place in this discussion, and so his claim should be dismissed.

I like Mr. Singh and I intend no disrespect to him. Nevertheless, I think his claim is deeply problematic from the perspective of logic—and I hope that my pointing this out will help elevate the quality of reasoning in the public discussion about abortion.

I hope, too, that pro-life MPs will get elected.

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is a retired philosophy professor (Providence University College) who lives in Steinbach, Manitoba.

For additional thought:

• Untangling popular “pro-choice” claims and arguments concerning abortion
• Aborting Trudeau's (other) abortion argument

Self-defeat, self-deceit, and freedom of speech

SO MUCH PUN.COM

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, May 1, 2014

Self-defeat, self-deceit, and freedom of speech

I shake my head in disbelief at logically self-defeating statements, especially when behind the logical self-defeat there lurks a self-deceit that squelches dissent. The antidote? Truth-seeking use of reason coupled with respectful exercise of free speech.

The following examples (which I've stumbled across over the years) will clarify.

“There is no truth.” Umm. Is this true? I suspect that the person saying this is deluded about and hiding from—you guessed it—truth.

“Language does not communicate truth.” Oh really? If it's true, then it's false. If it's false, well, then language does communicate truth.

“All observation is theory-laden,” and so, it is sometimes (often) implied, all observations should be dismissed as biased. Okay, but isn't this an observation? And so isn't it biased, too? Surely, at least some observations are informed by, and actually get at, the real world—and thereby allow us to test against bias.

“Don't be judgmental.” If set out as a condemnation (as is typical nowadays), then is this a case of being judgmental? Surely it is. As such, it's a judgment pretending not to be a judgment. It would be better to encourage an accurate and wise judgment.

“Our organizational culture reflects diversity and inclusiveness.” This is web/software organization Mozilla's justification for pushing CEO Brendan Eich out from his job. Eich had supported—gasp!—traditional (non-gay) marriage. Apparently, Mozilla's pretense concerning “diversity” and “inclusiveness” excludes those who differ.

“Don't be intolerant.” Yes, this seems tolerant. But it isn't. It's a case of intolerance of intolerance—and thinking otherwise is self-delusion.

For many persons the intolerance of intolerance presents an intellectual impasse, so I'll say more.

Recently a group of citizens from Weyburn, Saskatchewan (my hometown), attempted to block a U.S.-based critic of same-sex sex and same-sex marriage from speaking at a public meeting in Weyburn, a meeting to which the speaker was invited. (The speaker was detained temporarily by Canadian border officials at Regina airport, and was arrested later for speaking at University of Regina without invitation or permission.) The reality of the Weyburn group's intolerance was clearly lost on the group's members, who called themselves, ironically (and I'm not kidding), Intolerance Free Weyburn.

How do we get past the apparent impasse of the intolerance of intolerance? A first step is to realize that not all intolerance is bad and not all tolerance is good.

Intolerance of student cheating is good, and tolerance of student cheating is bad. Intolerance of drunk-driving is good, tolerance of drunk-driving is bad. Intolerance of child abuse is good, and tolerance of child abuse is bad.

The issue in the larger democratic, social realm is to figure out which is which: of what should we be tolerant, of what should we be intolerant?

How do we best figure this out?

I submit that it's via encouraging the exercise of free speech (done respectfully) to set out publicly accessible reasons (not mere in-house faith reasons) aimed at truth and the common good. And then build on that.

(This gives us grounds for thinking that shutting down freedom of speech à la Intolerance Free Weyburn is a bad form of intolerance.)

Surely, the free exchange of ideas—even deeply controversial ideas—done carefully for the sake of truth-seeking is what makes democracy great. Surely, respectful and open-minded discussions are crucially important for the preservation of liberty. Surely, mere disagreement does not equal hate.

Sometimes lurking behind logical self-defeat is self-deceit, and sometimes lurking behind “non-judgmentalism,” “diversity,” “inclusiveness,” and “tolerance” is an ideology that's grossly intolerant of dissent.

All this to say: We who live in a democratic society have a responsibility to discern what is true and good, express our findings freely, show respect to those with whom we disagree, plus urge those with whom we disagree to do likewise.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College.)

Ducks, hate, and logic (part 2)

Phil Robertson on "I am second"

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, February 6, 2014

Ducks, hate, and logic (part 2)

Much anger was expressed a few weeks ago in the media about Phil Robertson, the patriarch of Duck Dynasty (an extremely popular A&E television show), and his alleged anti-gay comments in Gentleman's Quarterly (GQ magazine). Robertson stated publicly, albeit bluntly and explicitly, that the Bible says same-sex sex is morally wrong—i.e., it's a sin, among other sins, including bestiality, heterosexual fornication and promiscuity, greed, drunkenness, slandering, and swindling.

In an earlier installment of this column (January 2, 2014) I addressed the oft-heard objection that Robertson equated and compared same-sex sex to bestiality, thereby diminishing the humanity of persons who engage in gay sex, thus inciting hatred toward them. I showed that this objection is false.

Today I examine the objection that setting out a moral objection to gay sex is, automatically, to engage in hate.

Clearly, for some angry critics it was assumed that Robertson's saying that same-sex sex is morally wrong is, because of the mere fact of saying same-sex sex is morally wrong, an instance of hatred.

But these critics should think carefully here.

If "saying X is morally wrong" is an instance of hatred, then "saying 'saying X is morally wrong' is morally wrong" is an instance of hatred, too.

It turns out that the view that all claims asserting moral wrongness are instances of hatred and thus morally wrong is a view that includes itself in its field of reference and thus self-defeats. The claim is guilty of the very thing it claims is wrong!

The claim, in other words, is attempting to take the moral high ground while at the same time destroying the moral ground on which it's standing.

Note for the sake of clarity: I am not saying that "saying X is morally wrong" is in fact an instance of hatred, at least it's not necessarily true that it is such an instance. Surely, and significantly, there is room to express moral views respectfully.

Think carefully about the if-then claim I set out. Here it is again: if "saying X is morally wrong" is an instance of hatred, then "saying 'saying X is morally wrong' is morally wrong" is an instance of hatred, too.

Above I have simply set out a conditional statement (an "if-then" statement) which is true even when the antecedent (the part immediately after the "if" and ending at the comma) is false. The interesting logical fact is that the conditional statement shows that those who do say "saying X is morally wrong" is an instance of hatred (i.e., they assert the antecedent to be true) have a serious problem on their hands: i.e., the consequent (the part immediately after the "then") has got to be true too.

But then this morally undermines the objectors' own view: if their view is true, it's morally wrong. Also, if their view is false, then, well, it's not true.

Contrary to what some angry critics would have us think, then, the simple fact is this: To set out an objection based on moral principle is NOT automatically to engage in hate.

The fact remains that it is possible to raise moral objections without engaging in hate—and this is what Phil Robertson has done.

All this to say, to (once again) paraphrase C. S. Lewis’s wise old professor in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe: “Logic! Why don’t they teach logic in schools these days?!”

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Science versus philosophy? (Part 1)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, February 12, 2009)

Science versus philosophy? (Part 1)
Some folks subscribe to the following statement: A claim is reasonable to believe only if it is a claim of science—so philosophical (and theological) claims should be dismissed.

The above view is known as strong scientism (hereafter, scientism). Here is one reason (of three) for not believing scientism: it’s a classic example of a self-refuting statement.

First, some clarifications.

A statement or claim has a field of reference: it’s about something. For example, the statement, “Cats are furry creatures,” is about cats.

Some statements include themselves in their field of reference. For example, the statement, “All printed English sentences contain letters of the alphabet,” refers to itself as well as other English sentences.

A self-refuting statement includes itself in its own field of reference but fails to satisfy its own criteria of truthfulness or rational acceptability. Consider these claims as examples: "All English sentences are less than three words long" (yes, count'em); "There are no truths" (an alleged truth); “Language can never communicate ideas” (think about it).

So far, so good.

Now, here are some claims of science: Each molecule of water consists of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen; energy equals mass times the speed of light squared; gold is soluble in aqua regia; the universe began 13.7 billion years ago; after 1,620 years approximately half the radium atoms in a given quantity of radium will have transmuted into radon atoms.

Okay, now consider scientism, the claim that, of all claims, only the claims of science are reasonable to believe.

Notice that the scientism claim includes itself in its own field of reference (because it’s a claim about claims). Notice, too, that this claim isn’t a claim of science per se (such as those in the list above having to do with H2O, E=mc2, etc.); rather, it’s a claim of a different order—it’s a claim about scientific claims.

But (and this is the crucial point), because scientism isn’t a claim of science—instead, it’s a claim about the claims of science—scientism isn’t reasonable. After all, scientism asserts that claims other than the claims of science are not reasonable. Hence, scientism self-refutes.

What, then, is scientism? Scientism is a philosophical claim. It’s a claim about what constitutes knowledge (in philosophical parlance, it’s an epistemological claim).

Think of it this way. Scientism asserts that the set of reasonable claims is exhausted by non-philosophical claims of the sort in the above-listed claims of science (the scientific findings); however, because scientism is not a member of the set of claims of science—i.e., scientism describes this set philosophically/abstractly "from the outside” (it is about/above the set, not in it)—scientism is, by its own criteria, not reasonable.

The upshot: As truly important and wonderful as science is, the realm of good reasoning and knowledge is not exhausted by it.

[Stay tuned for reasons 2 and 3.]

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.)