Who Designed the Designer? Debunking Dawkins' Objection

Below is the text from my recent Provf Talk, in case it's of interest to my readers. I'll provide a link to the video version when it becomes available.

Who Designed the Designer?

Debunking Dawkins’ Objection

By Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Providence University College

Provf Talks, November 24, 2016

I. Introduction

Good morning.

The well-known atheist Richard Dawkins was Professor for Public Understanding of Science at University of Oxford from 1995 until 2008.  Dawkins’ 2006 book The God Delusion has sold over 3 million copies and has been translated into over 30 languages.  The book has been and remains influential.  This past July on Steinbach’s Main Street, during Steinbach’s outdoor festival “Summer in the City,” I saw The God Delusion displayed at a kiosk sponsored by a group called HUMANISTS, ATHEISTS, AND AGNOSTICS OF MANITOBA.  The book was displayed almost as a holy book.  In the book’s crucial fourth chapter, Dawkins argues that the objection/ question—Who designed the designer?—blocks any reasonable inference to a designer.  In today’s Provf Talk I will argue that this important objection is a philosophical failure—a philosophical blunder.

First I will clarify the objection.  Then I will set out my critique.  Then I will consider a couple objections to my critique.

II. Clarifying the objection

It’s important to begin by noting that Dawkins acknowledges that there is a complexity to nature which looks designed.  Dawkins has famously stated this: “biology is the study of complex things that appear to have been designed for a purpose.” But, Dawkins emphasizes, the design is merely apparent.

According to Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection, appealing to an intelligent designer to explain nature’s complexity (i.e., its apparent design) is an explanatory failure. Why? Because it merely passes the explanatory buck. The intelligent designer hypothesis transfers the mystery of nature’s complexity, which is the puzzle to be explained, to the mystery of the designer’s complexity, which is a new puzzle to be explained. But this in turn generates another puzzle, i.e., the mystery of the complexity of the designer’s designer. And this generates another puzzle—the mystery of the complexity of the designer of the designer’s designer. And so on.

More specifically, Dawkins argues that because the complexity of the natural world (i.e., its apparent design) is highly improbable, and because the intelligent designer must be at least as complex as the complexity of the natural world, it follows that the intelligent designer must be at least as improbable as the natural world.

But, Dawkins continues, this is to explain one improbability by another improbability at least as great as, or greater than, the first improbability. What is worse (for the intelligent designer proponent), the question of the origin of the designer adds yet another layer of improbability to explain the additional complexity of the designer’s designer. Then the question of the complexity of the designer of the designer’s designer adds yet another layer of improbability. And so on, ad infinitum.

Because of this unending regress of additional improbabilities, Dawkins thinks that the God hypothesis is not a reasonable explanation for the apparent design found in nature. In fact, Dawkins thinks that his argument renders God extremely improbable. Dawkins concludes: “God almost certainly does not exist.” Thus, God is illusory.

Of course, the question arises: Is Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer argument logically sound?

III. Critique

I think Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer argument is not sound, for at least two reasons.

1. First, it relies on a false premise. It's false that the complexity of a designer makes a design hypothesis improbable. Intelligent designer explanations are accepted in science (and in everyday reasoning) even if the designer is complex: e.g., in archeology (to explain cave paintings and arrowheads), in cryptography (to explain codes), and in forensic science (to explain “who done it”).  In fact, in these sciences the designer is even more complex than the objects or phenomena explained, yet the designer hypothesis is legitimate.

Notice that if we were to accept Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection as a block to inferring a designer, then—to be logically consistent—the aforementioned explanations would not be legitimate.  But they are legitimate.  In archeology, the designer is more complex than the cave painting and arrowhead.  In cryptography, the designer is more complex than the code.  In forensic science, the designer is more complex than the murder weapon or event. Thus, it’s false that the complexity of a designer makes a designer hypothesis improbable.

2.Second, the issue of the complexity and origin of a designer simply has no bearing on the process of determining whether something is designed. It's not relevant. Consider the science known as SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence). In SETI the intelligent design hypothesis is allowed to explain ET's communications (if they were to occur); moreover—and significantly—whether the alleged message is truly a message from ET depends not at all on our knowledge of ET's complexity or origin, but solely on whether the message displays design.

How do we discern design?  Think about some strings of letters in a Scrabble game. Let's say I'm playing Scrabble with my family and I leave the room to answer a phone call and when I return I see these letters: “Dad, it's your turn to buy pizza.” To discern design, two conditions should be satisfied. We determine whether (1) the thing is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes, given what we know from empirical experience of the capacities of non-intelligent causes, and (2) the thing is strongly analogous to things we know (also) from empirical experience to be designed by intelligent causes. Surely, I discern, rightly, that my family wants pizza! The letters organizing themselves on their own into “Dad, it’s your turn to buy pizza” is highly improbable, and that particular string of letters is highly analogous to things done by known intelligent causes. Of course, it's possible I am mistaken, but it's reasonable to think I'm not.

Now consider the message from outer space in the 1997 movie Contact (starring Jodie Foster and Matthew McConaughey, a film adaptation of agnostic Carl Sagan’s 1985 novel by the same title). Again, the way to discern whether something is designed is to determine whether (1) the thing is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes, given what we know from empirical experience of the capacities of non-intelligent causes, and (2) the thing is strongly analogous to things we know (also) from empirical experience to be designed by intelligent causes.

In Contact the message that signals intelligent causation consists of a repeating list of the prime numbers up to and including 101.  Recall that a prime number is any positive integer greater than 1 and is exactly divisible only by 1 and itself: 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29….to 101.  Picking out and listing prime numbers is improbable without intelligence. We know this.  Picking out and listing prime numbers is strongly analogous to what intelligent causes do. We know this too—it’s what mathematicians and scientists like to do in their spare time!  (Yes, I’m thinking of Prov’s resident mathematician Yinka Bammeke, Prov’s resident biologist Rebecca Dielschneider, and Prov’s resident social scientists Val Hiebert, Dennis Hiebert, and Morgan Mulenga.)

Back to ET. So, the discernment—the inference—of intelligent design from the list of prime numbers up to 101 is due to these two conditions being satisfied: (1) the thing or pattern is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes, and (2) it is strongly analogous to things we know to be designed by intelligent causes.  Now, notice this: The complexity or origin of the designer, in this case ET, has no bearing on the inference. It is simply not relevant to satisfying the two conditions!

Who designed ET?  Who designed the intelligent cause? Who designed the designer?  Perhaps the designer just is (and always has been).  Or not.  Perhaps the designer is complex.  Or not.  The point here is that we need not understand the nature of a designer (i.e., whether it’s complex or not) or even the origin of a designer (whether it has a designer or not) to determine that something has been designed and, by implication, that a designer exists.  We need only to discern the satisfaction of the two conditions: (1) the thing is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes, and (2) it is strongly analogous to things we know to be designed by intelligent causes.  Therefore, as an alleged block to discerning a designer from its designed effects, the who-designed-the-designer objection is beside the point—it’s not relevant.

IV. Objections to my critique

At this juncture, two objections might be set out to my critique.

1. First, one might be tempted to argue that God is simple and so the God explanation does not fall prey to Dawkins’ objection concerning complexity.

In reply, I’ll just say this. I think that the doctrine of God’s simplicity is an important (and difficult) philosophical and theological doctrine, and should be studied for the sake of achieving greater knowledge of God.  However, I think that such a project would be lost on the likes of Dawkins and so would have little apologetical value.  More importantly, I think it would be a rabbit trail. The fact remains (as I have argued) that whether the designer is simple or complex is irrelevant to the question of discerning whether something is designed, whether by God or a God-like being—i.e., the issue is merely whether the object or phenomenon in question displays the marks of intelligent design.

2. Second, one might object that in my examples in which we clearly detect design—e.g., archaeology, cryptography, forensic science, Scrabble—we model the detectable design on known intelligent causes, i.e., us; but it’s not reasonable to do this sort of modelling with any kind of supernatural intelligent agent such as God.  God, or so it might be objected, is too different from us.

In reply, in the examples of archaeology, cryptology, forensic science, and Scrabble—yes—we are modeling the design inference on known intelligent causes, which happen to be us. But the fact remains that with SETI (search for extraterrestrial intelligence) things get interesting. In SETI we don’t know whether ET is a natural agent or god-like being or angel or something else—yet we permit the discernment of design independent of modeling ET’s mind. We use known intelligence, i.e., ours. If this is reasonable in SETI, which it is, it’s reasonable elsewhere. To say it isn’t reasonable elsewhere is to assume that intelligence other than human intelligence can never be modeled on the known effects of human intelligence. But if the issue is whether such intelligence is in fact limited solely to us, to forward this as an objection is to assume what’s at issue—it commits the fallacy of question-begging. It assumes as settled that which is at issue.  It assumes as settled that there aren't other intelligences somewhat like ours, when that's what we are wondering about. It puts the cart before the horse. It assumes the outcome of an investigation before the investigation begins. We should look and see, and let the evidence lead us.

Maybe there is a Mind or God who made us in God’s image and so we are able, using empirical investigation, to discern this Mind’s empirical effects in the created order. Recall that even Dawkins acknowledges that there is in fact apparent design in nature. Significantly, then, because Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection fails, it does not preclude our discernment of the effects of such a God.

V. Conclusion and recap

Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection has two major flaws: it is based on a false premise, and it is basically irrelevant.  In other words, the objection that purports to show us that God is a delusion is (to put it mildly) a philosophical blunder.

Significantly, nature’s apparent design remains—and continues to suggest an Intelligent Designer. As even Dawkins should admit.

Thank you.


Further reading:

• Hendrik van der Breggen, "Review of The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins," Journal of the International Society of Christian Apologetics, Volume 3, Number 1 (2010): 119-122.
• Hendrik van der Breggen, "Dawkins' Logico-Philosophical Blunder: A Reply to a Dawkins Apologist," Journal of the International Society of Christian Apologetics, Volume 2, Number 1 (2009): 41-48.

Update (January 3, 2017)

Here is the video (17 minutes): Provf Talk

Universe's Fine-Tuning vs. Anthropic Objection

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, October 8, 2009)

Universe’s Fine-tuning vs. Anthropic Objection

Contemporary science tells us that the initial conditions of the universe’s coming into being are exquisitely fine-tuned for life, so much so that many thoughtful people conclude that this fine-tuning is evidence of a supernatural intelligent designer.

The idea is this: Because there are an astronomical number of conditions that have to be “just right” for life to exist, and because life (especially human life) has intrinsic moral worth, it very much seems that there is an orchestration of factors (instead of just a huge number of mere coincidences) aimed to bring about an end or value—and this smacks of intelligent design.

Thus, the universe’s fine-tuning for life provides one more sub-argument for a cumulative case argument for God’s existence.

However, some critics, such as Richard Dawkins (author of The God Delusion and professor of the public understanding of science at Oxford University), object to the fine-tuning argument on the basis of what is sometimes called the Anthropic Principle.

According to this objection, it is not surprising that we observe the large number of apparent coincidences which make the universe's initial conditions conducive to life. Why isn't it surprising? Because, Dawkins and company point out, those conditions obviously constitute the set of conditions required for our existence. If those coincidences didn’t occur as they did, then we wouldn’t be around to observe them, let alone think about them.

Therefore (so the objection goes) there is no puzzle or mystery that suggests intelligent design. In fact, Dawkins asserts, the Anthropic Principle “provides a rational, design-free explanation.”

The objection sounds good and persuades many, but is it sound? That is to ask, is the objection rationally acceptable?

We should think not.

Consider the following thought experiment, set out by the philosopher William Lane Craig (in a debate at Queen’s University in the early 1990s): "You're dragged before a firing squad of a hundred trained marksmen with rifles aimed at your heart; you hear the command; you hear the roar of the guns; and you see that you're still alive, that they all missed [i.e., you see one hundred 'apparent coincidences']. You say: 'That's not surprising, because their missing is obviously required for me to be alive.'"

Now, Craig astutely points out: "The fact that you are making the observation is not surprising given that they missed. But the 'coincidence' of missing needs explanation!"

Similarly, the fact that we are observing the large (astronomical) number of "apparent coincidences" which led to life in the universe isn't surprising given that these coincidences occurred. But the incredible life-sustaining/life-generating "coincidences" themselves still call out for explanation!

Craig adds (in an academic article on the same topic, apparently not read by Dawkins): "Certainly we should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence. But it does not follow that we should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with our existence."

In other words, merely pointing to the conditions required for our existence, as Dawkins and company do, does not explain those conditions. The conditions that are favourable or “propitious” (Dawkins’ word) to our existence continue to call out for explanation. What is worse (for Dawkins and company), merely asserting that our capacity to notice these conditions is the result of some required favourable conditions doesn’t provide any explanation of the conditions themselves, let alone a “rational” explanation or a “rational design-free explanation.”

Here is the point: Dawkins and company confuse pointing to a condition with explaining that condition, but the former is not an instance of the latter.

Think about it. Yes, the conditions that are favourable or “propitious” to our existence are necessary for us to be alive and able to notice those conditions. But the question remains: Why do those conditions exist? Pointing out that the conditions are needed for life and observation is interesting, to be sure, but leaving it at that doesn’t account for their existence in the first place, which is the issue at hand.

Thus, the fine-tuning argument is untouched by the so-called Anthropic objection. The universe’s initial conditions, which are in fact exquisitely fine-tuned for life, continue to point to an intelligent designer.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.)

The Straw Man Fallacy

APOLOGIABy Hendrik van der Breggen

(The Carillon, August 13, 2009)

The Straw Man Fallacy
A fallacy is a mistake in reasoning or argument. Some fallacies are so common that they have been given a name. The straw man fallacy occurs when a person criticizes a weak position that an author did not really hold and then concludes—on the basis of the criticized misrepresentation—that the author’s real position is logically flawed.

In other words, instead of the real flesh-and-blood version of the opponent’s view or argument, the critic sets out a straw scarecrow or fake target-practice version of the opponent’s view or argument, and then proceeds to knock down the straw version as if it were the real McCoy.

But finding a logical flaw in a misrepresentation isn’t the same as finding a logical flaw in the original argument.

Some instances of the straw man fallacy are easy to spot. Jane says to John: “Valentine’s Day is overrated, so please don’t purchase me any expensive gifts.” John later tells Jake: “Jane thinks Valentine’s Day exploits men, so she should be okay with me not giving her anything.” Clearly, John has misrepresented Jane’s view (and John may be in some serious trouble).

But other instances of the straw man fallacy are not so easy to spot.

In the preface of an academic book criticizing Intelligent Design theory, Richard Dawkins (Oxford University’s professor for the public understanding of science) writes the following as a summary representation and dismissal of the case for Intelligent Design: “[Intelligent Design] leaps straight from the difficulty—‘I can’t see any solution to the problem’—to the cop-out—‘Therefore a Higher Power must have done it.’” [Richard Dawkins, "Foreword," in Niall Shanks, God, the Devil, and Darwin: A Critique of Intelligent Design Theory (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), ix.]

In other words, Dawkins characterizes Intelligent Design (ID) as an argument from ignorance or gaps in our knowledge: I don’t know how X happened, therefore X must have been due to an intelligent designer—and, of course, such an argument is weak (a “cop-out”).

If this is what ID actually does, then Dawkins would have a point. Dawkins’ point is beside the point, however, because he misrepresents the view he is criticizing.

In my study of ID literature (for part of my PhD), I found that ID proponents do not argue, “I can’t see any solution to the problem…therefore a Higher Power did it.” Rather, they argue in a much more sophisticated manner, as follows: (1) The scientific community knows that, after years of investigating X and learning about nature’s capacities regarding X, there is much positive evidence for thinking that non-intelligent causes are not able to produce X; (2) the more we investigate X, the more we know that the structure of X bears features that closely resemble the effects of known intelligent causes; (3) therefore, in view of what we know, it is reasonable to think that an intelligent cause is responsible for X; (4) of course, we could be mistaken, but this is where the known evidence presently points us.

In other words, and contrary to what Dawkins would have us believe, ID’s appeal to an intelligent cause is based on what we know, not on what we don’t know. It’s based (tentatively) on positive knowledge, not on knowledge gaps or ignorance.

In the above case, then, Dawkins commits the straw man fallacy: he criticizes ID by misrepresenting it as a feeble straw caricature.

Whether we agree with Intelligent Design or not, this principle of careful logical thinking remains: If we are going to critique a view, we should at least represent it accurately. No straw men allowed.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Who designed the designer? (Part 2)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen

(The Carillon, December 11, 2008)

Who designed the designer? (Part 2)

The question—Who designed the designer?—is set out by Richard Dawkins (in The God Delusion) as an objection to God’s existence.

According to Dawkins, explaining nature’s improbable complexity (that is, nature’s apparent design) by appealing to a designer is to appeal to something more improbable than nature, because the designer would have to be more complex than what it explains. Moreover, the designer would have to be explained by the designer’s designer, and so on. Thus, according to Dawkins, God’s existence is highly improbable.

Here is another reason for thinking that this objection fails: it’s based on a false assumption.

Dawkins assumes that the complexity of a designer makes a designer hypothesis improbable. But consider this: Intelligent cause/designer explanations are accepted in science even if the designer is complex—e.g., in archeology (to explain cave paintings and arrowheads), in cryptography (to explain codes), and in forensic science (to explain whodunnit). In fact, in these sciences the designer is even more complex than the objects or phenomena explained, yet the designer hypothesis is legitimate.

If (for argument’s sake) we were to accept Dawkins’ assumption as true, then, to be logically consistent, the aforementioned explanations would not be legitimate. But they are legitimate. So Dawkins’ assumption—that the complexity of a designer makes a design hypothesis improbable—is false.

At this juncture, Dawkins might object (as he does in The God Delusion) that it is not reasonable to make a design inference in a more general or ultimate way, i.e., from the evidence of the physical universe to an intelligent designer such as God.

Why not? Because, according to Dawkins, ultimate causes should be simple and non-intelligent, as in neo-Darwinian evolution, where causes are non-intelligent as well as simpler than their complex effects.

Significantly, however (and unnoticed by Dawkins), this is in effect to assume that simple unintelligent causes constitute what is ultimately real. But if we are actually trying to let the universe’s evidence of apparent design (instead of our assumptions) tell us whether or not there is an ultimately real intelligent designer, then Dawkins’ assumption is at issue!

In other words, Dawkins incurs the fallacy of question-begging (a.k.a. circular reasoning): he assumes as proven that which is at issue, and he unwittingly sneaks this assumption into his argument.

Dawkins, then, assumes the outcome of his investigation right from the start, instead of letting the evidence of the investigation decide the outcome. God or no God, this is a logical sin.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.)

Who designed the designer? (Part 1)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, November 27, 2008)

Who designed the designer? (Part 1)

The question—Who designed the designer?—has been famously set out by Richard Dawkins (in The God Delusion) as an objection to God’s existence.

According to Dawkins, explaining nature’s improbable complexity (that is, nature’s apparent design) by appealing to a designer is to appeal to something more improbable than nature, because the designer would have to be more complex than what it explains. Moreover, the designer would have to be explained by an even more complex and improbable explanation—i.e. the designer’s designer—and so on. Thus, Dawkins thinks, God’s existence is highly improbable.

Here is one reason (of several) for thinking that Dawkins’ objection fails: It’s irrelevant.

The issue of the complexity and origin of a designer simply has no bearing on the process of determining whether something is designed.

Consider the science known as SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence). In SETI the intelligent design hypothesis is allowed to explain ET’s communications (if they were to occur). Moreover—and significantly—whether the alleged message is truly a message from ET depends not at all on our knowledge of ET’s complexity or origin, but solely on whether the message displays design.

How do we discern design? Think about some long words in a Scrabble game, or consider some sophisticated computer software. Or imagine, say, the discovery of strange complex machinery on Mars. Or recall the messages from outer space in the movie Contact.

The way to discern evidence of whether something is designed (or not) is to determine whether the thing satisfies two criteria: (1) that its existence is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes alone, given what we know from empirical experience of the capacities of non-intelligent causes; and (2) that it is strongly analogous to things we know (also) from empirical experience to be designed by intelligent causes. (So this is an argument based on what we know; this isn’t an argument from ignorance or gaps in our knowledge.)

Who designed the designer? Perhaps the designer just is (and always has been). Or not. Perhaps the designer is complex (more complex than what it has designed). Or not.

The point is this: We are not required to understand the nature of a designer (i.e., whether it is complex or not) or even the origin of a designer (whether it has a designer or not) to determine—rationally and empirically—that something has been designed. We just need evidence of design.

Therefore, as an alleged block to discerning a designer from its designed effects, Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection is beside the point. It’s a logical blunder.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, located in Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada.)