Who Designed the Designer? Debunking Dawkins' Objection

Below is the text from my recent Provf Talk, in case it's of interest to my readers. I'll provide a link to the video version when it becomes available.

Who Designed the Designer?

Debunking Dawkins’ Objection

By Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Providence University College

Provf Talks, November 24, 2016

I. Introduction

Good morning.

The well-known atheist Richard Dawkins was Professor for Public Understanding of Science at University of Oxford from 1995 until 2008.  Dawkins’ 2006 book The God Delusion has sold over 3 million copies and has been translated into over 30 languages.  The book has been and remains influential.  This past July on Steinbach’s Main Street, during Steinbach’s outdoor festival “Summer in the City,” I saw The God Delusion displayed at a kiosk sponsored by a group called HUMANISTS, ATHEISTS, AND AGNOSTICS OF MANITOBA.  The book was displayed almost as a holy book.  In the book’s crucial fourth chapter, Dawkins argues that the objection/ question—Who designed the designer?—blocks any reasonable inference to a designer.  In today’s Provf Talk I will argue that this important objection is a philosophical failure—a philosophical blunder.

First I will clarify the objection.  Then I will set out my critique.  Then I will consider a couple objections to my critique.

II. Clarifying the objection

It’s important to begin by noting that Dawkins acknowledges that there is a complexity to nature which looks designed.  Dawkins has famously stated this: “biology is the study of complex things that appear to have been designed for a purpose.” But, Dawkins emphasizes, the design is merely apparent.

According to Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection, appealing to an intelligent designer to explain nature’s complexity (i.e., its apparent design) is an explanatory failure. Why? Because it merely passes the explanatory buck. The intelligent designer hypothesis transfers the mystery of nature’s complexity, which is the puzzle to be explained, to the mystery of the designer’s complexity, which is a new puzzle to be explained. But this in turn generates another puzzle, i.e., the mystery of the complexity of the designer’s designer. And this generates another puzzle—the mystery of the complexity of the designer of the designer’s designer. And so on.

More specifically, Dawkins argues that because the complexity of the natural world (i.e., its apparent design) is highly improbable, and because the intelligent designer must be at least as complex as the complexity of the natural world, it follows that the intelligent designer must be at least as improbable as the natural world.

But, Dawkins continues, this is to explain one improbability by another improbability at least as great as, or greater than, the first improbability. What is worse (for the intelligent designer proponent), the question of the origin of the designer adds yet another layer of improbability to explain the additional complexity of the designer’s designer. Then the question of the complexity of the designer of the designer’s designer adds yet another layer of improbability. And so on, ad infinitum.

Because of this unending regress of additional improbabilities, Dawkins thinks that the God hypothesis is not a reasonable explanation for the apparent design found in nature. In fact, Dawkins thinks that his argument renders God extremely improbable. Dawkins concludes: “God almost certainly does not exist.” Thus, God is illusory.

Of course, the question arises: Is Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer argument logically sound?

III. Critique

I think Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer argument is not sound, for at least two reasons.

1. First, it relies on a false premise. It's false that the complexity of a designer makes a design hypothesis improbable. Intelligent designer explanations are accepted in science (and in everyday reasoning) even if the designer is complex: e.g., in archeology (to explain cave paintings and arrowheads), in cryptography (to explain codes), and in forensic science (to explain “who done it”).  In fact, in these sciences the designer is even more complex than the objects or phenomena explained, yet the designer hypothesis is legitimate.

Notice that if we were to accept Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection as a block to inferring a designer, then—to be logically consistent—the aforementioned explanations would not be legitimate.  But they are legitimate.  In archeology, the designer is more complex than the cave painting and arrowhead.  In cryptography, the designer is more complex than the code.  In forensic science, the designer is more complex than the murder weapon or event. Thus, it’s false that the complexity of a designer makes a designer hypothesis improbable.

2.Second, the issue of the complexity and origin of a designer simply has no bearing on the process of determining whether something is designed. It's not relevant. Consider the science known as SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence). In SETI the intelligent design hypothesis is allowed to explain ET's communications (if they were to occur); moreover—and significantly—whether the alleged message is truly a message from ET depends not at all on our knowledge of ET's complexity or origin, but solely on whether the message displays design.

How do we discern design?  Think about some strings of letters in a Scrabble game. Let's say I'm playing Scrabble with my family and I leave the room to answer a phone call and when I return I see these letters: “Dad, it's your turn to buy pizza.” To discern design, two conditions should be satisfied. We determine whether (1) the thing is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes, given what we know from empirical experience of the capacities of non-intelligent causes, and (2) the thing is strongly analogous to things we know (also) from empirical experience to be designed by intelligent causes. Surely, I discern, rightly, that my family wants pizza! The letters organizing themselves on their own into “Dad, it’s your turn to buy pizza” is highly improbable, and that particular string of letters is highly analogous to things done by known intelligent causes. Of course, it's possible I am mistaken, but it's reasonable to think I'm not.

Now consider the message from outer space in the 1997 movie Contact (starring Jodie Foster and Matthew McConaughey, a film adaptation of agnostic Carl Sagan’s 1985 novel by the same title). Again, the way to discern whether something is designed is to determine whether (1) the thing is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes, given what we know from empirical experience of the capacities of non-intelligent causes, and (2) the thing is strongly analogous to things we know (also) from empirical experience to be designed by intelligent causes.

In Contact the message that signals intelligent causation consists of a repeating list of the prime numbers up to and including 101.  Recall that a prime number is any positive integer greater than 1 and is exactly divisible only by 1 and itself: 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29….to 101.  Picking out and listing prime numbers is improbable without intelligence. We know this.  Picking out and listing prime numbers is strongly analogous to what intelligent causes do. We know this too—it’s what mathematicians and scientists like to do in their spare time!  (Yes, I’m thinking of Prov’s resident mathematician Yinka Bammeke, Prov’s resident biologist Rebecca Dielschneider, and Prov’s resident social scientists Val Hiebert, Dennis Hiebert, and Morgan Mulenga.)

Back to ET. So, the discernment—the inference—of intelligent design from the list of prime numbers up to 101 is due to these two conditions being satisfied: (1) the thing or pattern is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes, and (2) it is strongly analogous to things we know to be designed by intelligent causes.  Now, notice this: The complexity or origin of the designer, in this case ET, has no bearing on the inference. It is simply not relevant to satisfying the two conditions!

Who designed ET?  Who designed the intelligent cause? Who designed the designer?  Perhaps the designer just is (and always has been).  Or not.  Perhaps the designer is complex.  Or not.  The point here is that we need not understand the nature of a designer (i.e., whether it’s complex or not) or even the origin of a designer (whether it has a designer or not) to determine that something has been designed and, by implication, that a designer exists.  We need only to discern the satisfaction of the two conditions: (1) the thing is highly improbable via non-intelligent causes, and (2) it is strongly analogous to things we know to be designed by intelligent causes.  Therefore, as an alleged block to discerning a designer from its designed effects, the who-designed-the-designer objection is beside the point—it’s not relevant.

IV. Objections to my critique

At this juncture, two objections might be set out to my critique.

1. First, one might be tempted to argue that God is simple and so the God explanation does not fall prey to Dawkins’ objection concerning complexity.

In reply, I’ll just say this. I think that the doctrine of God’s simplicity is an important (and difficult) philosophical and theological doctrine, and should be studied for the sake of achieving greater knowledge of God.  However, I think that such a project would be lost on the likes of Dawkins and so would have little apologetical value.  More importantly, I think it would be a rabbit trail. The fact remains (as I have argued) that whether the designer is simple or complex is irrelevant to the question of discerning whether something is designed, whether by God or a God-like being—i.e., the issue is merely whether the object or phenomenon in question displays the marks of intelligent design.

2. Second, one might object that in my examples in which we clearly detect design—e.g., archaeology, cryptography, forensic science, Scrabble—we model the detectable design on known intelligent causes, i.e., us; but it’s not reasonable to do this sort of modelling with any kind of supernatural intelligent agent such as God.  God, or so it might be objected, is too different from us.

In reply, in the examples of archaeology, cryptology, forensic science, and Scrabble—yes—we are modeling the design inference on known intelligent causes, which happen to be us. But the fact remains that with SETI (search for extraterrestrial intelligence) things get interesting. In SETI we don’t know whether ET is a natural agent or god-like being or angel or something else—yet we permit the discernment of design independent of modeling ET’s mind. We use known intelligence, i.e., ours. If this is reasonable in SETI, which it is, it’s reasonable elsewhere. To say it isn’t reasonable elsewhere is to assume that intelligence other than human intelligence can never be modeled on the known effects of human intelligence. But if the issue is whether such intelligence is in fact limited solely to us, to forward this as an objection is to assume what’s at issue—it commits the fallacy of question-begging. It assumes as settled that which is at issue.  It assumes as settled that there aren't other intelligences somewhat like ours, when that's what we are wondering about. It puts the cart before the horse. It assumes the outcome of an investigation before the investigation begins. We should look and see, and let the evidence lead us.

Maybe there is a Mind or God who made us in God’s image and so we are able, using empirical investigation, to discern this Mind’s empirical effects in the created order. Recall that even Dawkins acknowledges that there is in fact apparent design in nature. Significantly, then, because Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection fails, it does not preclude our discernment of the effects of such a God.

V. Conclusion and recap

Dawkins’ who-designed-the-designer objection has two major flaws: it is based on a false premise, and it is basically irrelevant.  In other words, the objection that purports to show us that God is a delusion is (to put it mildly) a philosophical blunder.

Significantly, nature’s apparent design remains—and continues to suggest an Intelligent Designer. As even Dawkins should admit.

Thank you.


Further reading:

• Hendrik van der Breggen, "Review of The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins," Journal of the International Society of Christian Apologetics, Volume 3, Number 1 (2010): 119-122.
• Hendrik van der Breggen, "Dawkins' Logico-Philosophical Blunder: A Reply to a Dawkins Apologist," Journal of the International Society of Christian Apologetics, Volume 2, Number 1 (2009): 41-48.

Update (January 3, 2017)

Here is the video (17 minutes): Provf Talk

Origins, Science, and the Bible (part 2)



ALMA radio telescope, Chile

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

Origins, Science, Bible
(part 2)

Today, I want to think about some philosophical matters that are relevant to the overall conversation about origins, science, and the Bible. More specifically, I will argue that God’s revelation via nature and God’s revelation via Scripture have domains which overlap.

To make my case, I will do two things. First, I will question the limitation placed on questions typically handed to science (how?) and to theology (why? who?). Second, I will point to some areas of overlap.

1. Questions

Typically, science is understood as answering questions having to do with how. How does the world work? How do material forces operate? Science has been extremely successful in answering these questions, allowing us to understand the laws of nature and thereby improve life via technology.

In my studies in philosophy of science, however, I have noticed that how questions don’t exhaust the sorts of questions/ issues addressed by the sciences. Some sciences also address that issues.

For example, astrophysics deals with, among other things, whether or not it is the case that the universe (i.e., all physical matter/energy, space, time) began.

Also, astrophysics deals with, among other things, the question of whether or not it is the case that the universe’s initial conditions are “fine-tuned” to be conducive to subsequent life (whether subsequent life wholly evolved via chemical and biological evolution, was wholly specially created, or was specially created with some degree of subsequent evolution).

Also, the science of SETI (search for extraterrestrial intelligence) deals with whether or not it is the case that a signal from space is due to an intelligent cause, without knowing how an intelligent cause works, without knowing what its nature is, and even without knowing whether it has a designer or not.

In my studies of the Bible I have noticed that the questions of who—e.g., Who is God? Who are we?—and the questions of why—e.g., Why did God create? Why are we here? Why do we do evil?—don't exhaust the sorts of questions/ issues addressed by the Bible. The Bible also addresses that issues.

For example, Genesis 1:1 says “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” Whatever else Genesis tells us about who God is and why God created, Genesis 1:1 lets us know that God caused the beginning of the universe and that the universe began.

Hebrews 11:3 clarifies Genesis by letting us know that “the universe was created by the word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things that are visible.”

(Yes, Hebrews says “by faith we understand that…,” but the revealed truth that X is the case is of interest here. Also, a prior verse in Hebrews says “faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.” It seems, then, that this view of faith needn’t rule out observation and good reasoning to help us have assurance and conviction, especially when Psalm 19:1-2 tells us that “The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands. Day after day they pour forth speech; night after night they display knowledge.”)

Also, John 1:1-3 tells us that “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God… All things were made through him….”

Also, a couple of other passages of Scripture tell us that time had a beginning. For example, 2 Timothy 1:9: “This grace was given us in Christ Jesus before the beginning of time” (italics added). Also, Titus 1:2: “[We have] eternal life, which God, who does not lie, promised before the beginning of time” (italics added).

Clearly, then, science deals with more than how questions, and the Bible deals with more than who or why questions: both science and the Bible also deal with issues of that—i.e., that something is the case.

2. Overlap

But this means that sometimes there’s an overlap between that which nature reveals to be the case and that which Scripture reveals to be the case. So, if the Bible is true, then sometimes our reason and observation of the world should allow us to discern at least some of God’s activities in nature which have also been revealed in Scripture.

Interestingly, the evidence of the big bang beginning of space, time, and matter/ energy seems to allow us to discern via reason and observation what has also been revealed in Scripture: i.e., that the universe—all matter/energy, space, and time—began.

(I’m here thinking of William Lane Craig’s many works, including his book, co-authored with atheist Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology [Oxford University Press, 1993], and more recently Craig's books Reasonable Faith [Crossway, 2008) and On Guard [Cook, 2010].)

Interestingly, the evidence of the universe’s fine-tuning for life seems to allow us to discern via reason and observation what has also been revealed in Scripture: i.e., that the universe displays effects of an intelligence.

(I’m here thinking of Robin Collins’ work that will be presented in his upcoming book The Well-designed Universe: God, Fine-tuning, and the Laws of Nature. See too the readable summary of the evidence for fine-tuning over at the BioLogos website.)

Interestingly, the evidence of the living cell (e.g., DNA) seems to allow us to discern via reason and observation what has been revealed in Scripture: i.e., that the making of life requires some sort of information input ("word") that smacks of intelligence and non-physicality.

(I’m here thinking of Stephen C. Meyer’s book Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design [Harper, 2009].)

It seems, then, that if we widen our awareness of the sorts of questions/ issues addressed by the sciences (not just how, but also that), and if we widen our awareness of the sorts of questions/ issues addressed by the Bible (not just who and why, but also that), we can thereby notice that the Bible’s special revelation concerning the nature is confirmed when we examine nature.

3. Conclusion

In closing, a comment from mathematician and philosopher of science John Lennox is appropriate. (Lennox, who has debated the popular atheist Richard Dawkins, is someone whose philosophical work I greatly respect and whose work pretty much makes the same points I’ve set out above.)

Lennox writes: “I am not, of course, claiming that the Bible can inform every branch of science, but I am claiming that there are certain fundamental points of convergence of such immense significance for our understanding of the universe and ourselves that it is worth pointing them out. Such convergences between the Bible and contemporary science add to the Bible’s credibility in a skeptical world—as Scripture itself would warrant us in thinking (Rom. 1:19-20).” (John Lennox, Seven Days That Divide the World: The Beginning according to Genesis and Science [Zondervan, 2011], 142.)

This is not to say that we should use the Bible as a science textbook, but it is to say that we should let the convergence points inform theology (by suggesting some interpretations of Scripture to be better than others) and that we should let the convergence points inform science (by suggesting possible lines of further scientific inquiry).

It is also to say that the project of connecting the dots between science (when done properly) and Scripture (when interpreted properly) belongs to philosophy and theology, and that these connections (when clear) can serve the church's tasks of apologetics and evangelism—to help point people to the God who became flesh in Jesus.

Reason and observation have an important role in discerning God’s revelations in the world. As a Christian who is a philosopher with an interest in apologetics, I find this exciting.

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College.

Origins, Science, and the Bible (part 1)

Origins, Science, and the Bible (part 1)

"The Ancient of Days" (1794) by William Blake

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, February 27, 2014

Origins, Science, and the Bible (part 1)

I didn’t see the recent debate between atheistic evolutionist Bill Nye ("the science guy") and six-day-young-earth creationist Ken Ham, but based on what I’ve read about the debate (e.g., see my colleague Patrick Franklin's blog), and based on my background knowledge concerning Nye and Ham, it's clear that the Nye-versus-Ham debate was much too narrow in its approaches to the origins issues. Atheistic evolution and six-day-young-earth creationism are located at the extreme ends of a continuum that has several more models in between. Still, I think that debates are good to spur on careful thinking.

As for me, I favour those models that at least allow the intelligent design hypothesis into the scientific explanatory toolkit to compete as an account for any features in the universe which smack of intelligent causes, if the features can be properly discerned as such on the basis of public evidence and careful use of reason—i.e., on the basis of careful science—whether the universe is old, young, or somewhere in between (I believe it’s old). 

Though I think that the various (non-atheist) evolutionary theories are logically compatible with God (as a means whereby God creates), I have doubts about whether they actually do a good job of accounting for (a) life's origin and (b) the whole of life’s subsequent diversity—but I'm no expert on this, so I'll let the scientists slug it out. 

I also favour an understanding of the Genesis account of the Bible that doesn't take a young-earth, literal six 24-hour day interpretation as the only reasonable interpretation. It seems to me that the text is open to other interpretations, which are at least as reasonable, if not more reasonable. 

Today, I don’t want to take issue with any (other) of the goings-on at the Nye-Ham debate. Rather, I simply want to recommend some resources for students, teachers, parents, and pastors who find the origins-science-Bible questions interesting—and who might wish to pursue further investigation. 

To help understand Genesis vis-à-vis contemporary science, I recommend John Lennox's little book Seven Days that Divide the World: The Beginning according to Genesis and Science (Zondervan 2011). Lennox is a philosopher of science at Oxford University. In recent years, Lennox has engaged in public debate with his Oxford colleague, the popular atheist Richard Dawkins (author of The God Delusion). 

To help understand scientists and their disagreements about the origins of life and the role of evolution, I recommend the website for Discovery Institute’s Center for Science and Culture. (See  too their website faith + evolution, which is a resource aimed especially to assist pastors, lay leaders, Sunday school teachers, and high school students.) The Center for Science and Culture is a respectable intelligent design think tank that questions the extent of evolution’s creative powers and argues that science can detect intelligent causes in nature (sometimes, when evidence warrants). 

For a helpful lecture that provides an outline of the merits of intelligent design as a competing hypothesis in science, I recommend Stephen C. Meyer’s “Intelligent Design: The most credible idea?” (YouTube 2012). Meyer is a philosopher of science, a senior fellow at the Discovery Institute, and author of the books Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design(Harper 2009) and Darwin's Doubt: The Explosive Origin of Animal Life and the Case for Intelligent Design (Harper 2013). 

Of course, intelligent design is not without its detractors, even within Christian circles. So I also recommend the website for BioLogos. 

BioLogos is a respectable theistic evolution think tank, founded by Francis Collins. Collins is current director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, former director of the Human Genome Research Institute, recipient of the U.S. National Medal of Science, plus author/co-author of the popular books The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief (Free Press 2006) and The Language of Science and Faith: Straight Answers to Genuine Questions (InterVarsity Press 2011). 

BioLogos accepts evolution as God’s means of creation through natural processes (a.k.a. “evolutionary creation”), but rejects the intelligent design hypothesis (which takes some features of life’s origin or development to be better explained in terms of intelligent causation). 

To further understand the scientific merits—and alleged faults—of intelligent design (ID), I recommend the debate “Is Intelligent Design Viable?” (YouTube 2009; transcript available here). This debate is a respectful, high-level intellectual interaction between Francisco Ayala, an anti-ID biologist and former president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and William Lane Craig, a pro-ID philosopher of science and Christian apologist (website: Reasonable Faith).

Next time I will share my thoughts about some philosophical matters relevant to the overall conversation about science and the Bible. More specifically, I will make a case for thinking that God’s revelation via nature and God’s revelation via Scripture have domains which overlap. 

Stay tuned. 

Here is Origins, Science, and the Bible (part 2).

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 4 of 4)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, March 15, 2012

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 4 of 4):
Intelligent design is not a theological explanation

Sometimes the intelligent design hypothesis is said to be an illegitimate scientific explanation because of the so-called God-of-the-gaps objection. The idea is that intelligent design (ID) is mistakenly used to cover gaps in our knowledge but, as science will show, non-intelligent causes do the job.

In previous columns I set out three philosophical arguments for thinking that the God-of-the-gaps objection, when aimed at ID, is problematic. Today, I will address a theological objection to ID.

Let's review my previous arguments, then let's take a look at the theological concern.

Review.

1. The God-of-the-gaps objection fails because it is too strong ( Feb 2). Always ruling out ID runs the risk of ignoring actual limits to what non-intelligent causes can in fact do, and thus we end up always appealing to non-intelligent causes even when there might be good evidence that an intelligent cause actually produced the event or structure. The result: We assume the outcome of an investigation before the investigation takes place (which is, to put it mildly, closed minded).

2. The God-of-the-gaps objection fails because the proper application of ID is not an appeal to ignorance or gaps in our knowledge; rather, ID is an appeal to positive knowledge (Jan 12). ID is appropriately applied when, and only when, two conditions are satisfied: (1) we have positive knowledge that non-intelligent causes clearly struggle/fail, and (2) we have positive knowledge that the phenomena to be explained clearly resemble the sorts of things that only known intelligent causes do.

3. The application of the ID hypothesis is guided by an additional reasonable constraint: ID is to be applied only (if at all) to historical sciences, not nonhistorical sciences (Feb 23). ID isn’t an appropriate explanation in sciences that attempt to explain the ongoing regular operations of nature via natural laws; rather, ID is limited to sciences that attempt to explain a historical origin of a structure or event.

Yes, we should keep in mind that the God-of-the-gaps objection sometimes gains traction when an appeal is made to what we don’t know and God or ID is mistakenly introduced to cover gaps in our knowledge. Nevertheless, the God-of-the-gaps objection doesn’t gain traction when we have positive knowledge of gaps in nature’s causal capacities plus positive knowledge of what intelligent causes can do.

So far, so good.

Enter: The theological concern.

As odd as this may seem, there is also a theological objection to the use of ID in science. This objection stems from a "strong" doctrine of creation, i.e., the creation itself is characterized as “fully gifted” or having a "robust formational economy." The idea is that God created a universe with an “inbuilt potentiality” so that it organized itself (some say “freely”), without subsequent creative acts by God, into all the complex and diverse structures and life forms we observe.

On this view (or set of views), the doctrine of God may be a metaphysical presupposition for the doing of science per se (to explain the universe's orderliness and the human mind's capacity to understand the universe's order), but God is not to be used as a scientific hypothesis to explain some particular event/s in the created order. Hence: ID, which attempts to explain scientifically some events as caused by a special act of God, is theologically inappropriate.

I have three responses to this theological objection.

First, ID does not attempt to identify any specific agent as the cause of the events or patterns that smack of intelligent agency. Rather, ID merely attempts to employ empirical evidence to discern that an intelligent agent was at work. Whether the intelligent agent is God or an alien—or whomever—would be determined by the doing of philosophy and theology.

Perhaps an analogy will help here. Think of ID as merely the first step in a crime scene investigation—think of the popular television series CSI: Miami. When detective Horatio Cain arrives at the scene of an alleged crime (and after he takes off his sunglasses), Horatio first attempts to discern that the death wasn't an accident, i.e., the death is not due to natural (non-intelligent) causes, but due to a mind (an intelligent cause). In subsequent investigation Horatio tries to determine the specific identity of the criminal. (Yes, now the CSI theme song "Who are you?" should come to mind. :-)

Second, whether or not God has made the universe in such a way that all design potentialities were front-loaded at the initial creation event, without subsequent creative acts (so everything comes into being via some form of evolution, e.g., chemical evolution, then neo-Darwinian evolution, etc.)—whether or not this is how God chose to act should be determined by the evidence given by the universe, not assumed at the get go.

Perhaps another analogy will help. Think of the universe and its contents as a beautiful oil painting. Yes, it's theoretically possible that an artist created a “fully gifted” canvas so that it contains the potentialities of all the oil paints in such a way that while the artist stretches the canvas the paints emerge out of the canvas to become the beautiful complex configurations we now behold. Or perhaps, like Rembrandt or Van Gogh, the artist first secured the canvas on wooden stretchers and then later, after the canvas was taut, used various brushes to add and spread paint onto the canvas to form the beautiful image.

Surely, whether we should accept the first of these options or the second (or even some third option) should be determined by the evidence, not assumed at the start. The "strong" doctrine of creation with its “fully gifted” or "robust formational economy" (etc.) would have us think that the painting must have emerged and evolved without subsequent special creative acts by the artist. My point: Art historians should let the painting itself tell us how it came to be.

In other words, the universe should be allowed to speak for itself—which is what ID allows. In other words (again), because God is free to create however God wants, we should let the evidence of the universe tell us what happened.

Third, nature itself (i.e., the cosmos), the general patterns of nature which science discovers (i.e., the laws of nature), and the very doing of science per se (i.e., our ability to know the world and discern its patterns, albeit fallibly and non-exhaustively)—these provide philosophical grounds for thinking that there is a Mind (God) who created an orderly universe along with human beings whose minds can discern this order. ID embraces this. However, unlike the "strong" doctrine of creation, ID also allows for an additional possibility: i.e., that of scientifically discerning the more specific causal actions of an intelligent Mind (perhaps God) as they may have also occurred in history.

So, on ID science can discern that a Mind created not only the universe (e.g., via the Big Bang) which is hospitable to life (e.g., fine-tuning of the universe’s initial conditions) but also life itself (e.g., the first life's DNA), if the latter creation in fact occurred later on in the history of the cosmos.

If God has in fact acted in various ways and at various times in the past, then ID would allow for such acts to be investigated by the various scientific disciplines, disciplines that, because of their very existence, also point to God. All of this, it seems to me, is theologically significant—and exciting.

Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., teaches philosophy at Providence University College. Van der Breggen acknowledges that Intelligent Design is presently a minority position in science and that many bright people disagree with ID. He also admits that he could be mistaken, though he likes to believe he is not, so he encourages readers to think carefully. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 3 of 4)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, February 23, 2012

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 3 of 4):
Intelligent design has reasonable constraints

According to the God-of-the-gaps objection, science should not appeal to intelligent design (ID) to explain phenomena found in the natural realm. The concern is that ID will be applied inappropriately, filling gaps in our knowledge, gaps that science will explain via non-intelligent causes.

Philosopher David Hull warns, "Once [scientists] allow reference to God or miraculous forces to explain the first origin of life or the evolution of the human species, they have no way of limiting this sort of explanation." As biochemist Michael Behe observes, "There is the anxiety that if the supernatural were allowed as an explanation, then there would be no stopping it—it would be invoked frequently to explain many things that in reality have natural explanations."

In other words, at the heart of the God-of-the-gaps objection is the idea that the application of a hypothesis must be guided by reasonable constraints but, or so the objection goes, the ID hypothesis has none. Thus, we must always appeal to non-intelligent causes.

Last time I argued that the God-of-the-gaps objection fails because it is too strong. Always ruling out ID runs the risk of ignoring actual limits to what non-intelligent causes can in fact do, and thus we end up always appealing to non-intelligent causes when an intelligent cause actually produced the event or structure. The result: We assume the outcome of an investigation before the investigation takes place (which is, to put it mildly, closed minded).

The time before last time, I argued that the God-of-the-gaps objection fails because the application of ID is not an appeal to ignorance or gaps in our knowledge; rather, ID is an appeal to positive knowledge. ID is appropriately applied when, and only when, two conditions are satisfied: (1) we have positive knowledge that non-intelligent causes clearly struggle/fail, and (2) we have positive knowledge that the phenomena to be explained clearly resemble the sorts of things that only known intelligent causes do. In other words, and contrary to what the God-of-the-gaps objection would have us think, the application of ID is guided by reasonable constraints.

Today I will argue that ID has yet another reasonable constraint to guide its application, and this constraint weakens the God-of-the-gaps objection even further. (This constraint may be a bit more difficult to understand than the constraints I set out previously, so please bear with me.)

The additional constraint is this: In many sciences, explanations that appeal to intelligent agency constitute a syntactically/ categorically inappropriate response to the question motivating those sciences, so in these sciences an appeal to ID is inappropriate from the get go, whereas in other sciences ID is not inappropriate.

Philosopher of science Stephen C. Meyer explains the constraint well, so I will follow him closely (subsequent quotes are from Meyer).

Meyer points out that the sciences can be divided into two broad categories: historical and nonhistorical.

The nonhistorical sciences consist of branches of physics, chemistry, and biology, and are "concerned primarily with the discovery and explication of general phenomena." The goal of these sciences is to investigate the world's regular operations, i.e., "to discover, classify or explain [via] unchanging laws and properties of nature."

The historical sciences, on the other hand, consist of such sciences as historical geology, evolutionary biology, and archaeology. Their concern is "to reconstruct the past and explain the present by reference to the past," i.e., to "explain events or data not primarily by reference to laws but by reference to past causal events or sequences of events—what might be called 'causal histories.'"

Whereas Meyer uses the terms "nonhistorical science" and "historical science", some thinkers use the terms "operation science" and "origin science," respectively. Operation science has to do with the ongoing regularities of nature; origin science has to do with historical singularities or beginnings in nature.

Clearly, an appeal to intelligent agency is not always inappropriate in the historical sciences. In archaeology it makes sense to claim that an intelligent agent was the cause of what appears to be a cave painting. Also, in historical biology it makes sense to claim that an intelligent agent may have been the cause of life's origin. Of course, these claims might be false. However, with respect to the motivating questions of the historical sciences—i.e., questions of the sort "What is the cause of X?"—they are not logically inappropriate responses.

On the other hand, in the nonhistorical sciences an appeal to intelligent agency is logically inappropriate always. The answer "an intelligent agent did it" fails to respond correctly to the kind of question motivating the nonhistorical sciences. Nonhistorical sciences ask questions concerning how nature operates normally, i.e., how nature operates without the interference or special actions of intelligent agency (whether human or divine or alien), and so these sciences seek answers which involve the descriptive and/or explanatory use of natural laws and non-intelligent processes.

Meyer puts it this way: “To offer ‘God did it’ as an answer to a question such as ‘How does weightlessness generally affect crystal growth?’ clearly misses the point of the question. The answer does not so much violate the rules of science as the rules of grammar.”

Appeals to intelligent agency in the natural realm, then, are constrained by the fact that they are syntactically inappropriate in the nonhistorical or operational sciences. This means that as a possible causal answer in the doing of science, ID is limited primarily to the category of historical or origin sciences. Significantly, this constraint reduces the chances of applying ID erroneously.

Therefore, because the application of the ID hypothesis is guided by this additional reasonable constraint, i.e., the constraint that ID is to be applied only (if at all) to historical sciences, the God-of-the-gaps objection to the scientific legitimacy of ID (arising from ID's alleged lack of reasonable constraint) is additionally weakened.

Stay tuned for part 4.

P.S. My quotes from Stephen C. Meyer are from his essay "The Methodological Equivalence of Design and Descent," in The Creation Hypothesis: Scientific Evidence for an Intelligent Designer, edited by J. P. Moreland (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 67-112. Meyer restates these points in his book Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 408-410.

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 2 of 4)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, February 2, 2012

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 2 of 4):
Intelligent design lets evidence speak for itself

According to the God-of-the-gaps objection, the intelligent design hypothesis is an illegitimate scientific explanation. The idea is that intelligent design (ID) is mistakenly used to cover gaps in our knowledge but, as science will show, non-intelligent causes do the job.

Last time I argued that ID, when properly applied, is actually an argument from positive knowledge, not from ignorance or gaps in our knowledge. I argued that ID is to be applied when, and only when, two conditions are satisfied: (1) we have positive knowledge of the capacities (or lack thereof) of non-intelligent causes, that is, we have good reasons for thinking that non-intelligent causes fail and will very probably continue to fail in their accounting of a particular event or structure, and (2) we have positive knowledge that the event or structure in question is the sort of thing known intelligent causes do.

Today I will set out another argument for thinking that the God-of-the-gaps objection, when aimed at ID, is problematic.

The God-of-the-gaps objection is too strong. The objection tells us that to avoid the risk of mistakenly appealing to an intelligent cause, we must always stick with non-intelligent causes. However, it turns out that always ruling out intelligent causes means that we must appeal to a non-intelligent cause even if an intelligent cause, in fact, produced the event or structure.

Indeed, if we accept the God-of-the-gaps objection, then we must always ignore known limits of what non-intelligent causes can in fact do, even when the known evidence points to intelligent design.

Surely, this is a problem.

To illustrate the problem, consider a Scrabble game (played at my home) where the letters are arranged as follows: DAD IT IS YOUR TURN TO BUY PIZZA. If we always disallow ID, then I would be committed to thinking that the letters arranged themselves, however improbably, without the benefit of intelligent causal input. But I know (have very reasonable belief) that there is a causal gap in the capacities of the Scrabble tiles to arrange themselves into a meaningful sentence, and I know that the arrangement in question is the sort of thing that intelligent causes do. The upshot: A constant appeal to non-intelligent causes will block what my sons actually communicated via the Scrabble board. Hence, no pizza.

Now, let’s think about God. If God really did create the universe a finite time ago (e.g., via a finely-tuned big bang), and if God subsequently really did act in the world in a special way (e.g., to create the first living organism), and if God actually left good evidence or traces of Himself in what He created (as the Scriptures suggest)—if these were all the case, yet science is never allowed to provide explanations that involve intelligent causation (whether divine or merely supernatural or whatever)—would our scientific theories miss something important?

It seems to me that they would. Our theories would always be plugging actual gaps in the non-intelligent causal capacities of reality with non-intelligent causes, even when the events and structures in question point to actual intelligent causation. That is to say, the requirement of a constant appeal to non-intelligent causes will block our knowledge of intelligent causation even if an intelligent cause actually produced the event or structure in the world.

Here's the lesson: The number 1 rule of science should be that we seek the best explanation of the evidence, period; we should not force the evidence to fit a philosophy.

Lehigh University biochemist Michael Behe illustrates the above lesson in a fun but deeply insightful way:

“Imagine a room in which a body lies crushed, flat as a pancake. A dozen detectives crawl around, examining the floor with magnifying glasses for any clue to the identity of the perpetrator. In the middle of the room, next to the body, stands a large, gray elephant. The detectives carefully avoid bumping into the pachyderm's legs as they crawl, and never even glance at it. Over time the detectives get frustrated with their lack of progress but resolutely press on, looking even more closely at the floor. You see, textbooks say detectives must ‘get their man,’ so they never consider elephants.” (Michael J. Behe, Darwin's Black Box [The Free Press, 1996], 192.)

In other words, the God-of-the-gaps objection assumes the outcome of our investigations before the investigations take place. Surely, this is closed-mindedness.

Thus, the God-of-the-gaps objection is problematic—and it shouldn’t block our scientific inquiries into evidence for intelligent design.

Stay tuned for part three.

Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College, Canada. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 1 of 4)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, January 12, 2012

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 1 of 4):
Intelligent design is not an appeal to ignorance

Sometimes the intelligent design hypothesis is said to be an illegitimate scientific explanation because of the so-called God-of-the-gaps objection. Today I will explain the God-of-the-gaps objection, plus I will argue that this objection is problematic.

According to the God-of-the-gaps objection, intelligent design (ID) is a faulty explanation because it is based on ignorance, not knowledge. That is to say, ID is based on gaps in our knowledge of the capacities of natural non-intelligent causes, but natural non-intelligent causes are actually at work, as further scientific investigation will show.

For example, many years ago people appealed to God as an explanation for lightning. But, of course, we now know that lightning is an atmospheric electrostatic discharge (i.e., a form of static electricity), not God's intervention. Clearly, using God as an explanation of lightning is to display ignorance of the actual causes of lightning. Clearly, too, as science progresses, the gaps due to human ignorance close—and so the "God" of the gaps gets squeezed out.

Thus, according to the God-of-the-gaps objection, we should not appeal to ID as an explanation.

Is the God-of-the-gaps objection reasonable to believe? I don't think so. Here is one argument for thinking that the God-of-the-gaps objection, when aimed at ID, is problematic. (Next time I will set out a second argument.)

Yes, the God-of-the-gaps objection gains traction when a God hypothesis is applied without reasonable constraint, that is, when evidence truly doesn't warrant it (think of our lightning example). However, the fact remains that ID can sometimes be applied reasonably.

According to ID proponents, ID is appropriate when—and only when—two conditions are satisfied: (1) we have positive knowledge for thinking that non-intelligent causes clearly struggle/fail, and (2) we have positive knowledge that the phenomena to be explained clearly resemble the sorts of things that only known intelligent causes do.

Interestingly, the satisfaction of these conditions is at the heart of reasoning that we do in everyday life when we discern intelligent causes.

For example, if I am playing Scrabble with my family and I see the letters, DAD-IT-IS-YOUR-TURN-TO-BUY-PIZZA, I know (i.e., have reasonable belief) that the arrangement of letters has been intelligently designed. Why? Because (1) I know that it’s extremely improbable for Scrabble letters to arrange themselves this way without input of intelligence, and (2) I know that this arrangement of letters displays those distinct characteristics which originate from a mind or personal agent, i.e., an intelligent cause.

Sure, it's logically possible that the letters' arrangement was due to chance, natural law, or some combination of these, but, clearly, it's reasonable to think that an intelligent cause explanation is the more plausible hypothesis.

In the 2009 book Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design, philosopher of science Stephen C. Meyer takes the above-described ID reasoning to the investigation of the origin of the information content of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), the blueprint of life. Notice how Meyer employs the aforementioned two conditions.

First, Meyer argues, we know that the origin of the code of DNA is highly improbable when we are given non-intelligent causes only. According to Meyer, contemporary science tells us that the major contending explanations which do not appeal to intelligent causes are not up for the explanatory task. Contemporary science tells us that material non-intelligent causes, when understood wholly in terms of chance, physical necessity, or combinations of chance and physical necessity, very apparently lack the capacity to produce the rich information content of DNA.

In other words, because of what we know of physical matter, we have positive knowledge that explanations of DNA's origin which don't appeal to intelligent causes have great difficulty.

Second, Meyer argues, we know from our uniform and repeated experience of the cause-and-effect structure of the world that only intelligent causal agency produces the sort of information that is found in DNA (i.e., information that is like that found in my string of Scrabble letters, but is much more complex). Meyer calls this sort of information functionally specified information (or specified information, for short). The information consists of a complicated set of instructions that direct the construction of non-living material/chemical structures to function together in a highly specific way, i.e., as a complex integrated system, which is the first life.

Moreover, we know that DNA's code, i.e., DNA's complex functionally-specified information, resembles human-made computer software, but is much more sophisticated. As Bill Gates of Microsoft has famously said, “DNA is like a computer program but far, far more advanced than any software we’ve ever created.”

Because of the satisfaction of both of the above two conditions, Meyer concludes that the ID hypothesis is a scientifically legitimate way to go.

But, we should pause here and notice: Meyer's argument is definitely not an argument from gaps in our knowledge.

In other words, the ID hypothesis (when used properly) is based on what we know. It's based on positive knowledge of the capacities (or lack thereof) of non-intelligent causes, and it's based on positive knowledge of the sorts of things only intelligent causes do. Properly understood, then, ID is not an argument based on ignorance, so ID is not a case of God-of-the-gaps reasoning.

Therefore, when directed at ID, the God-of-the-gaps objection is problematic—and it should not block our scientific inquiries into evidence for intelligent design.

Stay tuned for part two.

Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

Skepticism about Evolution

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

(The Carillon, December 3, 2009)

Skepticism about Evolution
I am skeptical of (at least) one sense of evolution. To explain, I will do the following: First, I will clarify several senses of “evolution”; second, I will specify the sense of evolution about which I am skeptical; third, I will set out some reasons for my skepticism.

1. The word “evolution” has several meanings, which, for the sake of clarity and truth, should be kept distinct.

Evolution can mean mere physical change over time, as, say, stars “evolve”—i.e., change—after they burn for a few million years.

Or evolution can mean chemical evolution, that is, a coming together of non-living material stuff to form the first living cell.

Or evolution can mean common descent, which means that all organisms have the same ancestor somewhere in the distant past.

Or evolution can mean, as it usually does mean, neo-Darwinian evolution, which is to say that, after the first life has begun, natural selection operates on random genetic mutation to produce the various complex organs and forms of life we now observe.

Or evolution can mean a combination of all of the above.

Moreover (to add a bit more complexity to the issue), each of the above meanings of “evolution” or combinations thereof can be understood either theistically (i.e., as guided by the Creator who created matter and its properties/laws) or atheistically (as wholly unguided and undesigned).

Furthermore (to add one last wrinkle), “evolution” can also be understood in a much more limited neo-Darwinian sense, that is, as micro-evolution, which is natural selection operating on genetic mutation merely to produce small-scale changes in an organism’s development.

An example of such small-scale or micro-evolution would be the changes in the beak sizes of the finches Darwin observed on the Galapagos Islands, changes which occurred as the type of available food changed. In contrast, an example of macro or large-scale neo-Darwinian evolution would be the production, via natural selection and genetic mutation, of the beaks of Darwin’s finches, and the finches themselves, in the first place.

2. I am skeptical of “evolution”—whether understood theistically or atheistically—when it means large-scale neo-Darwinian evolution, that is, when it means that after the first life began, the various complex life forms we now witness are wholly or primarily due to natural selection operating on random genetic mutation.

3. Why am I skeptical? First, I think that the arguments for large-scale neo-Darwinian evolution are not strong. Also, there are some claims from important scientists and philosophers, claims about large-scale neo-Darwinian evolution, claims that push me further in the skeptical direction:

“Molecular evolution is not based on scientific authority. There is no publication in the scientific literature…that describes how molecular evolution of any real, complex, biochemical system either did occur or even might have occurred. There are assertions that such evolution occurred, but absolutely none are supported by pertinent experiments or calculations.” Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box (The Free Press, 1996, 2006). Behe is professor of biochemistry at Lehigh University, Pennsylvania.

“We must concede that there are presently no detailed Darwinian accounts of the evolution of any biochemical system, only a variety of wishful speculations.” Franklin Harold, The Way of the Cell (Oxford University Press, 2001). Harold is emeritus professor of biochemistry and molecular biology at Colorado State University. According to Oxford University Press, Harold is “one of the world’s most respected micro-biologists.”

"We are skeptical of claims for the ability of random mutation and natural selection to account for the complexity of life. Careful examination of the evidence for Darwinian theory should be encouraged.” This is from a 2008 document titled “A Scientific Dissent from Darwinism,” signed by 700 highly credentialed scientists. The list of scientists who signed this document can be found at the Discovery Institute’s Center for Science and Culture (click on "Dissent from Darwinism").

The Center for Science and Culture adds: “The list is growing and includes scientists from the US National Academy of Sciences, Russian, Hungarian and Czech National Academies, as well as from universities such as Yale, Princeton, Stanford, MIT, UC Berkeley, UCLA, and others.”

So, is it reasonable to be skeptical about large-scale neo-Darwinian evolution? I am inclined to think so.

P.S. I am inclined to think that it’s also reasonable to be skeptical about unguided chemical evolution, i.e., the purely accidental coming together of non-living material stuff to form the first living cell. But this is a topic for another column. See for starters my column “DNA & Intelligent Design” (March 26, 2009). See too Stephen C. Meyer’s recently published book Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design (HarperOne, 2009).

P.P.S. For a fine debate between a highly-respected scientist and defender of large-scale neo-Darwinian evolution (Francisco Ayala) and a highly-respected philosopher and proponent of intelligent design (William Lane Craig), I encourage readers to check Apologetics315.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College. Van der Breggen’s views do not always reflect the views of his colleagues at the college at which he teaches. Some colleagues are young-earth literal six-day creationists, some are theistic evolutionists, and some are intelligent design proponents. Nevertheless, all are disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ.)

Universe's Fine-Tuning vs. Multiple Universe Theory

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, November 5, 2009)

Universe’s Fine-tuning vs. Multiple Universe Theory

Contemporary science tells us that the initial conditions of the universe’s coming into being are exquisitely fine-tuned for life, so much so that many thoughtful people conclude that this fine-tuning is evidence of a supernatural intelligent designer.

The idea is this: Because there are an astronomical number of conditions that have to be “just right” for life to exist, and because life has intrinsic moral worth, it very much seems that there is a delicate orchestration of factors (instead of just a huge number of mere coincidences) aimed to bring about an end or value—and this smacks of intelligent design.

Thus, the universe’s fine-tuning for life provides one more sub-argument for a cumulative case argument for God’s existence.

Some critics, however, dismiss the above argument by making an appeal to what is called Multiverse or Multiple Universe Theory (MUT).

The idea is that our universe is but one of trillions or an infinite number of universes and so it is reasonable to think that the occurrence of the fine-tuning of our universe happened by undirected chance. Because trillions or an infinite number of arrows were shot, it is reasonable to think that no archery skill—that is, no direction by an intelligent agent—is required for an arrow to hit the bull’s-eye.

MUTs, however, are seriously problematic explanations, for (at least) five reasons, which have a cumulative force.

First, MUTs lack strong positive evidence. Scientist-theologian John Polkinghorne writes: "Science speaks only of one universe of our own experience. People try to trick out a 'many universe' account in sort of pseudo-scientific terms, but that is pseudo-science. It is a metaphysical guess that there might be many universes with different laws and circumstances."

In fact, as philosopher John Leslie points out, "all multiple universe theories are highly speculative and some may verge on the fantastic."

Moreover, even theoretical physicist Lee Smolin describes his own multiverse model as “frank speculation” and “fantasy.”

Second, MUTs require a "generator" to bring about the various different universes (to shoot the various arrows), but such a mechanism would have to be randomizing to ensure the eventual actualization of the very remote possibility of our universe (the bull's-eye), which seems unlikely to be the case. Indeed, as philosopher Robin Collins points out, for such a generator to ensure randomness would require fine-tuning—i.e., a "conspiracy of factors"—and, hence, would suggest a designer of the generator.

Third, MUTs seem less simple than design theory. An appeal to one very powerful and transcendent designing mind (or even a few thousand of such minds) seems more elegant than an appeal to gazillions of different universes (which probably would contain all sorts and multitudes of minds).

According to philosopher Richard Swinburne, "To postulate a trillion trillion other universes, rather than one God in order to explain the orderliness of our universe, seems the height of irrationality." In other words, MUTs seem very much to violate Ockham's Razor (the principle that in explaining X, entities are not to be multiplied beyond what is needed to explain X).

Fourth, the appeal to an MUT is not a natural extrapolation from our common experience.

As Collins observes, “In the case of fine-tuning, we already know that minds often produce fine-tuned devices, such as Swiss watches. Postulating God—a supermind—as the explanation of the [universe's] fine-tuning, therefore, is a natural extrapolation from what we already observe minds to do. In contrast, it is difficult to see how the atheistic many-universes hypothesis could be considered a natural extrapolation from what we observe.”

Fifth, the appeal to MUTs commits what philosopher William Dembski calls the inflationary fallacy, the mistake of "bolster[ing] an otherwise failing chance hypothesis by artificially inflating its probabilistic resources (i.e., the number of opportunities for the event)."

This fallacy is well illustrated by the following hypothetical example from philosopher William Lane Craig: “[A] card player who gets four aces every time he deals could explain this away by saying, ‘there are an infinite number of universes with poker games going on in them, and therefore, in some of them someone always by chance gets four aces every time he deals, and—lucky me!—I just happen to be in one of those universes.’"

In other words, making an appeal to the existence of a multitude of other universes to avoid the design inference seems very much to be a move that is philosophically dubious.

Thus, the universe’s initial conditions, which are exquisitely fine-tuned for life, continue to point to an intelligent designer.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Universe's Fine-Tuning vs. Anthropic Objection

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, October 8, 2009)

Universe’s Fine-tuning vs. Anthropic Objection

Contemporary science tells us that the initial conditions of the universe’s coming into being are exquisitely fine-tuned for life, so much so that many thoughtful people conclude that this fine-tuning is evidence of a supernatural intelligent designer.

The idea is this: Because there are an astronomical number of conditions that have to be “just right” for life to exist, and because life (especially human life) has intrinsic moral worth, it very much seems that there is an orchestration of factors (instead of just a huge number of mere coincidences) aimed to bring about an end or value—and this smacks of intelligent design.

Thus, the universe’s fine-tuning for life provides one more sub-argument for a cumulative case argument for God’s existence.

However, some critics, such as Richard Dawkins (author of The God Delusion and professor of the public understanding of science at Oxford University), object to the fine-tuning argument on the basis of what is sometimes called the Anthropic Principle.

According to this objection, it is not surprising that we observe the large number of apparent coincidences which make the universe's initial conditions conducive to life. Why isn't it surprising? Because, Dawkins and company point out, those conditions obviously constitute the set of conditions required for our existence. If those coincidences didn’t occur as they did, then we wouldn’t be around to observe them, let alone think about them.

Therefore (so the objection goes) there is no puzzle or mystery that suggests intelligent design. In fact, Dawkins asserts, the Anthropic Principle “provides a rational, design-free explanation.”

The objection sounds good and persuades many, but is it sound? That is to ask, is the objection rationally acceptable?

We should think not.

Consider the following thought experiment, set out by the philosopher William Lane Craig (in a debate at Queen’s University in the early 1990s): "You're dragged before a firing squad of a hundred trained marksmen with rifles aimed at your heart; you hear the command; you hear the roar of the guns; and you see that you're still alive, that they all missed [i.e., you see one hundred 'apparent coincidences']. You say: 'That's not surprising, because their missing is obviously required for me to be alive.'"

Now, Craig astutely points out: "The fact that you are making the observation is not surprising given that they missed. But the 'coincidence' of missing needs explanation!"

Similarly, the fact that we are observing the large (astronomical) number of "apparent coincidences" which led to life in the universe isn't surprising given that these coincidences occurred. But the incredible life-sustaining/life-generating "coincidences" themselves still call out for explanation!

Craig adds (in an academic article on the same topic, apparently not read by Dawkins): "Certainly we should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence. But it does not follow that we should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with our existence."

In other words, merely pointing to the conditions required for our existence, as Dawkins and company do, does not explain those conditions. The conditions that are favourable or “propitious” (Dawkins’ word) to our existence continue to call out for explanation. What is worse (for Dawkins and company), merely asserting that our capacity to notice these conditions is the result of some required favourable conditions doesn’t provide any explanation of the conditions themselves, let alone a “rational” explanation or a “rational design-free explanation.”

Here is the point: Dawkins and company confuse pointing to a condition with explaining that condition, but the former is not an instance of the latter.

Think about it. Yes, the conditions that are favourable or “propitious” to our existence are necessary for us to be alive and able to notice those conditions. But the question remains: Why do those conditions exist? Pointing out that the conditions are needed for life and observation is interesting, to be sure, but leaving it at that doesn’t account for their existence in the first place, which is the issue at hand.

Thus, the fine-tuning argument is untouched by the so-called Anthropic objection. The universe’s initial conditions, which are in fact exquisitely fine-tuned for life, continue to point to an intelligent designer.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.)