Being a Christ-centred teacher: What it means (to me)

Apologia, etc.
Being a Christ-centred teacher: What it means (to me)

By Hendrik van der Breggen

[The following article appeared in the Providence University College publication, Eye Witness Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2013),pp. 12-14.]

Words of caution

What does it mean (to me) to be a Christ-centred teacher?  I have parenthetically added “to me” to the question because I wish to acknowledge that I am still a student of teaching and still learning to be a follower of Jesus Christ.  Also, I wish to admit that my knowledge in these areas (and in general) is fallible, non-exhaustive, and prone to bias.  With these caveats in mind, I will set out what I take to be three salient features of a Christ-centred teacher.

Salient feature 1

                                  

“See to it, then, that the light within you isn’t darkness.” (Luke 11:35)

First, to be a Christ-centred teacher is to be Christ-centred: it is to have accepted the Lordship of Jesus Christ, not someone or something else.  Truth has intrinsic value, so truth concerning Jesus’ identity is important here.

Scandalous as this may seem, Jesus is somehow the very God of the universe come to earth as a human being—Jesus is God in the flesh, God with us.  Contrast this with the views of Islam (Jesus is merely a prophet, not God), Jehovah’s Witnesses (Jesus is the Archangel Michael, not God), and theological liberalism (Jesus was merely a good man, not God).  Or contrast this with the New Age (I am God).  To be Christ-centred is to confess that Jesus is Lord—to believe that Jesus is God (God the Son).

Significantly, the belief that Jesus is God, if true, is an objective truth in two senses. It’s an objective truth in the sense that it has to do with ultimate reality: Jesus is the Truth, i.e., Jesus is the ultimate metaphysical reality—God—who is personal and faithful.  Also, it’s an objective truth in the sense that it is a real relation between what is believed (a proposition) and what the belief is about (reality), and this correspondence, when it holds, holds whether it's believed by me and others or not. My belief that Jesus is God, if it’s true, matches or appropriately corresponds with the reality that Jesus is God, and reality (not my sincerity, faith, or conviction) makes my belief true.

Also, the objective truth that Jesus is God can be known subjectively (personally), albeit fallibly and non-exhaustively, whether that knowledge is gotten by reading historical reports, by hearing a preacher, by having a spiritual intuition, or by whatever means or combination of means God might use. The clearest source of this knowledge comes from the reports of those who saw and lived with Jesus (as recorded in the New Testament), reports clarified and confirmed by the church's creeds and traditions, reports promulgated by ministers of the Gospel.

A hugely important part of this objective truth, which we also learn from the reports of those who saw and lived with Jesus, is that the God-man Jesus was killed and then resurrected bodily, thereby somehow reconciling a sinful world to a Holy God.  By faith we accept the truth of Jesus’ work on the cross.

A Christ-centred teacher, then, is a teacher who accepts that Jesus—not anything or anyone else—truly is Lord.

Salient feature 2

“Why do you call me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ and do not do what I say?” (Luke 6:46)  “Many will say to me…‘Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and in your name drive out demons and perform many miracles?’ Then I will tell them plainly, ‘I never knew you. Away from me, you evildoers!” (Matthew 7: 22-23)

Second, to be a Christ-centred teacher is not merely to give intellectual assent to the proposition that Jesus is Lord is true but it is also to follow him.  Surrender to Christ presupposes truth about Jesus and knowledge of this truth plus action in accordance with this knowledge.  We are to be transformed by his Word having its—God’s—way with us, and thereby we are known by God.

We are to be doers of the Word.  We are to do works of love and mercy and justice which are in accordance with and directed by our knowledge of him and his will for us (knowledge given to us in the moral fabric of the creation, in conscience, and most clearly in Scripture).  Such works are for the benefit of our neighbours—humanity—and such works involve all the activities that human beings can do: business, science, medicine, aviation, theatre, construction, literature, farming, music making, parenting, skating, counselling, cooking, tailoring, preaching—and teaching.

Salient feature 3

“[Do not be] always learning but never able to acknowledge the truth.” (2 Timothy 3:7)

Third, being a Christ-centred teacher is to engage in works of love and mercy and justice via teaching.  Significantly, if Jesus is our model for teaching, then teaching presupposes the reality of truth (in the previously described two objective senses), the reality of being able to know truth (to varying degrees), and the reality of being able to communicate knowledge of truth (fallibly and non-exhaustively).

Christ-centred teachers should note that metaphysics (what is real) should not be confused with epistemology (theory of knowledge/ how we know).  That is, the reality of truth should not be confused with evidence or tests for truth.  As mentioned, Truth (with a capital T) is Jesus, the metaphysical ultimate reality (which is, in wholeness, triune).  But, as mentioned too, truth (with a lower case t) can also be understood as a correspondence relation: truth is a real relation—a metaphysical relation—between a proposition and what is real.  (Note: Stories can be a means of delivering propositions in such a way as to also provide a taste or subjective experience of the alleged reality to which the propositions, if true, purport to refer.)  On the other hand, evidence or tests which allow us to think we’ve discovered truth consist of observations in our experience, coherence with an established belief system or discipline, and/or practical usefulness—these have to do with epistemology, the knowing of truth.  Observations, coherence, and usefulness are indications of truth, not truth per se.

Indications of truth can be discerned by individuals, but they are better discerned with the help of the community of truth-seekers.  As a community we engage each other and the world in a dialogue of discovery whereby knowledge of truth is discerned (fallibly and non-exhaustively) and truth is our common master.

At this juncture, we should note that absolute certainty is not required nor is it possible (it’s possible for God, but not for humans); rather, mere reasonable belief often constitutes knowledge (which can be held with humble confidence instead of absolute certainty).  The objective truth that I am taller than my wife Carla is easily known by Carla and me and anyone who has met us (I’m 6’3.5”tall, Carla is 5’ tall).  To be sure, we don’t know exactly how much taller I am, i.e., we don’t know the exact number of micro-millimeters our height difference amounts to, but that’s beside the point.  The proposition that Hendrik is taller than Carla by at least 12 inches is an objective truth that we can know with confidence, while acknowledging that we don't have God-like knowledge.

Significantly, the above-described propositional knowledge is not limited to the merely physical realm.  Propositional knowledge can also include whatever is real in the realms of the abstract (e.g., the truth that, for any right triangle where c is the length of the hypotenuse and where a and b are lengths of the other two sides, a² + b² = c²), the realm of the moral (e.g., the truth that torture for fun is evil), and, with God’s help, the realm of the spiritual (e.g., that God exists, that God is a trinity).  Such knowledge may be achieved with the help of the knowledge-of-truth-seeking disciplines: e.g., the sciences, history, ethics, theology.

Besides propositional knowledge, there is also knowledge by acquaintance (a.k.a. "simple seeing").  We can have a direct awareness of reality when our faculties of perception are operating properly in contexts for which they are designed.  Such awareness includes the deliverances not only of our five senses but also introspection, rational insight, moral insight, plus the personal witness of the Holy Spirit.  Such awareness serves as a basis for further knowledge, constructed by further observations coupled with imagination and reasoning.  Also, knowledge by acquaintance allows us to test our concepts about reality by comparing the concepts with reality.

Another type of knowledge is know-how.  Know-how includes the skills of a craft or discipline, plus the practical skill—wisdom—of living life well, faithfully, and pleasing to God.

Finally, in the pursuit of knowledge of truth and the communication of knowledge of truth, Christ-centred teachers should also distinguish between psychological objectivity and rational objectivity, according to philosopher J. P. Moreland.  Psychological objectivity involves a lack of subjective involvement, a lack of commitment, a detachment from reality.  Such objectivity, if possible, seems appropriate only when there is no investigation or no interest, and thus should not be a part of an education that encourages students to make a subjective commitment to seek and embrace whatever is true, excellent, praiseworthy, and good.  Rational objectivity, on the other hand, acknowledges our subjective involvement as appropriate—we are, after all, subjective beings—and it calls us to exercise those epistemological virtues by which we discern objective truth (regarding what is real).  How?  By calling us to honesty, by calling us to take into account positive evidence and negative evidence, by calling us to reason carefully, by calling us to acknowledge and limit the intrusions of personal and cultural bias (as much as humanly possible), and by calling us to respect the true and good insights arising from our communities of investigation (i.e., the various academic and scientific disciplines).

Of course, much more can and should be said about what it means to be a Christ-centred teacher, but these three salient features—the acceptance of the truth that Jesus is Lord, the actual doing as Jesus would have us do, and the teaching of truth that can be known and communicated as knowledge of truth—seem (to me) to be foundational.

Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor of Philosophy

Providence University College

Faith statements impinge on academic freedom? (Part 4 of 4)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, February 24, 2011)

Faith statements impinge on academic freedom? (Part 4 of 4)

Over the past few years, the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) has been investigating and blacklisting several Christian universities because, CAUT alleges, these schools violate academic freedom. According to CAUT, culprit schools “have imposed [on faculty] a requirement of a commitment to a particular ideology or statement [of faith] as condition of employment,” and so such schools “cannot be practicing academic freedom.” Thus, or so CAUT would have us believe, the blacklisted Christian schools lack academic legitimacy and credibility.

Happily, last week CAUT announced that it will cease its lengthy formal investigations (which, as critics have correctly pointed out, could have been conducted in minutes simply by checking each school's website).

Unhappily, however, CAUT still plans to maintain a list of schools that require their faculty to sign a faith statement. (I say "unhappily" because CAUT's project continues to cast public suspicion on listed schools wholly in the absence of empirical evidence that the academic freedom of faculty or students in these schools has been actually impaired.)

In three previous Apologia columns (April 22, April 29, May 6, 2010), I set out three reasons for thinking that CAUT's blacklisting project is problematic. Today, I will add a fourth reason.

First, let's review my previous reasons.

Reason 1. Via its blacklisting project CAUT is thwarting academic freedom broadly conceived. That is, CAUT is denying the fact that academic freedom is enhanced if we allow sub-groups of the broader scholarly community to accept the philosophical-theological light that they believe they have discovered, allow them to band together, and allow them to use the aforementioned light as a lamp unto their collective feet. Sure, these sub-groups might be mistaken; but they might not be mistaken. Either way, there is an increase in the freedom of the broader academic community to pursue knowledge and truth—which is good.

Reason 2. CAUT is unfairly imposing its preferred philosophical-theological views onto the broader academic community. Via its blacklisting project, CAUT is assuming that no scholarly sub-community can appropriately settle on and commit to some philosophical-theological truths unless the larger academic culture approves. But this means that CAUT is granting itself a privileged philosophical-theological status (e.g., agnosticism or atheism) over and above that of the schools on the blacklist (i.e., Christian theism), and this allows CAUT—as a self-appointed theological-philosophical authority—to judge the blacklisted schools to be academically inferior. Because this philosophical-theological posturing is done without argument or debate, CAUT is engaged in academic bullying.

Reason 3. In an important sense it is false that a Christian school's requirement for faculty to subscribe to a statement of faith means that such schools "cannot be practicing academic freedom." In my personal experience teaching at a Christian university college, faculty and students have the freedom to investigate—and are in fact encouraged to investigate—the faith doctrines of their particular school. Thus, faculty and students have the freedom to seek truth even under the auspices of a faith statement.

So far, so good.

Recently, I have learned of yet another good reason for thinking that CAUT's blacklisting project is problematic.

Reason 4. CAUT's major concern—that a school's requirement of faculty to adhere to a particular ideology or faith statement as a condition of employment may impinge on the outcome of an academic investigation and thereby impinge on academic freedom—is a concern for all schools, not just Christian schools.

To support reason 4, I will quote (with permission) from an email sent to me by my friend and colleague, Dr. Kevin Flatt, assistant professor of history at Redeemer University College. (Aside: When Kevin was a teenager, he was a student in one of my Sunday school classes—yes, the pupil quickly becomes the master!)

According to Dr. Flatt, "all scholarship, whether Christian or not,…involves parameters that limit academic freedom."

Dr. Flatt defends this claim with two excellent insights (so I quote in extenso here):

(1) Even secular universities impose limits on academic freedom on the basis of some (albeit minimal) shared perspective. For example, no Canadian university would allow a scholar to outright deny the historical truth of the Holocaust, or to argue that women are not full human beings, or to publish papers suggesting that professors should murder their students. Why? Because such "freedom" would strike at the very basis and mission of those universities. In this way, even secular universities constrain academic freedom on the basis of a shared starting point, even if the content of that starting point differs from, and is less specific than, that of Christian universities.

(2) But even if this were not so, on an individual level, every scholar works with what [Yale philosopher] Nick Wolterstorff calls "control beliefs" (Reason within the Bounds of Religion, chap. 9) that act as self-imposed limits on what theories that scholar will even consider. For example, someone who holds the non-existence of God as a control belief will always rule out a theory that involves miraculous divine intervention in the course of events, no matter how strong the evidence in its favour (I'm preaching to the converted here, I know). Admittedly, control beliefs can be revised over time, but at any given moment, every scholar must operate within their parameters. Even if the faculty at a secular university (unlike at a Christian one) have not joined together on the basis of shared control beliefs, the individuals concerned are still operating with those beliefs. And in any case, as I argue under (1), I think the secular academy does have some shared control beliefs, whether it wants to admit it or not.

Thus, the Canadian Association of University Teachers now has four good reasons to completely halt its blacklisting project—or, as Reason 4 suggests, at least include the rest of Canada's universities on its list.

P.S. Here is a list of faculty at Canadian universities and colleges who reject CAUT's investigations concerning academic freedom at faith-mandated postsecondary institutions: Faculty Statement on CAUT.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Faith statements impinge on academic freedom? (Part 3 of 4)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, May 6, 2010)

Faith statements impinge on academic freedom? (Part 3 of 4)

The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) is blacklisting several Christian universities because, CAUT alleges, these schools violate academic freedom. According to CAUT, culprit schools “have imposed [on faculty] a requirement of a commitment to a particular ideology or statement [of faith] as condition of employment,” and so such schools “cannot be practicing academic freedom.” Thus, or so CAUT would have us believe, the blacklisted Christian schools lack legitimacy and credibility.

I think CAUT’s blacklisting project is problematic, for three reasons. (Last times I set out reasons 1 and 2; this time I will set out reason 3.) [For a fourth reason, see my column of February 24, 2011.]

Reason 3: It is in an important sense false that a Christian school’s requirement for faculty to subscribe to a statement of faith means that such schools “cannot be practicing academic freedom.”

Consider the following. I teach at a Christian university college, and my school’s statement of faith requires me to acknowledge the following central doctrines as true: that God exists, that Jesus is God incarnate, that Jesus physically resurrected from the grave. (There are other doctrines, but space is a concern here.)

Now also consider this. I have three degrees in philosophy from respectable Canadian secular universities: BA (University of Calgary), MA (University of Windsor), and PhD (University of Waterloo). The focus of my academic research has been to examine the merits of philosophical objections concerning Christianity in general and Jesus’ resurrection in particular. My academic work has included the study of logic and critical thinking, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and ethics.

Yes, there is much that I don’t know, but I believe that I have sufficiently good reasons for freely accepting my school’s faith statement.

Now—and here is my point—at the school that employs me I have the freedom to continue to investigate the truth claims of my school’s faith statement. In fact, my school encourages me to do academic research which addresses contemporary philosophical objections concerning core doctrines of the Christian faith.

For example, a year or so ago my department head asked me to review atheist Richard Dawkins’ best-selling book The God Delusion, a book highly critical of core Christian doctrine. My research into Dawkins’ work turned into a faculty forum presentation plus two articles for an academic journal.

And here is another point: When I teach philosophy at the school at which I am employed, I encourage students to investigate freely and carefully the relevant aspects of our school’s faith statement when we address the big philosophical questions: Does God exist? Is it reasonable to believe that Jesus’ resurrection occurred? Is the concept of incarnation logically coherent? What is truth? Can we know truth? Is anything really right or wrong? Is God relevant to ethics? That sort of thing.

My students have the freedom to disagree with my views (and the school’s views) on these questions, as long as they argue well—i.e., appeal to good reasons and evidence, plus show respect to those with whom they disagree. In fact, we seek truth together, and we sometimes know truth (and sometimes even know it well), all the while acknowledging that we are fallible and that our knowledge is not exhaustive. Often we end up with a reasonable faith.

Surely, my students and I have—and practice—academic freedom, even though I subscribe to a faith statement.

CAUT, then, is in an important sense mistaken that a Christian school’s requirement for faculty to subscribe to a statement of faith means that the school “cannot be practicing academic freedom.”

Therefore, to the Canadian Association of University Teachers and its blacklist project, I say this: In the name of academic freedom broadly conceived (my reason 1), in the name of careful philosophical thinking (my reason 2), and in the name of the freedom to seek truth even under the auspices of a faith statement (my reason 3), please stop.

P.S. See also my reason 4.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence College, located in Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada. Providence College is a Christian university college that asks its faculty to agree with a statement of faith.)

Faith statements impinge on academic freedom? (Part 2 of 4)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, April 29, 2010)

Faith statements impinge on academic freedom? (Part 2 of 4)

The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) is blacklisting several Christian universities because, CAUT alleges, these schools violate academic freedom. According to CAUT, academic freedom is the teacher’s right to teach and do research “without restriction by prescribed doctrine.” According to CAUT, culprit schools “have imposed [on faculty] a requirement of a commitment to a particular ideology or statement [of faith] as condition of employment.” Thus, or so CAUT apparently would have us believe, the blacklisted Christian schools lack academic legitimacy and credibility.

I think CAUT’s blacklisting project is problematic, for three reasons. (Last time I set out reason 1; this time I will set out reason 2; next time reason 3.) [See reason 4 in my column of February 24, 2011.]

Reason 2: CAUT’s blacklist relies on a questionable philosophical assumption.

For CAUT’s blacklist actually to cast doubt on the academic legitimacy or credibility of the work done by Christian groups of academics which operate under a statement of faith, CAUT is assuming that no scholarly sub-community can appropriately settle on and commit to some philosophical-theological truths unless the larger (dominating) academic culture approves. But this assumption is dubious.

CAUT’s assumption is dubious because it unfairly deals a trump card to those philosophical-theological positions—i.e., agnosticism and atheism—which hold philosophical-theological truth claims to be unknowable or false.

CAUT is in effect assuming a privileged epistemological (knowledge) status for agnosticism and atheism. And, because these philosophies are either popular among or held by at least a few influential CAUT members, the assumption of this privileged epistemological status has the following result: it automatically gives CAUT the (self-appointed) authority to judge as academically illegitimate the work of those scholars who—God forbid!—freely band together and corporately commit to studying under the doctrinal banner that the Christian God is real and can be known.

CAUT, then, is engaged in philosophical self-promotion.

What is worse (for CAUT), CAUT’s epistemological assumption shows that CAUT is out of touch with much contemporary philosophy of religion (my area of academic specialization). Over the past few decades in many Anglo-American university philosophy departments, there has been a rebirth of respectable philosophical argumentation that defends (a) the truth of God’s existence, (b) the reasonableness of belief in Jesus’ miraculous resurrection, plus (c) the logical coherence of Christianity’s core theological doctrines.

In other words, when, under the veil of “academic freedom,” the philosophical-theological legitimacy of recent work in contemporary philosophy of religion is in effect dismissed—without argument—by the privileged epistemic status CAUT grants to the agnostic-atheistic positions, CAUT is engaging in philosophical sleight of hand.

Via its blacklist, CAUT is, wittingly or unwittingly, imposing its preferred philosophical-theological views onto the broader academic community. But this is not academic freedom, it is academic bullying.

Therefore, to CAUT and its blacklist project, I say this: In the name of academic freedom broadly conceived—and in the name of careful philosophical thinking—please stop.

Next time I’ll set out my third reason for thinking that the CAUT’s blacklist is problematic. (Spoiler alert: I think it is in an important sense false that a school’s requirement for faculty to subscribe to a statement of faith means that the school “cannot be practicing academic freedom.”)

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence College, located in Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada. Providence College is a Christian university college that asks its faculty to agree with a statement of faith.)

Faith statements impinge on academic freedom? (Part 1 of 4)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, April 22, 2010)

Faith statements impinge on academic freedom? (Part 1 of 4)

The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) is blacklisting several Christian universities because, CAUT alleges, these schools violate academic freedom. According to CAUT, academic freedom is the teacher’s right to teach and do research “without restriction by prescribed doctrine.” According to CAUT, culprit schools—Trinity Western University (presently blacklisted), Canadian Mennonite University, Redeemer University, Crandall University (the latter three are in CAUT's sights)—“have imposed a requirement of a commitment to a particular ideology or statement [of faith] as condition of employment.” According to James Turk, executive director of CAUT, “A school that requires its faculty to subscribe to a particular religious belief or ideology cannot be practicing academic freedom.”

I think CAUT’s blacklisting project is problematic, for three reasons. [Actually, four reasons.  I set out reason 4 in my column of February 24, 2011.]

Reason 1: CAUT is thwarting academic freedom broadly conceived.

In defence of reason 1, I will appeal to some insights from Regent College Professor John C. Stackhouse Jr., an academic with professional experience in both secular and faith-based universities.

In University Affairs (a publication for university teachers), Stackhouse points out the following: Wholly unqualified academic freedom, as found in modern secular universities, and partially qualified academic freedom, as found in explicitly faith-based Christian universities, are both important in a society that values academic freedom.

According to Stackhouse, there is something positive about a secular community of scholars which has unqualified academic freedom (i.e., there is radical plurality, no assumption is taken for granted, and study moves on from there); and there is something positive about a faith-based community of scholars which has qualified academic freedom (i.e., there is a philosophical-theological commonality based on a coherent well-articulated set of grounding assumptions, and study moves on from there).

Stackhouse wisely writes: “I want to urge my fellow Canadian scholars to leave space for the alternative of a community of scholars that can take a number of basic assumptions for granted and go on together to analyze a wide range of important questions. The synergy that comes from such shared intellectual commitments is simply not to be found in the secular university.”

In other words (mine, not Stackhouse’s): Academic freedom when broadly conceived is enhanced if we give scholars the freedom not to have to reinvent the light bulb. That is to say, academic freedom is enhanced if we allow sub-groups of the broader scholarly community to accept the philosophical-theological light that they believe they have discovered, allow them to band together, and allow them to use the aforementioned light as a lamp unto their collective feet.

Of course, they might be mistaken; but perhaps not. Either way, there is an increase in the freedom of the broader academic community to pursue knowledge and truth—which is good.

In view of reason 1, to CAUT and its blacklist project, I say this: In the name of academic freedom broadly conceived, please stop.

Next times I’ll set out my second and third reasons for thinking that the CAUT’s blacklist is problematic. (Spoiler alert: I think CAUT is relying on an unnoticed faulty philosophical criterion in its blacklist. I also think it is in an important sense false that a school’s requirement for faculty to subscribe to a statement of faith means that the school “cannot be practicing academic freedom.”)

[Reminder: I also set out a fourth reason in a later column.]

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence College, located in Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada. Providence College is a Christian university college that asks its faculty to agree with a statement of faith.)