Showing posts with label Slippery Slope Fallacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Slippery Slope Fallacy. Show all posts

March 25, 2020

About slippery slopes: A philosopher critiques a sociologist

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
March 25, 2020




About slippery slopes: A philosopher critiques a sociologist

[This is a letter I sent this week to my local newspaper The Carillon.]

Dennis Hiebert's recent letter (“MAID more complex,” Carillon, March 12, page 7A) shows that he misunderstands the logic of slippery slope arguments. His letter deals with medical assistance in dying; I will focus only on his understanding of slippery slope arguments.

Before I provide my reasons for thinking Dr. Hiebert misunderstands the logic of slippery slope arguments, let me note that I have taught first-year university courses on critical thinking (including at Providence University College, where Dr. Hiebert teaches sociology) and I have studied critical thinking and logic at the graduate level (I have a PhD in philosophy).

Dr. Hiebert writes the following: “[A]ny first year university course on critical thinking will explain why slippery slope arguments are logical fallacies. The slippery slope fallacy is the erroneous belief that a particular position, if taken, will set off a chain of events that will inevitably lead to an undesirable outcome. As one kind of the larger category of fallacies of causation, it constitutes failure to understand cause. Whenever we can refuse, resist, or prevent B from occurring after A, then A cannot be said to produce B inevitably, inalterably, or unequivocally. All slippery slope arguments also involve the fallacy of hasty conclusion, because they fail to consider the complexity of factors in causal chains.

Dr. Hiebert's understanding of slippery slope arguments is problematic for (at least) three reasons.

First, Hiebert assumes (in his first sentence) that all slippery slope arguments are logical fallacies. The fact is, however, that this assumption is false. Some slippery slope arguments are logically fallacious, but some are non-fallacious—they can be reasonably strong.

Here is an example of the slippery slope argument that is fallacious (it's slightly silly, but helpful for illustration). A parent tells his daughter not to chew gum, because if she does, she'll probably begin to smoke cigarettes, which will lead to dancing, then drugs, then theft and murder, and then a lifetime in jail—so don't chew gum.

Clearly, the causal connections between the events on this alleged slippery slope are dubious. Hiebert is correct that such an argument constitutes a failure to understand cause.

Significantly, however—and Hiebert misses this—not all slippery slope arguments are fallacious merely because they are slippery slope arguments. Consider the following non-fallacious slippery slope argument.

If I build a huge bonfire directly under the low hanging branches of a large dry dead tree in a dry dense forest (during a fire ban), there will probably be a domino effect—the bonfire will cause the low hanging branches to ignite, which will cause the tree to ignite, which will cause other trees to ignite, and so on—so I shouldn't build the bonfire.

Or consider this: If I slam on the car brakes and come to a sudden and complete stop on Highway 401 near Toronto during rush hour (the 401 has been referred to as “Canada's busiest highway”), there will probably be a domino effect resulting in perhaps hundreds of collisions—so I shouldn't slam on the brakes and come to a sudden and complete stop on the 401 during rush hour.

So some slippery slope arguments are fallacious, and some are non-fallacious. Careful thinking is required to discern the difference. A slippery slope argument isn't fallacious simply because it's a slippery slope argument, contrary to Dr. Hiebert's assumption.

Second, there is a deeper problem that Hiebert misses. Some non-fallacious slippery slope arguments are more complex than slippery slope arguments based merely on physical causal connections, contrary to what Hiebert seems to think. Rather, they are better understood as arising probabilistically out of connections of what may be called a legal-logical sort.

Such non-fallacious slippery slope arguments hinge on the notion that reasons for one action sometimes also justify other actions that are unintended to be justified by those reasons. (I get this insight from Paul Chamberlain's book Final Wishes: A Cautionary Tale on Death, Dignity, and Physician-Assisted Suicide, which is a book I highly recommend. Dr. Chamberlain is a philosopher at Trinity Western University.)

Here's a fun fictional illustration that I used in my critical thinking courses (before my retirement from Providence as a philosophy professor) which helps students better understand the slippery slope at hand.

Let's say that (before my retirement) I approach my college president and propose that our school should make a policy of giving philosophy students the right to free tuition if they choose to accept it. My reason: philosophy students are people who must think very hard and aren’t guaranteed jobs after graduation. There would be a slippery slope here, for sure!

Once the rest of the student body heard about this policy, students would appeal to a principle of fairness (and would be motivated by greed perhaps) and would argue that all students should receive free tuition, not just philosophy students. Why? Because all students must think very hard and none are guaranteed jobs.

In other words, if thinking hard and having no guarantee of a job after graduation are accepted as sufficient grounds for a student to receive free tuition, then whether a student is taking anthropology, business, history, philosophy, psychology, sociology—or whatever—doesn’t make a relevant difference. The principle of fairness is fundamental, and the differences between academic disciplines, though real, are incidental. Fairness demands consistency.

Thus, if my college makes a policy (the “legal” bit of the legal-logical slippery slope) that gives philosophy students free tuition on the basis of hard thinking and lack of a job guarantee, then, in the name of fairness and consistency (the logical bit of the legal-logical slippery slope), the college should ensure that all students receive free tuition.

If my boss doesn't want to be unfair or inconsistent (and doesn't want our university to go broke), then he shouldn't give philosophy students the proposed deal.

Our lesson: The above non-fallacious, logical-legal slippery slope argument ensues because the reason behind my proposal justifies much more than intended. Alleged safeguards (e.g., philosophy students only) fail, because they are incidental—out-weighed by the major logical-legal principle that's been accepted.

(In the context of MAID/medical assistance in dying, the primary principle that a sufferer has the right to end his/her life will also outweigh safeguards such as terminal illness only, because suffering isn't limited to terminal illness. The alleged right to end one's life because of suffering justifies not only the situation of the terminally ill, but also those situations of the elderly, the disabled, the parent suffering the loss of a child, the person suffering chronic back pain, the depressed teenager, the person suffering existential despair/ meaninglessness/ feelings of being a burden, etc.)

Third, in view of my previous two reasons it's simply not true, as Hiebert claims, that “All slippery slope arguments also involve the fallacy of hasty conclusion, because they fail to consider the complexity of factors in causal chains.”

Why? Because Dr. Hiebert's understanding of slippery slope arguments fails to consider the complexity of such arguments. Some, such as the legal-logical slippery slope, do not commit the fallacy of hasty conclusion—they reasonably show that some social policy changes make an outcome more probable. They add grease to the slope.

For additional criticism of Hiebert's letter, I recommend Michael Zwaagstra's March 19 Carillon column, “Straight talk on assisted suicide.”

For additional criticism of MAID, please see my February 18 article available online at MercatorNet: “Putting the pros and cons of euthanasia under the microscope: A Canadian philosopher examines the euphemism of 'medical assistance in dying'.”



Hendrik van der Breggen is a retired philosophy professor who lives in Steinbach, Manitoba, Canada.


For additional reading on slippery slopes by Hendrik van der Breggen:

Additional writings on physician-assisted suicide by Hendrik van der Breggen:

Articles on physician-assisted suicide by other authors:

Books on physician-assisted suicide by other authors:

Videos on physician-assisted suicide:


April 28, 2011

Slippery Slope Arguments (Part 2)


APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, April 28, 2011

Non-Fallacious Logical-Legal Slippery Slope Arguments

(See part 1 here.)

A slippery slope argument is an argument that claims a particular action shouldn't be taken because this action will result in a series of events which will land us in a place that's bad or disastrous. The slippery slope fallacy occurs when the argument's alleged links between the individual events in the series lack evidence or are implausible. Sometimes slippery slope arguments are fallacious, sometimes not.

Today I will look at two non-fallacious, logical-legal slippery slope arguments.

First, I will set out a fun fictional example having to do with the college at which I work. Then I will set out a serious, possibly non-fictional example having to do with a moral issue in contemporary Canadian politics.

1. Fun fictional example.

Let's say that I approach my college president and propose that our college should give philosophy students the right to free tuition if they choose to accept it. My reason: philosophy students are people who must think very hard and aren’t guaranteed jobs after graduation.

There would be a slippery slope effect here of a logical-legal sort, for sure!

Once the rest of the student body heard about this proposal, students would appeal to a principle of fairness (and would be motivated by greed perhaps) and would argue that all students should receive free tuition, not just philosophy students. Why? Because all students must think very hard and none are guaranteed jobs.

In other words, if thinking hard and having no guarantee of a job after graduation are sufficient grounds for a student to receive free tuition, then whether a student is taking anthropology, business, history, philosophy, psychology—or whatever—doesn’t make a relevant difference. The principle of fairness is fundamental, and the differences between academic disciplines, though real, are incidental. Fairness demands consistency.

Thus, if my college gives philosophy students free tuition on the basis of hard thinking and lack of a job guarantee, then, in the name of fairness and consistency, the college should ensure that all students receive free tuition.

If my boss doesn't want to be unfair or inconsistent (and doesn't want our college to go broke), then he shouldn't give philosophy students the proposed deal.

Our lesson: The above non-fallacious, logical-legal slippery slope argument ensues because the reason behind my proposal justifies much more than intended.

2. Serious possibly non-fictional example.

Now, let's say a Canadian politician argues that we should give terminally ill patients the legal right to physician-assisted suicide (PAS). Why? Because, our politician argues, we should respect the personal autonomy of those who suffer—i.e., we should grant those who suffer the freedom to choose PAS.

Also, our politician argues, there is no need to worry about the spread of PAS to other contexts, because we can set up legal safeguards so only the terminally ill will have the right to PAS.

With all due respect to our politician, however, we should notice that here too is a danger of a non-fallacious logical-legal slippery slope.

Law courts will do what law courts do: promote consistency. Couple this fact with the fact that the fundamental principle to which our politician appeals is the principle that the sufferer has the right to choose PAS.

From these facts, it’s easy to imagine a lawyer arguing that the choice of the person who suffers is fundamental—most important—and so the importance of the context of terminal illness is secondary.

Surely, or so the lawyer's argument would go, if someone is suffering from something other than a terminal illness, say, chronic back pain, then that person should also have the right to PAS.

In addition, or so another lawyer's argument would go, the disabled person who suffers from depression should also have the right to PAS.

And so on.

After all, as the lawyers would argue, the right of the sufferers to choose to end their suffering is a fundamental principle, and the differences between the contexts of terminal illness, chronic back pain, and depression, though real, are merely incidental. It would only be fair and consistent to apply this fundamental principle to all who suffer. Thus, the lawyers would argue, all sufferers should have the freedom to choose PAS.

In other words, if we accept the principle of the autonomy of the sufferer as a justification for PAS, then a non-fallacious logical-legal slippery slope is a reasonable foreseeable outcome.

Hence, if we are concerned about the spread of PAS beyond the context of terminal illness, the politician’s argument should be rejected.

Our lesson: The politician's appeal to the principle of the autonomy of the sufferer, i.e., the principle that the sufferer has the right to choose physician-assisted suicide, justifies much more than initially intended.

The logical-legal slippery slope—when not fallacious—can be dangerous.

***

[P.S. Here is yet another example of a non-fallacious logical-legal slippery slope, which is also serious and possibly non-fictional.

Let's say that our politician argues that we should justify the legal and moral status of same-sex sexual relationships solely on the basis of love. Why? Because, our politician argues, love is a fundamental principle and so love is sufficient grounds for justifying one's choice of a sexual partner. The personal autonomy that lies at the heart of love is what's most important—and trumps all.

Should we accept this argument? As politically incorrect and insensitive as this may seem, I think we should not. Why? Because we have yet another non-fallacious logical-legal slippery slope lurking here. The politician's appeal to love justifies much more than initially intended.

Think about it. If my choice to love X is sufficient grounds for having sex with X, then, yes, X could be an adult of the same sex. But we should keep in mind that X is a place-holder: X could also be, say, a group of people (think polygamy), or X could be a child (think pedophilia).

But, our politician would argue, we could establish legal safeguards to limit X to one adult only. Yes, we could try. I strongly suspect, however, that such safeguards could be overridden by appeals to personal autonomy. If I've already accepted love as a fundamental principle—i.e., if I've already accepted the personal autonomy to choose to love in whichever way I please as a fundamental right—then, in the name of love, I should have the choice to engage in sex with whomever I want.

I know that this last possibly non-fictional, logical-legal slippery slope argument may seem silly and far-fetched, but I think that lawyers hired by proponents of having multiple wives (e.g., some Muslim and Mormon groups) or lawyers hired by NAMBLA (i.e., the North American Man-Boy Love Association) would disagree.]

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Canada.The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence. )

April 24, 2011

Slippery Slope Arguments (Part 1)

Thanks to Marla Williamson for the above work of art.
APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, April 21, 2011

Slippery Slope Arguments: Sometimes fallacious, sometimes not

A slippery slope argument is an argument that claims a particular action shouldn't be taken because this action will result in a series of other actions which will land us in a place that's bad or disastrous. The slippery slope fallacy occurs when the argument's alleged causal connections between the individual actions in the series lack evidence or are implausible.

Sometimes the slippery slope fallacy is called the domino fallacy. As logician T. E. Damer points out, "The name of the domino fallacy derives from the child’s game of lining up dominoes on end about an inch apart and then pushing the first one over, causing a chain reaction of falling dominoes." Damer adds, "The chain reaction works in the child’s game, but not all events are arranged so that a falling-domino effect ensues."

Here is an example of the slippery slope/ domino fallacy (from Damer). A college professor tells the following to her students: “I do not permit questions in my class, because if I allow one student to ask a question, then everyone starts asking questions, and the first thing you know, there is not enough time for my lecture.”

In reply, it should be noted that the asking of a question by one student probably will not end up with the whole class asking questions throughout the class. A question in one student’s mind, when asked and answered, probably will satisfy other students because they too had the same question. Also, the professor can advise students who have further questions to visit her during the professor's office hours.

Here is another example of the slippery slope/ domino fallacy (slightly silly, but helpful). A parent tells his daughter not to chew gum, because if she does, she'll probably begin to smoke cigarettes, which will lead to dancing, then drugs, then theft and murder—and then a lifetime in jail.

Clearly, the causal connections between the events on this alleged slippery slope are dubious. You get the picture.

Significantly, however, not all slippery slope arguments are fallacious. Consider the following non-fallacious, slippery slope argument.

If I build a campfire directly under a tree in a dry dense forest, there will probably be a domino effect, and we'll end up with a forest fire—so I shouldn't build the campfire.

Or consider this: If I slam on the car brakes and come to a sudden and complete stop on Highway 401 near Toronto during rush hour (the 401 has been referred to as "Canada's busiest highway"), there will probably be a domino effect resulting in perhaps hundreds of collisions—so I shouldn't slam on the brakes on the 401.

Slippery slope arguments—some are fallacious, some are non-fallacious. Careful thinking is required to discern the difference.

Next week we will examine some non-fallacious, legal-logical slippery slope arguments—arguments typically found in politics. Stay tuned!

See part 2 here.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, CanadaThe views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)