Philosophical bewitchments

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, December 10, 2015

Philosophical bewitchments

According to philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1899-1951), "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language." By this he meant (among other things) that often our confusions can be resolved by carefully attending to our use of words.

One function of language is to communicate stories to aid our understanding of the world. But sometimes these stories don't help—they bewitch us.

I put it this way: Stories without the light of reason and evidence blind us, and in the darkness bind us. (Yes, I love Lord of the Rings.)

Some examples (mine, not Wittgenstein's).

In the fable of the blind men and the elephant several blind men disagree about what an elephant actually is. A blind man touching the tail says it's a snake, another touching the leg says it's a tree trunk, another touching the tusk says it's a spear, etc. Then a king who sees the whole elephant tells the men they are mistaken: it's a large animal. Moral of the story: We are like the blind men.

But wait. We are all blind, except for the storyteller, who assumes the perspective of the king?

Better lesson: We are not all (completely) blind—we too can have the storyteller's perspective. We can use reason and evidence to evaluate perspectives to realize that some are better (closer to truth) than others.

Here's another bewitching story.

Some philosophers argue that language blocks our knowledge of reality. Language is socially constructed, it reflects our culture's values and reasoning processes, and language continually refers to other language (see dictionary). So we are in a "prison" of language. So communication falters.

But wait. Didn't the communication above take place via language? Didn't you understand what I just wrote?

Lesson: Philosophies of language/ knowledge written in a book must account for the known reality of that book and the known reality that the book's contents (words expressing the author's intentions) can be accurately understood by readers. If not, philosophers would never complain about being misrepresented. But they do. And sometimes rightly so.

Here's another bewitching story.

Some philosophers have held the view that language is meaningless unless a claim can be verified empirically via science or it's analytic (i.e., true by its internal logic, such as "all triangles have three sides").

But wait. This view is neither a finding of science nor true by definition. It's a philosophical view (about science and language). And wouldn't a claim have meaning even before it's verified? If not, how could we know what counts as verification?

Here's another bewitching story.

We all see (interpret) reality via paradigms (conceptual schemes) that are historically situated (conditioned), so all observation is theory-laden (reflecting our historical perspective/ bias), so we can never really know reality as it is.

But wait. Isn't this an observation about reality (i.e., the reality of observing)? Answer: Yes. If so, wouldn't it be theory-laden (historically situated/ biased) too? And if observation's theory-ladenness counts against knowing, wouldn't our theory-laden observation about observation count against not-knowing?

It turns out that the claim that we all see (interpret) reality via paradigms is an outside/ meta-paradigm view, which we apparently do have, at least to some extent. And it's enough to give us a handle on knowing the real.

Another bewitching story.

Science tells us that we only perceive sense-data (the neurological stuff sent to our brains via our senses), not the real world as it is.

But wait. To gain traction via science, doesn't this view depend on our truly seeing (via science) the way the senses and brain actually work? Answer: Yes. But this means that sense-data are not the terminus of perception but, rather, the means—that through which—we actually see.

Another bewitchment.

We all have a perspective, so all perspectives are equal.

No, I tell my students. Turn your face toward me (away from your iPhone), and you'll see me better.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Nietzsche's Skepticism

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, November 25, 2010)

Nietzsche's Skepticism

The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) has influenced much contemporary philosophy by pushing it in a skeptical direction. How? Via his denial of objective truth and his emphasis on personal perspective. Today I will look at Nietzsche's views concerning truth and knowledge plus I will offer a critique.

Famously, Nietzsche asserted that "God is dead" and "we have killed him." The idea is not only that God doesn't exist but also that we have made Him irrelevant to our lives.

While some people might despair in facing an atheistic and ultimately meaningless universe, Nietzsche affirmed life. Indeed, according to Nietzsche, onto the flux that is the world, the human mind constructs order—invents interpretations—to serve the life interests and values of the individual. Moreover, there are only interpretations, no facts. Also, these interpretations are not for truth’s sake, but for survival, health, and the increased domain of our "will to power." In other words, our interpretations—i.e., our perspectives (interpretive judgments concerning facts and values grounded in our interests, background assumptions, conceptual schemes, languages)—do not correspond to reality; they are merely useful.

Appropriately, Nietzsche addresses the concept of truth: “What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms….Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions.” Nietzsche adds: “Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live.” Moreover, Nietzsche writes: “There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes—and consequently there are many kinds of ‘truths,’ and consequently there is no truth.”

Because different people have different styles of survival and health, which arise from their various subjective aesthetic values (tastes) coupled with the exercise of their will to power, the result is a plurality of perspectives, but no truth. Whatever interpretation serves one’s aesthetic interests in the project of affirming and enhancing one’s life is the way to go. Or so Nietzsche would have us think.

Should we agree? Surely not. Thinking people should be skeptical about Nietzsche’s denial of truth and Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Consider the following problems for Nietzsche's views.

Nietzsche’s denial of truth self-refutes. On the one hand, when Nietzsche says truth is mere metaphor or illusion, then Nietzsche’s claim, which purports to be true, is mere metaphor or illusion—i.e., not true. On the other hand, if truth is not mere metaphor or illusion, then Nietzsche’s claim is false. So if Nietzsche's claim is true, it's false, and if it's not true, it's false. Either way, Nietzsche’s denial of truth is guilty of a direct self-refutation charge—and so should be rejected.

Also, when Nietzsche says God is dead and not relevant, Nietzsche presumes that these non-existence and non-relevance claims are true—so Nietzsche’s claim about God indirectly refutes his denial of truth. Moreover, when Nietzsche sets out his will-to-power theory, he is presuming a truth position about this theory/interpretation actually being either simply true or pragmatically justified, which again indirectly refutes his denial of truth. Furthermore, when Nietzsche claims that there are only interpretations and no facts, he presupposes this claim to be in fact true, once again indirectly refuting his denial of truth.

Nietzsche’s perspectivism is similarly problematic. On the one hand, if there is no truth, then perspectivism isn’t true. On the other hand, if there are only perspectives (interpretations), then the thesis that there are only perspectives is a perspective too—one among many. So why go with it?

In other words, as philosopher Paul Copan points out, perspectivism faces a dilemma: “The perspectivalist either (A) says something trivial and thus not worth paying attention to (‘it’s all perspective, but that’s just my own individual perspective’), or (B) contradicts himself (‘it’s all perspective—and I’m speaking for all perspectives—so if you disagree, you’re wrong’).” Either way, perspectivism falters.

But perhaps Nietzsche (or a present-day postmodern disciple of Nietzsche) might reply that there is a missing option: (C) it’s all perspective, but it’s pragmatic for us all to accept perspectivism, for the sake of life. It turns out that this option is problematic too.

First, if C is set out as a truth and not merely a useful claim, then C self-refutes. That is, C would be set out as a non-perspectival truth claim about the usefulness of perspectivism, a claim that transcends perspectives, which C precludes (because, according to C, it’s all perspective).

Second, if C is not set out as a perspective-transcending truth, then the result is a debilitating infinite regress. That is, for us to accept C, C too must presume a perspective that makes it pragmatic for us all to accept it; but, then, that perspective must presume another perspective which makes it pragmatic for us to accept the perspective about perspectives; but, then, that other perspective…and so on. In other words, there is an infinite regress that makes C unintelligible.

So, if option C is the case, then either there is a self-refutation or an infinite regress. Either way, C falters too.

In other words, Nietzsche’s claim that it’s all perspective, all interpretation, doesn’t hold.

Therefore, Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not block our knowledge of the world. As a matter of fact, the obvious remains: there are truths, there are facts, and many of these can be known (albeit fallibly and non-exhaustively).

Significantly, these known truths and facts serve as the ground for interpretation to occur in the first place, and this allows us to do science, history, natural theology, etc.—and apologetics.

P.S. The above column is a slightly revised excerpt from my article, "Awakening from the Nightmare: A Critical Overview of Friedrich Nietzsche's Philosophy," which will be published in Christian Research Journal, Volume 34, Number 01 (January/ February 2011):34-41. If Apologia readers are interested in reading the whole of my article on Nietzsche (along with some additional apologetics-related articles), please be advised that Christian Research Journal can be purchased here.

NOTE: My article "Awakening from the Nightmare: A Critical Overview of Friedrich Nietzsche's Philosophy" is now available online.

Apologia columns on radical skepticism:

• Radical Skepticism (Part 1 of 1): Funky/Pop Skepticism
• Radical Skepticism (Part 2 of 4): Sensory Skepticism
• Radical Skepticism (Part 3 of 4): Kantian Skepticism
• Radical Skepticism (Part 4 of 4): Linguistic Skepticism
• Skepticism Concerning Colours?
• Nietzsche's Skepticism

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)