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| From: Clear Philosophy - Philosophy Made Easy (I would point the arrows in various directions, to show logical interconnections.) |
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The
Carillon, December 11, 2014
Epistemology: Modest Foundationalism
Epistemology is that branch of philosophy which
studies knowledge. As a philosopher, I've come to think that the
epistemological view called modest foundationalism is the way to go.
To understand modest foundationalism, it is
helpful to look at foundationalism in general, classical foundationalism in
particular, plus the latter's weaknesses.
Foundationalism-in-general is the theory of
knowledge that there are two types of solid and secure beliefs: (1) basic
beliefs, which ground or confer justification on other beliefs but are not
themselves grounded or justified by other beliefs; and (2) those other, non-basic
beliefs, which derive their justification from the basic beliefs via some
appropriate belief-forming relation, such as deductive logic, enumerative induction,
inference to best explanation, etc.
The set of properly basic beliefs of the
classical foundationalist consists of—and is limited to—the following three, of
which we have certainty.
(a) Self-evident beliefs. These are propositions
seen to be true once understood: "bachelors are unmarried"
(definitions); 2+2=4 (simple math); "if P then Q, P, therefore Q"
(simple deductive logic).
(b) Incorrigible propositions. These are beliefs
concerning one's own immediate experience which seem immune from doubt: e.g., that
I feel pain.
(c) Sense-data. This is what's evident to my
senses: I seem to see a tree (I am being
appeared to "treely").
Significantly, classical foundationalism is
problematic for two reasons. First, it self-refutes—it doesn't satisfy its own
criteria. It's neither self-evident, nor incorrigible, nor evident to the
senses. It's a philosophical thesis.
Second, it's a philosophical thesis that fails
to include many ordinary beliefs obvious to common sense. Enter modest
foundationalsim.
Modest foundationalists hold that the set of
properly basic beliefs is broader than that of the classical foundationalist,
and certainty isn't required. This larger set of beliefs is justified (modestly)
on the basis that these beliefs are intuitively obvious in the absence of defeaters
(reasons to think otherwise).
That is, what we take to be obviously true via
our sensory/ rational/ moral intuitions is prima
facie (not absolutely) justified. Such intuitions are very apparently true,
and are legitimately believed as such in the absence of good reasons for
thinking our intuitions are mistaken, though, logically, they might be mistaken.
Such intuitions are presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
Modest foundationalism includes not only the
classical foundationalist's basic beliefs (a), (b), and (c), but also most or
all of the following: (d) that we're not trapped in a matrix or a dream (we intuit
this); (e) that the world has existed for more than five minutes (we intuit
this, too); (f) that many of our memory beliefs are accurate (I remember what I
ate for breakfast, so there's no need to cut open my stomach to check).
Also included are (g) that there are minds other
than my own (yes, your friends have them!) and (h) that my ordinary perceptions
of the world are veridical, i.e., I am more or less accurately seeing what's in
the external world when I examine the world around me (when I read this article
I know I truly see variously-shaped squiggly black marks on an actual piece of
paper).
Also, some philosophers add (i): that there are actual,
non-socially-constructed moral truths. We can "just see" (know/
intuit) that beheading babies is really wrong, that cutting children in half is
really wrong, that rape is really wrong (though some suppress this knowledge).
Finally, some philosophers add (j): that God is
real. This is a properly basic belief triggered (as opposed to inferred) when,
say, we experience beauty in nature or read the Bible (though this intuition can
be suppressed, too).
I think that (j) is correct, though I would add
that, if one struggles with or doubts (j), its truth can also be inferred/ discerned via the
evidence of the world—its design, its moral character, plus its evidence of the
life, death, and resurrection of Jesus—all gotten through the use of (a)
through (i) via the study of science, moral philosophy, and history.
(Hendrik
van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)
For further thought:
- Steven Cowan & James Spiegel, The Love of Wisdom: A Christian Introduction to Philosophy
- John S. Feinberg, Can You Believe It's True: Christian Apologetics in a Modern and Postmodern Era
- J. P. Moreland, Love Your God with All Your Mind: The Role of Reason in the Life of the Soul, 2nd edition
