More Critical Thinking Clarifications: Tolerance vs. Tolerance

APOLOGIABy Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, June 18, 2009)

More Critical Thinking Clarifications: Tolerance vs. Tolerance

In previous installments of Apologia we disentangled three blurred conceptual distinctions which hinder the art of argument and critical thinking: judge vs. judge (i.e., damn vs. cognitive discernment), argument vs. argument (i.e., quarrel vs. premises supporting a conclusion), and opinion vs. opinion (i.e., mere guess vs. reasonable belief).

This week we will disentangle a fourth blurred distinction: tolerance vs. tolerance.

“Be tolerant” is today’s oft-heard moral imperative. This principle of tolerance sounds good, but critical thinkers should ask: Is it sound?

Answer: No and yes.

It turns out that there are two senses of “tolerance.” Let’s call them tolerance 1 and tolerance 2. (If my labels seem to lack imagination, blame Dr. Seuss.)

Tolerance 1 is the contemporary popular understanding of tolerance. On this understanding, all views or lifestyles are accepted as somehow equal and true and good. “It’s all interpretation,” so a view/behaviour may be “true for you, but not for me” (and vice versa).

According to tolerance 1, you are intolerant if you disagree with someone’s ideas or conduct, that is, if you think someone is actually mistaken or wrong. According to contemporary popular culture, such intolerance is always a sin.

Sin or no sin, tolerance 1 is false. From the point of view of reason and morality, it’s simply not the case that all ideas and acts are equal, it’s simply not the case that all interpretations are equal.

Think about it. That the Holocaust occurred is true and well supported by evidence, whereas the belief to the contrary is false and not well supported by evidence. That 5+5=10 is true logically, whereas 5+5=11 isn’t true logically.

Think about it some more. Western democracy is a better idea morally than a Nazi government (because the former tends to respect the intrinsic moral worth of people whereas the latter does not). Talking with one’s spouse to resolve a dispute is a better idea morally than beating one’s spouse (because ditto). Child care is a better idea morally than child abuse (because ditto). You get the picture.

Now, consider tolerance 2, which is the classic understanding of tolerance. Tolerance 2 is the practice of forbearance (i.e., patience, self-control, and respect in the face of provocation) toward other persons who hold beliefs or engage in conduct with which we strongly disagree. It’s a willingness to accept a person’s right to espouse a view or engage in a behaviour even though we think the idea is mistaken or the conduct unwise or even immoral.

According to tolerance 2, intolerance is not always a sin. We may be appropriately intolerant of an idea if the idea is truly false and can be shown to be false, and we may be appropriately intolerant of a behavior if the behavior is truly harmful to others and can be shown to be harmful to others.

For example, according to tolerance sense 2, teachers are appropriately intolerant of false answers on an exam and of bullies on the school playground. Also, judges are appropriately intolerant of perjury and of murderers. Also, citizens are appropriately intolerant of governments or other organizations which engage in disinformation or commit (or prepare to commit) genocide.

Clearly, the classic understanding of tolerance (tolerance 2) is superior, intellectually and morally, when compared to the contemporary popular understanding of tolerance (tolerance 1).

Of course, the question now arises: Who’s to say what’s true and good? That is to ask: How do we arbitrate between competing claims about what’s true and good?

Answer: We are to say what’s true and good. How? By discerning what’s true and good via critical thinking—i.e., careful investigation coupled with a humble and truth-seeking heart.

Prayer is helpful too.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

P.S. The photo above is of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C., shortly after white supremacist Holocaust-denier James W. von Brunn went on a shooting spree, killing security guard Stephen T. Johns.

Critical Thinking Clarifications Continued: Opinion vs. Opinion

APOLOGIABy Hendrik van der Breggen

(The Carillon, June 4, 2009)

Critical Thinking Clarifications Continued: Opinion vs. Opinion
In contemporary popular culture the art of argument and critical thinking seems to have become a sometimes forgotten art, if not a lost art. Moreover, lack of proficiency in this art seems due in part to a blurring of (at least) four important conceptual distinctions.

In a previous installment of Apologia we disentangled two of these blurred distinctions: judge vs. judge (damn vs. cognitive discernment), and argument vs. argument (quarrel vs. premises supporting a conclusion). This week we will disentangle a third blurred distinction: opinion vs. opinion.

The following claim often signals the end of what may have begun as an interesting conversation about an important topic: “Everyone is entitled to their opinion.” The idea is that all opinions are equal, and so we can’t go any further intellectually. In other words: please shut up.

Legally and politically, the claim that everyone is entitled to their opinion is true (at least in most Western countries). Logically and evidentially, however, the claim often is not true.

In other words, yes, we do have the right to hold any opinion, but that doesn’t automatically make the opinion right. I have the right to believe that the moon is made of cheese, but that doesn’t mean the moon is made of cheese. Members of the Heaven’s Gate religious cult have the right to believe that killing themselves will get them onto a spaceship behind a comet, but that doesn’t make this religious claim reasonable to believe.

Also, yes, we do have the right to hold any opinion, but that doesn’t automatically make the opinion wrong either. It could be that an opinion corresponds with the facts. In my opinion, the moon is made of some sort of rock. In my opinion, there’s no good evidence for thinking that suicide is a ticket to ride on a spaceship.

To avoid being bamboozled by everyone-is-entitled-to-their-opinion, careful thinkers should make a distinction between (a) mere opinion and (b) opinion as reasonable belief. Careful thinkers should also understand that these sorts of opinion are on opposite ends of a continuum.

On the mere opinion end of the continuum, an opinion is basically a guess or an ungrounded intellectual stab at getting something right. For example, in my (mere) opinion, when my car engine sputters it’s because of some moisture in the gas line. I confess: I am not mechanically inclined, so I’m guessing—and I’m probably mistaken. The sputtering is probably due to dirty spark plugs, or a plugged air filter, or a malfunctioning carburetor, or…. You get the picture. (And, yes, unscrupulous mechanics usually smile with dollar signs in their eyes when they see me walk into their garage.)

On the other end of the continuum, we have opinion as reasonable belief. Such an opinion is well supported by good arguments and evidence and so we are justified in our confidence in thinking the opinion is probably true. Such opinion verges on knowledge or perhaps even is knowledge.

For example, my son’s opinion that his BMW has more horsepower than Ma and Pa’s ancient Mazda is an opinion that’s supported not just by the wonderful (but all too short) drive I was allowed to have in the BMW, but also by various reports from automotive experts. My son’s opinion is not a mere opinion; it’s a reasonable belief.

Another example: Let’s say that you have five doctors’ opinions which say you have cancer. Surely, it would be reasonable to think that you do have cancer! (Hopefully you don’t have cancer, but you get the point.)

In between the two ends of the opinion continuum—i.e., between mere opinion and opinion as reasonable belief—we have opinions that are either weakly or strongly supported, depending on the quality of the evidence and arguments that have been mustered.

So, what should we do the next time we set out a claim backed up with some good reasons and then someone dismisses our view saying, “Well, that’s just your opinion” or “Everyone has a right to their opinion”? We can respond (politely), “Yes, this is my opinion, but it’s not a mere opinion; it’s a reasonable opinion. I’ve got some good reasons for it. So which of these reasons do you think are problematic, and what are your reasons for thinking this?”

Happily, having dispensed with the mind-numbing everyone-is-entitled-to-their-opinion mantra, we could now have a conversation that actually respects the mind of the person with whom we’re talking.

Next week: tolerance vs. tolerance.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Critical Thinking Clarifications: Judge vs. Judge, Argument vs. Argument

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen

(The Carillon, May 21, 2009)

Critical Thinking Clarifications: Judge vs. Judge, Argument vs. Argument

Part of the core of a liberal arts education is the art of argument and critical thinking. I hope I don’t sound snobby saying so, but in contemporary popular culture the art of argument and critical thinking seems to have become a sometimes forgotten art, if not a lost art. Moreover, lack of proficiency in this art seems due in part to a blurring of (at least) four important conceptual distinctions.

In today’s installment of Apologia I would like to disentangle two of these blurred distinctions.

Blurred distinction #1: Judge vs. judge

“Don’t be judgmental,” we are often told. Many people today take this to mean that we should not judge positions/ views as true or false, plausible or implausible, right or wrong. With all due respect, these people are mistaken.

Yes, of course we shouldn’t be judgmental if by “judge” we mean to dismiss another person as morally inferior or worthless (usually when compared to oneself) or we mean to damn that other person (to hell). After all, Jesus said, “Do not judge, or you too will be judged” (Matthew 7:1). It would seem that this sort of judging is God’s job, not ours.

However, Jesus also said, “Stop judging by mere appearances, and make a right judgment” (John 7:24). There is, then, another sense of “judge” which is our job, not just God’s. By this sense of “judge” we mean the cognitive activity of making an accurate discernment.

Surely, some judgments are true and right: e.g., that the earth revolves around the sun; that clean drinking water and food are necessary for good health; that we should try to alleviate the suffering of others. Surely, too, some judgments are false and wrong: e.g., that the earth is the centre of our solar system; that oil spills help animal life flourish; that it’s morally permissible for a father to lock his daughter in a basement so he can rape her.

So, contrary to popular opinion—and as odd as it may sound to contemporary ears—sometimes we should be judgmental (in the sense of making an accurate discernment). Significantly, this requires proficiency in the art of argument and critical thinking.

Blurred distinction #2: Argument vs. argument

“Don’t argue,” we are often told too. Again, an unnoticed ambiguity needs to be brought to light.

The word “argument” can mean quarrel, which happens when voices are raised, fists are clenched, and more heat than light is generated. If this is what we mean by “don’t argue,” then—yes, please—do not argue!

However, the word “argument” can also mean rational persuasion. In this sense, an argument involves a set of statements (premises) which are used to support, prove, or give reasons for another statement (conclusion). Such arguments are used in courts of law, in medicine, in the sciences, in history, in theology, in philosophy—in all careful investigation.

In this second sense of “argument”—i.e., argument as rational persuasion—the art of arguing is a collaborative affair. That is, when engaging in argument (sense 2) people work together to discern which position has the best reasons for thinking it’s true (or not). An important aid to success in this collaboration is that people show respect to those with whom they disagree. In this way, one’s ego or culture doesn’t readily get in the way of truth, since others often know more than we do, and their arguments may be better than ours.

If “don’t argue” means that we should not engage in argument as rational persuasion, then we are inadvertently promoting forms of non-rational persuasion: e.g., propaganda, emotional manipulation, and appeals to force. Significantly, to avoid such non-rational persuasion requires proficiency in the art of argument and critical thinking.

The art of argument and critical thinking is a staple of a liberal arts education. Clearly, a society that promotes liberal arts education is a society that respects and nourishes the minds of its citizens.

Next: Opinion vs. opinion, and tolerance vs. tolerance.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba. Providence is a Christian liberal arts college.)

The Principle of Non-Contradiction

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, May 7, 2009

The Principle of Non-Contradiction

Near the beginning of C. S. Lewis’s The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, a wise professor (in whose home the Pevensie children first discover a passage to Narnia) utters in exasperation, “Logic! Why don’t they teach logic at these schools?”

Lewis (1898-1963) was bemoaning a general lack of proficiency in logic and critical thinking. Were he alive today, I suspect Lewis’s exasperation would continue.

Hoping Lewis would approve, I am going to devote occasional installments of Apologia to the clarification of some fundamental principles of logic and critical thinking.

For starters, let’s consider the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC). PNC says this: It is not the case that something can both be and not be, at the same time and in the same sense. The truth of PNC is known via rational intuition/insight: we simply “see” it to be true, once we think about it.

Strictly speaking, PNC cannot be proved because PNC is foundational to logic and thinking. Nevertheless, it seems quite reasonable to offer an indirect defence of PNC. How? By relying on PNC long enough to allow us to have a look at what would be the case if we attempted to abandon PNC.

(Note: We needn't be embarrassed at this limited question-begging since any opponent of PNC would have to do this too when he or she relies on PNC to argue for, contemplate, or assert the rejection of PNC.)

As an indirect defence of PNC, consider the following fun but insightful dialogue between A and B, two fictional disciples of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). (This dialogue is from H. Gensler’s book Formal Ethics [Routledge 1996], pp. 36-37.)

A: Are you still a follower of Hegel?

B: Of course! I believe everything that he wrote. Since he denied the law of noncontradiction [a.k.a. PNC], I deny this too. On my view, P [where P is any proposition] is entirely compatible with not-P.

A: I'm a fan of Hegel myself. But he didn't deny the law of noncontradiction.

B: You read the wrong commentators!

A: Don't get so upset! You said that he did deny the law, and I said that he didn't. Aren't these compatible on your view? After all, you think that P is compatible with not-P.

B: Yes, I guess they're compatible.

A: No they aren't!

B: Yes they are!

A: Don't get so upset! You said that they are compatible, and I said that they aren't. Aren't these two compatible on your view? Recall that you think that P is compatible with not-P.

B: Yes, I guess they're compatible. I'm getting confused.

A: And you're also not getting confused! Right?

(End of fun but insightful dialogue.)

In other words—and more seriously—if one accepts contradictions, then the following pairs of theses are logically compatible (i.e., can be true together): that Martin Luther King's teachings against racial segregation are true, and that Afrikaner teachings in favour of apartheid are true; that women are morally equal to men (a view of western civilization), and that women are morally inferior to men (a Taliban claim); that murder is wrong (believed by most people), and that murder isn’t wrong (believed by serial killer Ted Bundy).

Surely, though, each of the above pairs of claims is logically inconsistent—logically contradictory—and cannot be true together.

It very much seems, then, that the Principle of Non-Contradiction is true: it’s not the case that something can both be and not be, at the same time and in the same sense.

Logic! It should be taught in every school.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches critical thinking at Providence College. Hendrik ensures that all his students learn the Principle of Non-Contradiction.)