Easter?

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, April 13, 2017

Easter?

Easter is the celebration of Jesus’ resurrection.

The Christian “gospel” or good news is that God loves us and has defeated death.

God (God the Son) became a human being in the man Jesus. By suffering and dying on a cross, Jesus took our punishment for sin onto Himself. Then God (the Father) raised Jesus from the grave (tomb).

Jesus’ return to life in the same body but somehow wonderfully renewed is a sign that grounds this good news in reality.

By faith in Jesus—i.e., by believing Jesus' resurrection occurred plus trusting in and submitting to Jesus as Lord—we receive forgiveness and (with help from God the Holy Spirit) we become new creations who learn to love truly and have hope of eternal life.

It's an interesting story. But is it true? Did Jesus actually resurrect?

In the little book Finding the Real Jesus: A Guide for Curious Christians and Skeptical Seekers, investigative journalist and former atheist Lee Strobel argues that Jesus really did resurrect. (Significantly, Strobel's conversion story has just been released as a movie, named after one of his several other books: The Case For Christ.)

Strobel first dismantles some popular claims that purport to cast doubt on the Jesus described by the New Testament (e.g., claims from the Qur’an that Jesus wasn’t killed, claims from the scholar Bart Ehrman that the New Testament can’t be trusted, claims from others that the later Gnostic gospels are more reliable than the New Testament).

Ably sweeping away the skeptical confusion, Strobel then sets out a historical case for Jesus’ resurrection, a case that consists of (at least) five facts.

Fact 1: Jesus was killed by crucifixion.

Fact 2: Within days of Jesus’ death, Jesus’ disciples believed that He physically rose and appeared to them.

Fact 3: Paul, a former foe of the early church, claimed he saw the resurrected Jesus.

Fact 4: The skeptic James (Jesus’ half-brother) believed Jesus resurrected.

Fact 5: Jesus’ tomb was empty.

Strobel points out that the vast majority of New Testament scholars, whether skeptical of Jesus’ resurrection or not, concede the historicity of these facts.

Also, Strobel defends each of the above historical facts, emphasizing that the witnesses not only suffered immensely for the alleged truth of their belief but also knew, because they claimed to be eye witnesses, whether their belief was true or not.

Significantly, this makes them unlike the general religious person (or religious fanatic) who might suffer and die for his/her belief but doesn’t know first-hand whether his/her belief is true. Rather, the witnesses knew the truth of their resurrection claim, and they were willing to give up physical comfort and suffer immensely to proclaim Jesus’ actual resurrection.

Strobel’s conclusion: the best explanation of the evidence is Jesus’ miraculous resurrection.

I think Strobel is right.

Because of what we know about dead bodies (e.g., irreversible cell death and decay), a resurrection, if it happened, would be best explained as supernaturally caused.

Also, in view of the general evidence suggesting God’s existence (see Strobel's book The Case for a Creator), and in view of Jesus’ self-understanding as God, this means that a God-caused resurrection shouldn’t be ruled out prior to historical investigation.

(Asserting prior to investigation that Jesus' resurrection is impossible or improbable assumes there is no God who sometimes does miracles. But this assumption is at issue. Thinking otherwise commits the question-begging fallacy, the mistake of assuming as established what is at issue.)

Moreover, the witnesses’ declarations concerning Jesus’ resurrection should be taken seriously. As New York Law School professor Annette Gordon-Reed points out (in a different case), “Declarations against interest are regarded as having a high degree of credibility because of the presumption that people do not make up lies in order to hurt themselves; they lie to help themselves.”

All this counts in favour of taking the resurrection reports handed down to us via the historical facts as truthful.

The result: Jesus’ miraculous—i.e. God-caused—resurrection is strongly suggested by, plus makes good sense of, the historical evidence.

Happy Easter!

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College.)

For further reading:

• Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony
• Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the New Testament
• William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith
• William Lane Craig, On Guard
• Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus
• Sean McDowell, The Fate of the Apostles
• Hendrik van der Breggen, Turning Hume’s argument against miracle reports onto its head
• Hendrik van der Breggen, Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science

Did the Easter miracle happen?

Note: The following article was published in 2004 in The Record (a Kitchener-Waterloo newspaper) and I post it here to make it available to interested readers. The article was the 2005 winner of the General Readership category (newspaper article) awarded by The Word Guild.

A scene from the 2004 film The Passion of The Christ, directed by Mel Gibson

Did the Easter miracle happen?

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Record, April 10, 2004

Think of Easter and immediately bunnies and coloured eggs come to mind. However, as Mel Gibson's film The Passion of the Christ has reminded us, Easter has more to do with Jesus and the Christian gospel than it has to do with chocolate.

The traditional Christian gospel or good news is that God (God the Son) came to Earth in the man Jesus, He took our punishment for sin onto Himself by suffering and dying on a cross, and then God (the Father) raised Jesus from the grave (tomb). Jesus' resurrection, that is His return to life in the same body but somehow wonderfully renewed, is said to be a glorious sign to help us believe—accept by faith—the good news.

Of course, this begs the question: Is it reasonable to believe that Jesus actually resurrected?

In the little book The Case for Easter: A Journalist Investigates the Evidence for the Resurrection (Zondervan 2003), former journalist and former spiritual skeptic Lee Strobel argues that, yes, it is reasonable to believe that Jesus actually resurrected.

Strobel makes his case for Jesus' resurrection by appealing to, and defending, three historical facts:

○ Jesus was actually killed by crucifixion;

○ The tomb in which Jesus' dead body was placed was found empty a couple days later;

○ And Jesus was subsequently seen alive and well for several weeks in various locations, not only by a skeptic who touched Him to make sure He wasn't a ghost, but also by other individuals and variously sized groups of people, many of whom engaged Jesus in conversation and had meals with Him—and would later endure torture and death rather than recant their testimony.

THERE ARE OTHER EXPLANATIONS

Strobel also considers alternative, non-resurrection explanations—such as Jesus didn't really die, the witnesses hallucinated, a conspiracy occurred or it's all legend—but argues that they are all weak. Strobel's arguments are, I believe, strong, but because of space limitations I won't discuss those arguments here. I recommend that anyone who is interested in the problems with the non-miracle theories check out Strobel's book.

What I find interesting is that the alternative non-resurrection explanations, even the most outlandish ones which haven't a shred of evidence in their favour, such as Jesus has an unknown twin who pretended to be the resurrected Jesus after Jesus died, tend to be set forth by many—and clung to—primarily because of a philosophical reason.

How so? The proponents of the far-fetched have been infected by a skeptical philosophical view that has been transmitted to us from the Scottish philosopher David Hume.

If your son or daughter goes to university today and takes an introductory philosophy class, he or she will probably run into David Hume. Well, not David Hume in person, but a philosophy professor who is a kindred spirit.

Hume lived from 1711 to 1776. He is famous, rather notorious, for, among, other things, his argument against miracles. According to Hume, no matter how good the historical evidence is for a miracle such as Jesus' resurrection—even if the miracle actually occurred—the evidence is never good enough.

Hume argues that a miracle is a violation of a law of nature and that the laws of nature are very well established. The result, according to Hume, is that a miracle's occurrence is maximally improbable, and this maximal improbability counts against any good testimony for a miracle, either balancing the testimony (thereby providing grounds to suspend belief) or outweighing it (thereby providing grounds for disbelief). In reality, Hume thinks the latter is the case. Either way, though, Hume would have us dismiss miracle testimonies as unreasonable to believe.

CIRCULAR REASONING

Having studied Hume's argument for my master's thesis in philosophy at the University of Windsor and for my PhD dissertation in philosophy at the University of Waterloo, I have come to conclude that Hume's argument fails.

His argument fails because it begs the question. It “begs the question” in the sense that it engages in circular reasoning, it assumes as proven that which is at issue, and it sneaks the conclusion into the premises.

As mentioned, Hume takes the violation-of-law-of-nature aspect of a miracle to be sufficient grounds for counting the violated laws of nature wholly and destructively against miracle testimony—to judge the miracle to be maximally improbable.

Interestingly, in the case of Jesus' resurrection, such an event is maximally improbable, given the laws of nature and given that there is no intervention from outside the physical system. Significantly, this brings to light the fact that Hume makes the assumption that to make a probability judgment all that is needed is our knowledge of the relevant laws of nature.

But, it should be emphasized, we are supposedly talking about a miraculous resurrection (as suggested by the evidence), and so, although we are given the laws of nature, we are not given that there is no intervention from outside the system.

So in assuming that all that is needed is our knowledge of the relevant laws of nature and nothing about any possible intervention from outside of nature, Hume is, in effect, assuming that either God does not exist (and so God never intervenes via miracles) or, if God does exist, God's intentions concerning nature are shown to us wholly by the laws of nature (and so God never intervenes via miracles).

But if, as Hume assumes for the sake of argument, there is good evidence for what seems very much to be a miracle—Hume even allows it to be a real miracle—then Hume's assumption about the background knowledge is at issue.

In other words, in order for Hume's argument to work, it requires the assumption that the laws of nature express either all the goings-on of a universe without God or, if God exists, all of God's intentions concerning the universe. But the truth of this assumption must be put on hold when a miracle (whether actual or alleged) is supposed to be under investigation.

Indeed, for one's mind to be actually open to the possibility of the occurrence of an occasional real miracle—a possibility Hume allows, at least for the sake of argument—requires that the assumption Hume makes be suspended—at least when one is purportedly investigating the evidence for a miracle.

In other words, Hume's argument works only if we assume that there is no God who on rare occasions intervenes in nature, but this assumption is at issue when we are considering any alleged evidence for miracles.

LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE

Thus, by assuming the above-described background knowledge, Hume mistakenly begs the question which only the (alleged) miracle evidence can answer.

Hume's mind is already made up then, and not open to what the evidence suggests.

The upshot is that if your mind is not already closed to the possibility of a God who occasionally does a miracle, that is, if your mind is open to the possibility of God's existence and the possibility of this God intervening in nature, then the facts surrounding Jesus' alleged resurrection may make a miraculous resurrection explanation plausible, and even reasonable to believe.

If you weren't a believer in the past, Easter might now take on a whole new meaning.

Postscript (September 17, 2016): The notion of God “intervening” in nature can also be understood as God engaging in a special act vis-à-vis God's ongoing act of sustaining the creation. Space limitations in a newspaper article are not conducive to adding philosophical-theological nuance.

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Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College.

Miracles and historical investigation

Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, January 21, 2016

Miracles and historical investigation

Theologian Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) argues it's not reasonable to discern that a miracle has occurred in history. But his argument fails.

According to Troeltsch, on the basis of analogy to events known to us coupled with the assumption that nature behaves uniformly, we apply what we know about the present onto evidence having to do with the past, and thereby we extend our knowledge into the realm of the past.

But we have no knowledge (supposedly) of miracles occurring today (e.g., all dead men stay dead), so when we are given historical evidence for a miracle (e.g., testimony that Jesus allegedly resurrected) we infer by analogy from the present that no miracle occurred in the past (i.e., no resurrection of Jesus occurred).

Troeltsch's use of analogy is an epic fail, however.

Theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014) correctly points out that Troeltsch confuses a principle of method with a principle of content.

As a principle of method, the appeal to analogy should work like this: To say that a miracle didn’t occur requires positive knowledge of analogy of miracle testimonies to testimonies for which we know no actual object corresponds, whereas to say that a miracle did occur requires positive knowledge of analogy of miracle testimonies to testimonies for which we know a real object corresponds. The analogy should be between the testimonies per se, not that to which they testify.

But Troeltsch mistakenly uses analogy as a principle of content concerning what is to be known (i.e., the object of knowledge) rather than as a principle of method which works as a tool (i.e., the basis) by which we discern what is to be known.

Think of it this way. For testimonial evidence to allow us to come to knowledge of the past what we need is a positive analogy between past testimony and present known-to-be-true testimony (i.e., their comparable characteristics or virtues as credible testimonies/ sources); we do not need an analogy between the things testified to (i.e., the testimony's contents). Significantly, if uniqueness of what's testified to counts against a testimony, then nothing new would ever be learned from others!

Again, it is not the lack of a present-day analogy to the object of a testimony that counts against testimony; rather, what counts against a testimony is its positive analogy to present-day testimony to which we know no testified-to object conforms—i.e., what counts against a testimony is its positive analogy to known-to-be-false testimonies such as those of people who are known to exaggerate or hallucinate or lie.

In the case of reports of alleged miracles, to think that there must always be an analogy between the things (objects) testified to is to assume that there is no possibility of a special action by a supernatural cause such as God. But, if the issue is whether such an action actually occurred, this is to beg the question, i.e., assume as proven that which is at issue (a logical "sin").

Troeltsch's appeal to analogy presumes the nature of the object of a testimony because it (his appeal to analogy) requires that all events must be non-miraculous events like the (allegedly) non-miraculous events we see today. However, if the issue is whether all events are non-miraculous—which is the issue if we’re trying to determine whether an actual miracle has occurred by investigating evidence—then Troeltsch smuggles a predetermined outcome into an alleged investigation. He puts the cart before the horse.

At this juncture, one might follow philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) and object that a miracle such as Jesus' resurrection is maximally improbable. But this objection assumes either we know that God doesn't exist (so miracles are maximally improbable) or we know that, if God exists, God's intentions are wholly revealed by the laws of nature (so miracles are maximally improbable). But we don't know this! These assumptions are question-begging, too, if the issue is whether a God-caused event (such as Jesus' resurrection) has actually occurred and is evidence for a God who sometimes engages in special actions.

All this to say: miracles can be studied historically.

In view of competing worldview claims—e.g., Christianity vs. Islam vs. Atheism—such study should be done.

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

Further reading:

• Turning Hume’s argument against miracle reports onto its head (April 24, 2025)
• Easter and Historical Investigation (Apologia, April 17, 2014)
• Do Jesus’ miracles violate the laws of nature (Apologia, April 3, 2014)
• Easter and Philosophy (Apologia, April 8, 2010)
• Believing Christmas because of Easter (Apologia, December 17, 2009)
• Did Easter happen? (Apologia, April 8, 2009)

• Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament, by Craig Keener
• "History and Miracles," by Francis Beckwith (In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God's Action in History)
• "Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science," Ph.D. dissertation by Henry Van Der Something-or-other (see chapter 5, pp. 360-374)

Various thoughts (again)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, November 12, 2015

Various thoughts (again)

Sometimes I sit on our deck, quietly puffing on my pipe, and I think. What follows are some of my thoughts. They're somewhat disconnected and perhaps disconcerting—read at your own risk.

● The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba is asking the public for feedback on "Physician Assisted Dying." Here's a wee bit of feedback from me. Yes, I'm pretty sure we all want physician assisted dying: please don't abandon us as we die, please provide clean sheets, food, and morphine as death takes its course. Thank you. Oh, wait, sorry, I misunderstood: you're actually wondering if I'd like for you to kill me? Maybe the college should be asking the public for feedback on Physician Assisted SUICIDE. Just saying.

● The Supreme Court of Canada says physician assisted suicide (er, I mean, "dying") will be legal as of February 6, 2016. Doesn't this reflect poorly on all our efforts on suicide prevention? Are only some suicides worth preventing? National Suicide Prevention Week (revised): Monday to Thursday only?

● The survey from Manitoba's College of Physicians and Surgeons tells us that "Physicians must not impose their moral or religious beliefs about physician assisted dying on patients." Hmmm. Isn't the college imposing the moral belief that life is no longer the default position and so the patient must choose to live or die? (Intellectual health warning: Somebody is having their philosophical cake and eating it too.)

● Physician assisted suicide imposes a terrible burden on the vulnerable. If life is no longer society's default position, then the most vulnerable—the elderly, terminally ill, disabled—must justify their continued existence. This is plain nasty—a kick in the teeth.

● "Progressive" is sometimes a euphemism for "slippery" or "slither."

● Glamour Magazine has named Cecile Richards "Woman of the Year." Yes, this is the woman in charge of Planned Parenthood, the organization that's been killing unborn babies and selling baby parts. And, yes, this magazine awarded the same title to the man Bruce/ "Caitlyn" Jenner. Clearly, glamour ain't what it used to be.

● IVF (in vitro fertilization) involves morally dubious practices and risks: (a) destruction of multiple human embryos (human beings) to get one that "sticks" (in the uterus); (b) possible abortion of excess children if more than one embryo sticks; (c) ongoing frozen "leftovers"; (d) egg harvesting at risk of women's health ("eggsploitation"); (e) increased demand for surrogate mothers ("breeders"); (f) severing of ties to one or more biological parents when anonymous donor sperm or eggs are used; (g) turning of children into commodities. IVF? LOL (lots of lament).

● Science and physicalism/ materialism should be distinguished. Why? Because science—a method (methods) of inquiry—and physicalism/ materialism—a metaphysical philosophical view—might not wholly overlap. We should be open to going wherever the evidence takes us. Maybe a non-physical entity or being (e.g., an intelligent agent/ mind) is a better explanation of the data?

● To dismiss historical investigation of Jesus' miraculous physical resurrection because one thinks that nature's regularities make such a special act by God maximally improbable is to assume that nature's regularities express the whole of God's intentions regarding God's actions, or it is to assume that God doesn't exist. But this is question-begging. (Question-begging is a mistake in reasoning: it's to assume as proven that which is at issue; it's to assume the conclusion in the premises; it's to assume the outcome of an investigation before doing the investigation; it's to put the cart before the horse; it's to commit a philosophical sin—an abuse of reason.)

● Enlightenment/ autonomous reason was an abuse of reason. The problem wasn't reason per se; the problem was the faulty, arrogant assumptions. Abuse or misuse is not a good reason for disuse.

● Jesus is the Logos and the Truth. Think carefully, for Christ's sake.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Easter and historical investigation

"The disciples Peter and John came running to the tomb
on the morning of the resurrection" by Eugene Burnand (1898)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, April 17, 2014 

Easter and historical investigation 

For many, Easter is the celebration of Jesus' bodily, physical resurrection after His death by crucifixion. Jesus' resurrection indicates that we should take Jesus seriously as Lord—God in human flesh. 

Of course, Jesus’ resurrection is a miracle. It’s an event that goes against our expectations of nature's usual course, and it’s caused by God. 

Some object that because a miracle has to do with God, a miracle is beyond historical investigation. 

Typically, Christians accept Jesus’ resurrection via faith, which is legitimate, because this is a work of the Holy Spirit. 

But in a world of competing religious claims (and competing spirits) is it possible to investigate an alleged miracle such as Jesus' resurrection historically (to arbitrate between competing spirits)? 

I think the answer is Yes. 

Note: In much of what follows I am indebted to contemporary philosopher Francis Beckwith (especially his article "History and Miracles" in the book In Defense of Miracles). 

If God were to exist and raise Jesus from the dead within physical space and time, then that miraculous event would have a physical dimension that could be accessed as historical evidence without first applying a theological interpretation to that evidence. 

Think about some of the phenomena surrounding Jesus' alleged resurrection, phenomena that can be—and have been—investigated historically apart from theological interpretation. 

Beckwith sets out the following: 

(1) “the claim by Jesus of Nazareth, a first-century Jewish carpenter, that he was the Son of God and that his resurrection from the dead would establish the truth of his claim." 

Beckwith interjects (in the lecture version of his article): "Why can't that be investigated? You have a historical person who said a number of things." 

(2) “[T]he crucifixion, death and entombment of Jesus (c. A.D. 33).” 

(3) “Jesus' tomb discovered to be empty a few days after his death.” 

(4) “[T]he claim by Jesus' followers that they saw their leader alive several days after the burial." 

It turns out that the above phenomena have been accepted by many if not most historians as historical facts. (For references see the works of Lee Strobel, Gary Habermas, William Lane Craig.) 

Okay, so we have the above facts. What about interpreting those facts theologically? Is the hypothesis that God raised Jesus from the dead out of order? 

Answer: No. 

It turns out that naturalistic (non-God) explanations run amok in view of the facts. (See Strobel, Habermas, and Craig.) 

Plus it turns out that contextual considerations make the theological interpretation plausible. 

The very facts themselves call out for a theological explanation. A resurrection smacks of supernatural causation, especially in view of the resurrectee’s divine claims. 

Moreover, and more broadly, there are good independent reasons—a cumulative case argument—for thinking that God exists. 

The Big Bang points to a beginning of the universe. Because it's reasonable to think that whatever begins to exist has a cause, it's reasonable to think that the universe's beginning—i.e., the beginning of space, time, and matter/energy—has a cause. This cause is powerful and universe transcendent: supernatural. 

Also, the fine-tuning for life of the universe's initial conditions points to the universe’s cause being a super-intelligent cause, as do the molecular machines of the living cell and its DNA code/ language. 

Also, the very concept of a miracle such as Jesus' resurrection implies/ predicts the above findings of contemporary science, thereby adding further plausibility to the theological interpretation. (For more on this, see my PhD dissertation "Miracle reports, moral philosophy, and contemporary science" or see this condensed, more readable version of my PhD dissertation "Turning Hume’s argument against miracle reports onto its head.") 

Now couple the above reasoning with the work of the Holy Spirit in one's heart. 

Therefore, historical investigation doesn't preclude knowledge of the resurrection of Jesus—it confirms the truth of Jesus' miraculous resurrection. 

Jesus is risen. Jesus is Lord. Happy Easter! 

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College.)

Do Jesus' miracles violate the laws of nature?

"Feeding the Multitudes" by Bernardo Strozzi (1581-1644)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon

April 3, 2014 

Do Jesus' miracles violate the laws of nature? 

Some say that a miracle, such as Jesus’ multiplication of loaves and fishes, is a violation of the laws of nature, and thus should be dismissed. I disagree. 

The bringing about of something physical out of the non-physical does not violate nature's laws. Why not? Because such a bringing about is merely a change to the material conditions to which the laws of nature apply. 

Philosophers David and Randall Basinger explain: “Natural laws…are conditional propositions [i.e., if-then statements]. They do not describe what will or will not occur, given any set of preconditions. Natural laws tell us that, given a specific set of natural conditions and given that there are no other relevant forces present, certain natural phenomena will or will not always occur.” 

In other words, a natural law says this: If X is a so-and-so, then X does such-and-such, given no interference. For example, if X is a sugar cube, then X dissolves in water, if there are no other influences present. 

This means that if there are some other relevant forces or interferences or influences present—let's say the sugar cube has been wrapped in clear plastic—then the law concerning the solubility of sugar will not be violated when the sugar cube does not dissolve in water. Yes, our predictions might be off, but the law remains intact. 

Philosopher Robert Larmer helpfully clarifies with another example: “We do not…violate the laws of motion if we toss an extra billiard ball into a group of billiard balls in motion on a billiard table. There is no moment at which the laws of motion are contravened. What we do by introducing the extra billiard ball is change the material conditions to which the laws of motion apply and hence change the result which would otherwise be expected.” 

At this juncture, one might object that Jesus’ many loaves and fish, unlike the billiard ball, were supposedly brought into physical existence out of nothing, that is, from the non-physical realm. (Jesus had a few loaves and fish to begin with, but not enough to feed thousands plus have baskets full of leftovers.) Wouldn't a violation of a law of nature occur here? 

That is to ask: Wouldn't the creation of matter/energy violate the First Law of Thermodynamics—i.e., the Principle of the Conservation of Energy? 

Larmer anticipates this objection. Larmer points out that the Principle of the Conservation of Energy has two formulations: (1) “Energy can neither be created nor destroyed, although its form may change"; and (2) "In an isolated system (that is, a system not causally influenced by something other than itself) the total amount of energy remains constant, although its form may change.” 

Larmer also points out that the first formulation is stronger than the second, and that the actual evidence only supports the second. In addition, it is only the first formulation that the creation of matter/ energy would violate. 

Now, because the first formulation is not only much stronger than the second but also much stronger than the evidence warrants, and because the first formulation is the only formulation of the two that a miracle would violate, the first can be reasonably seen to be not a law of nature but an assumed metaphysical principle which unjustifiably rules out miracles. 

The second formulation, on the other hand, is a legitimately expressed law of nature. And on the second formulation it is possible for a transcendent agent to intervene in the physical universe by bringing about something physical out of the non-physical. 

Thus, a miracle does not violate the laws of nature. 

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College. For further discussion of the notion of miracle, see Hendrik’s PhD dissertation, “MiracleReports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science”.)

Billy Graham and my conversion to Christ

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, October 31, 2013

Billy Graham and my conversion to Christ

Evangelist Billy Graham is turning 95 years old and has published yet another book: The Reason for My Hope: Salvation. [He is also planning another evangelistic outreach: My Hope America.] I respect Billy Graham immensely.

I recall an evening in my mid-20s, when I was not a Christian believer. I sat alone in a hotel room, half drunk, and watched a Billy Graham Crusade on TV. According to Graham, Jesus is Lord and Saviour—Jesus is The Way—so I should choose to put my faith in Jesus and follow Him.

I wasn't converted at that particular time, but Graham's message about Jesus stuck in my mind, and a few years later I did commit to follow Jesus Christ.

I am no evangelist, and I often stumble as I follow Jesus, but perhaps sharing the story of my conversion may be of interest to readers contemplating ultimate questions.

I grew up in a home with fine, loving parents who regularly took my three sisters and my three brothers and me to a local church (a United Church). But, as is typical with many young people, in my case the religious teachings didn't stick. For all practical purposes, when I left home (at age 18) I wasn't a believer.

I joined the military, worked for an oil company, worked in a restaurant, worked in an institution for delinquent kids, and went to university off and on. A couple of important personal relationships with significant others didn't work out. I also drank much alcohol. The point of life eluded me. I felt deeply alone, and I became depressed, sometimes suicidal.

Prior to committing myself (at age 30) to Jesus, I was aware that I was "broken" morally. My life was a mess, I was on a downward spiral, and I knew it (though when in a drunken stupor or high or otherwise engaged in less-than-noble activity I would suppress this knowledge).

In my clearer moments I thought that maybe or even probably there was a God, and I sensed that I was morally at odds with this God. But I didn't know what to think about the Jesus preached by Billy Graham.

I recall some Christians at the University of Calgary sharing a "Four Spiritual Laws" booklet with me, encouraging me to accept Jesus as Lord of my life; but, again, I didn't know what to think about Jesus.

I was aware of several competing religious truth claims. My oldest brother was a Baha'i (so Jesus was just another prophet or "manifestation" of God, Jesus is not God incarnate, not God in human flesh). One of my sisters was a Jehovah's Witness (so Jesus was the archangel Michael, not God). Another brother was an agnostic/ skeptic (so Jesus was probably just a good man, if he existed).

My favourite philosophy professor was an atheist (so Jesus can't be God because there is no God). Mormons asked me to read the Book of Mormon and pray for a "burning in the bosom" (a subjective experience) to confirm the truth of the Book of Mormon (so somehow I could become a god). Also, an old army buddy was enamored with New Age philosophy (I am God and I am the universe).

I was confused, and the voices calling me in multiple (contradictory) directions added to the confusion. Alcohol helped me find peace, for a while, until it threatened to become my master.

Somehow, in my confusion and brokenness, I groped for God and moved towards repentance (i.e., I began to turn away from some of the things I knew were wrong). My heart attitude was something like this: God, if you're there, I'll do your will.

I read the New Testament. I found Jesus' call to follow Him to be attractive. Yet, in the midst of the competing religious and philosophical truth claims, I needed to be convinced that Jesus is actually the way, as Billy Graham claimed.

Happily, three things happened. (Note: In retrospect I believe these things were due to the Holy Spirit working in my life and through the lives of others.)

1. I slowly came to understand the intellectual force of the New Testament as evidence for the reality of Jesus' physical resurrection (and I especially came to the realization that major objections were mostly philosophical and philosophically weak; later I even did an MA and a PhD related to these objections).

2. I slowly came to understand that the New Testament evidence concerning Jesus tells us that He is the God of the universe come to earth as a human being (i.e., many of Jesus' claims and acts are best understood as Jesus asserting Himself to be the very God described in the Old Testament).

3. I came into contact—in person and through books, audio recordings, and video—with some intelligent people who took these beliefs about Jesus seriously (these Christians were gentle and respectful, plus willing to engage in the humble, truth-seeking use of reason).

It was these things that allowed me to take seriously—take as truth—the Gospel/ good news: i.e., that Jesus is actually the God of the universe come to earth as a human being, that He loves us, and that by dying for us He offers us forgiveness for our moral wrong-doings (sins) when we trust in Him and follow Him.

In fact, it became clear to me that the physical, bodily resurrection of Jesus is central to the Gospel—and makes the Gospel the arbitrator of the world's various religious and philosophical truth claims. The evidence for Jesus' resurrection encouraged me to take Jesus, instead of other religious leaders or philosophies, most seriously.

Significantly, Jesus' resurrection, in the context of its occurrence, serves as vindication of Jesus actually being God in the flesh and thus also vindication of Jesus' claims about forgiveness and redemption. Significantly, too, because of Jesus' resurrection we have hope, real hope, that death does not have the last word.

To make my long conversion story short, I put my faith in Jesus Christ and now follow Him. In other words, I've come to believe the good news!

I thank God for this good news, and I thank God for Billy Graham.

Postscripts

• Beliefs about truth have consequences, not only for the hereafter but also for the here and now. As I followed Jesus as Lord, I changed from being a predominantly self-centered person to someone much more concerned about the well being of others (of course, I'm still a work in progress). Alcohol no longer is my master (I even managed to quit smoking). I do not entertain immoral thoughts as often as I did (I sometimes stumble, but repent and persevere). I no longer have an ongoing depression and feeling of being alone (instead, I have a deep peace and joy, plus a sense that God is near; I sense this most clearly when I am obedient to God). In addition, I am delighted to report that God has blessed me with a wonderful wife, two excellent sons, and a beautiful daughter-in-law (and perhaps another beautiful daughter-in-law!). I thank God who is revealed in Jesus Christ for all of this, too.

• As I finished writing this column, my cousin's 31-year-old dear daughter Jessica died (she was suffering from muscular dystrophy). Family and friends are weeping and mourning, to be sure. Yet, in the midst of the pain, we find comfort in the hope of seeing Jessica again, a hope that's not mere wishful thinking—because of the reality of Jesus' resurrection. We are also quite confident that Jessica is presently dancing with Jesus! Thank you, Lord Jesus.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College.  The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Easter and Philosophy

APOLOGIA By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, April 8, 2010)

Easter and Philosophy
“After his suffering, he showed himself to [the apostles] and gave many convincing proofs that he was alive. He appeared to them over a period of forty days and spoke about the kingdom of God.” (Acts 1: 3)

The traditional Easter gospel or good news is this: God (God the Son) came to Earth in the man Jesus; Jesus took our punishment for sin onto Himself by suffering and dying on a cross; then God (the Father) raised Jesus from the grave (tomb), thereby defeating death. Jesus' resurrection, that is, His return to life in the same physical body but somehow wonderfully renewed, is said to be a glorious sign, which, with the help of God (the Holy Spirit), allows us to believe (accept by faith) the good news of God’s forgiveness, love, and justice—news we are called to proclaim and put into practice.

Of course, this raises the question: Is it reasonable to believe that Jesus actually resurrected? I am convinced that the answer is yes, so I encourage readers to check out the New Testament along with the many good books that set out the relevant evidence gleaned from the New Testament and elsewhere, books such as Lee Strobel’s The Case for Easter and William Lane Craig’s Reasonable Faith and On Guard.

But not everyone is convinced of the historical occurrence of Jesus’ resurrection. Indeed, many critics attempt to derail the direction the evidence points by setting out alternative non-resurrection explanations—such as Jesus didn't really die, the witnesses hallucinated, a conspiracy occurred, or it's all legend. Significantly, as Strobel and Craig rightly argue, such alternative explanations are weak.

Strobel’s and Craig’s arguments are worthy of study, but I won’t rehash them here. Nevertheless, as a philosopher, I think it’s important to point out that many contemporary non-resurrection explanations tend to be set forth primarily because of a philosophical reason.

How so? It turns out that many contemporary resurrection critics have been infected by a skeptical philosophical view that has been transmitted to us from the Scottish philosopher David Hume.

If your son or daughter goes to university today and takes an introductory philosophy class, he or she will probably run into David Hume. Well, not David Hume in person, but a philosophy professor who is a kindred spirit.

Hume lived from 1711 to 1776. He is famous, rather notorious, for, among other things, his argument against miracles. According to Hume, no matter how good the historical evidence is for a miracle such as Jesus' resurrection—even if the miracle actually occurred—the evidence is never good enough.

Hume argues that a miracle is a violation of a law of nature and that the laws of nature are very well established. The result, according to Hume, is that a miracle's occurrence is maximally improbable, and this maximal improbability counts against any good testimony for a miracle, either balancing the testimony (thereby providing grounds to suspend belief) or outweighing it (thereby providing grounds for disbelief). In reality, Hume thinks the latter is the case. Either way, Hume would have us dismiss miracle testimonies as unreasonable to believe.

Having studied Hume's argument for my master's thesis in philosophy at the University of Windsor and for my PhD dissertation in philosophy at the University of Waterloo, I have come to conclude that Hume's argument fails.

His argument fails because it commits the fallacy of question-begging. It "begs the question" in the sense that it engages in circular reasoning: it assumes as proven that which is at issue, and it sneaks the conclusion into the premises.

As mentioned, Hume takes the violation-of-law-of-nature aspect of a miracle to be sufficient grounds for counting the violated laws of nature wholly and destructively against miracle testimony—to judge the miracle to be maximally improbable.

Interestingly, in the case of Jesus' resurrection, such an event is maximally improbable, given the laws of nature and given that there is no intervention from outside the physical system.

Significantly, this brings to light the fact that Hume makes the assumption that to make a probability judgment all that is needed is our knowledge of the relevant laws of nature.

But, it should be emphasized, we are supposedly talking about a miraculous resurrection (as suggested by the evidence), and so, although we are given the laws of nature, we are not given that there is no intervention from outside the system.

So in assuming that all that is needed is our knowledge of the relevant laws of nature and nothing about any possible intervention from outside of nature, Hume is, in effect, assuming that either God does not exist (and so God never intervenes via miracles) or, if God does exist, God's intentions concerning nature are shown to us wholly by the laws of nature (and so God never intervenes via miracles).

But if, as Hume assumes for the sake of argument, there is good evidence for what seems very much to be a miracle—Hume even allows it to be a real miracle—then Hume's assumption about the background knowledge is at issue.

In other words, in order for Hume's argument to work, it requires the assumption that the laws of nature express either all of the goings-on of a universe without God or, if God exists, all of God's intentions concerning the universe. But the truth of this assumption must be put on hold when a miracle (whether actual or alleged) is supposed to be under investigation.

Indeed, for one's mind to be actually open to the possibility of the occurrence of an occasional real miracle—a possibility Hume allows, at least for the sake of argument—requires that the assumption Hume makes be suspended—at least when one is purportedly investigating the evidence for a miracle.

In other words, Hume's argument works only if we assume that there is no God who on rare occasions intervenes in nature, but this assumption is at issue when we are considering any alleged evidence for miracles.

Thus, by assuming the above-described background knowledge, Hume mistakenly begs the question which only the (alleged) miracle evidence can answer.

Hume's mind is already made up, then, and not open to what the evidence suggests.

The philosophical upshot is that if your mind is not already closed to the possibility of a God who occasionally does a miracle, that is, if your mind is open to the possibility of God's existence and the possibility of this God intervening in nature, then the facts surrounding Jesus' alleged resurrection may make a miraculous resurrection explanation plausible, and even reasonable to believe.

Easter—it’s truly good news because it’s grounded in reality.

For additional thought: "Turning Hume’s argument against miracle reports onto its head."

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Believing Christmas because of Easter

Caravaggio's "Doubting Thomas"/ "The Incredulity of Saint Thomas" (c. 1602-03)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, December 17, 2009)

Believing Christmas because of Easter
Christmas is the time of year to reflect on the birth of Jesus. The heart of the Christmas story is that Jesus is God (God the Son) come to earth as a human being. Jesus is Emmanuel—God with us.

It’s an interesting story. But why believe it?

This, it seems to me, is where publicly-accessible knowledge of the historical reality of Jesus’ subsequent death (30-something years later) and resurrection (a few days later yet) becomes crucially important.

If Easter is true, that is, if Jesus really resurrected after His death, then this event would constitute a miraculous sign, i.e., an extraordinary supernaturally-caused, empirically-observable event that provides grounds (1) for believing Jesus is who He claimed to be (God in the flesh) and (2) for placing our faith in Him (as Lord and Saviour).

Significantly, careful New Testament scholarship provides excellent historical reasons for believing that, in actual fact, Jesus was killed and subsequently resurrected bodily (physically).

Some contemporary critics, however, inspired by philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), object as follows: Even if Jesus’ resurrection occurred, isn’t it likely that the alleged miracle will someday be better explained naturalistically, i.e., as produced by hitherto unknown laws of nature, without recourse to the supernatural?

In reply, I think that a reasonable answer to this objection is No. Here are some reasons for thinking that Jesus’ resurrection is supernaturally caused.

Concerning death, we have excellent knowledge of what relevant natural causes can and cannot do. Our universal experience (with the exception of Jesus' case) over thousands of years is that dead people, when left to themselves, do not resurrect or transform themselves into living bodies made with rejuvenated flesh and new powers. (Reminder: we are talking here about resurrection, not mere resuscitation). Also, our knowledge of cell necrosis (cell death) tells us that dead bodies not only stay dead, if no intervention occurs, but also begin, irreversibly, to decay. Bodily decomposition starts within minutes after death and, after a day or more without refrigeration, renders resuscitation, let alone a resurrection (on naturalistic assumptions), physically impossible.

In terms of naturalistic causes, then, a resurrection is, as philosopher Francis Beckwith points out, "more than presently inexplicable.” In fact, the more we learn about nature, the more we know that naturalistic hypotheses are not even remotely possible as plausible accounts of a resurrection.

Of course, to think that there are some previously unknown natural laws waiting to be discovered may be reasonable in some not well understood fields of investigation (say, a healing of cancer as an apparent answer to prayer); and so in those fields one must explain why one thinks one is not being rash in saying those laws cannot be found (perhaps our bodies have built-in, non-miraculous healing powers which become activated when we exercise an attitude of faith).

The fact remains, however, that it is not reasonable to think this way in the well understood realm of human death. As philosopher C. Stephen Evans observes, “we surely know enough about the natural order to know that it is most unlikely that there could be any natural explanation for a person who has been dead for three days being restored to life."

What is worse (for naturalistic explanations), in the case of Jesus’ resurrection we also have the resurrectee claiming to be God, thereby further pointing to supernatural causation.

Thus, and contrary to what some critics would have us think, if Jesus’ resurrection were to occur, as the historical evidence strongly suggests, it is reasonable to conclude that Jesus’ resurrection would be a supernaturally caused sign—a miracle.

In view of the publicly accessible historicity of Easter, Christmas clearly is not just another religious story. Easter gives us good reason to think that the heart of the Christmas story—the story of the supernatural God becoming a human being—is true.

Jesus is Emmanuel—God with us. This, it seems to me, is life-changing information.

Merry Christmas!

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)