Transgender ideology

Covers: Canada edition (left), U.S. edition (right)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, January 19, 2017

Transgender ideology

The January 2017 “Gender Revolution” edition of National Geographic magazine signals a popular embrace of transgender ideology. Popular or not, I have concerns.

First, a couple clarifications.

Clarification 1. All people, including people who identify as transgender, deserve respect, compassion, plus protection from bullying and violence.

Clarification 2. To identify as transgender is to feel one's personal/ gender identity does not correspond or fit with one's birth sex (i.e., the sex allegedly “assigned” at birth). Transgender ideology says such feelings are true, good, and should be expressed.

Here are four concerns.

Concern 1. Faulty immunity from criticism.

Many persons dismiss criticisms of transgender identity merely because the critics are alleged to be “transphobic.” But such a dismissal commits the ad hominem fallacy (i.e., the mistake of attacking the arguer instead of his/her arguments, when doing so is not relevant).

Criticisms should be accepted or rejected because of the criticisms' merits or lack thereof, respectively, not because of the critic's personal idiosyncrasies.

Concern 2. Absurd implications due to elevating feelings over fact.

Reason carefully used with evidence should put a check on feelings that are sometimes out of touch with reality. Remember anorexia nervosa, the disorder in which a person feels overweight when in fact isn't, so diets to a dangerous extreme? Here reason shows feelings, though sincerely held, can be untrue.

But now, for many, feelings are trump. Consider Bruce (“Caitlyn”) Jenner. He is a man who feels he is a woman and so has had plastic surgery to “feminize” his face and throat, has taken hormones to grow breasts, and may undergo genital surgery to remove his testicles plus use his penis to construct a “vagina.” But he isn't a woman. In view of the dangers with sex change (in transgender-friendly Sweden the rate of suicide for those who have sex-change surgery is 20 times greater than normal), isn't this like offering liposuction to someone with anorexia?

Significantly, if my feelings about myself are sufficient justification for my identity, why stop at transgender (e.g., a man identifying as a woman)? Why not trans-age (an adult identifying as a child)? Why not trans-species (a human identifying as a dog or cat or dragon)?

Upshot: Feeling as a sufficient guide to reality reduces to the absurd.

Concern 3. Moral incoherence.

Ethicist Andrew T. Walker and Bible professor Denny Burk astutely critique National Geographic’s feature article (written by pro-transgender journalist Robin Marantz Henig) as follows:

“The final page of Henig’s article celebrates the mutilation of minor children with a full-page picture of a shirtless 17-year old girl who recently underwent a double mastectomy in order to ‘transition’ to being a boy. Why do transgender ideologues consider it harmful to attempt to change such a child’s mind but consider it progress to display her bare, mutilated chest for a cover story? Transgender ideologues like Henig never address this ethical contradiction at the heart of their paradigm.”

Walker and Burk continue: “Why is it acceptable to surgically alter a child’s body to match his sense of self but bigoted to try to change his sense of self to match his body? If it is wrong to attempt to change a child’s gender identity (because it is fixed and meddling with it is harmful), then why is it morally acceptable to alter something as fixed as the reproductive anatomy of a minor? The moral inconsistency here is plain.”

Concern 4. Non-permanence of transgender identity.

It turns out that a child’s transgender identity isn’t fixed. According to psychiatrists Lawrence Mayer and Paul McHugh, there is “little evidence that gender identity issues have a high rate of persistence in children.”

Walker and Burk add: “In fact, about 80 percent of children who experience transgender feelings completely resolve their difficulties without any intervention after they reach puberty.”

Dear parents/ responsible adults: For our children’s sake, don’t be duped by transgender ideology.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views expressed in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Further reading:

• Walt Heyer, I was just like the 'trans' 9-year-old in National Geographic. Now I know it's pure fantasy (article)
• Lindsay Leigh Bentley, I am Ryland: The Story of a Male-identifying Little Girl Who Didn't Transition (article)
• Michelle Cretella, I'm a Pediatrician: How Transgender Ideology Has Infiltrated My Field and Produced Large-Scale Child Abuse (article)
• Vaughan Roberts, Transgender (book)
• Hendrik van der Breggen, Phobic anti-phobia? (article)
• Hendrik van der Breggen, Transgender preferred pronouns? (article)
• Hendrik van der Breggen, Untangling LGBTQ arguments (article)
• Hendrik van der Breggen, C16 and Forcing Your Religion (article)
• Hendrik van der Breggen, Men in women's bathrooms? (article)

Video:

• Camille Paglia, Lesson from History: Transgender Mania is Sign of Cultural Collapse (7 minutes).  Author, art professor, feminist, and cultural commentator Camille Paglia speaks on the current transgender mania, the wisdom of early medical and surgical intervention (calling it "child abuse"), and how the explosion of gender identities is a recurring sign of cultural collapse throughout the history of civilization.
• Genevieve Wood, Three Facts Those Promoting Transgenderism Ignore (3 minutes). Genevieve Wood works with The Heritage Foundation as senior communications advisor and senior contributor to The Daily Signal (which is the Heritage Foundation's multi-media news organization which covers policy and political news plus conservative commentary and analysis).
• Tranzformed: Finding Peace with Your God-given Gender (DVD)
• Transgender Kids: Who Knows Best (59 minute video which, refreshingly, shows pros AND cons of transgender issue)

Reductio ad absurdum

Photo: Jurassic World (2015)

APOLOGIA        

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, August 6, 2015

                

Reductio ad absurdum

               

Reductio ad absurdum is an argument strategy that employs logic to tease out the truth that another argument or claim is flawed. How? By reducing it to absurdity.

Let's look at this argument strategy in general terms, and then let's illustrate with a couple specific examples.

In a reductio ad absurdum argument, we assume, temporarily for the sake of argument, that the view under investigation is true. We approach the view in question with the attitude, "Okay, let's say it's true. What follows?" If the logical consequences of the view's assumed truth are false or logically contradictory, then it follows that the view under investigation is false or at least deeply problematic.

Here is an example from contemporary popular moral thought.

Consider the view that ethics is mere feeling, i.e., what's right and wrong is fundamentally a matter of subjective opinion or taste—there is no real right or wrong.

Let's say this is true, for the sake of argument. What follows logically?

If ethics is mere feeling, i.e., mere subjective opinion or taste, then right and wrong mean "I like" and "I don't like," respectively. Ethics becomes essentially similar to our attitudes to, say, food.

Just as I like chocolate ice cream rather than vanilla, you like vanilla rather than chocolate. No big deal. We're both right.

Cake: yum! Kale: yuck! Good: yum! Bad: yuck! This is the ethics-is-mere-feeling view.

But if the ethics-is-mere-feeling view is true (as we'll assume for the sake of argument), then another claim follows logically as true: just as Jane likes helping people and seeing them flourish, Joe likes torturing people and seeing them writhe in pain. So, if it's true that ethics is mere feeling, then Jane and Joe are both right ethically. No big deal.

Surely, though, that Jane and Joe are both right is clearly false (we know this via moral-rational insight). Hence, the assumption that ethics is mere feeling is flawed.

Here is another example from contemporary popular metaphysical thought (metaphysics has to do with the reality of being).

Let's say that personal identity, i.e., what I am, is wholly a personal matter—again, a matter merely of subjective feeling. My feelings about myself and my identity are trump.

Bruce (Caitlyn) Jenner basically holds this view. He feels he is a woman so he is a woman—and so he has had plastic surgery to "feminize" his face and throat, had hormone therapy for growth of breasts, and may yet undergo genital surgery to remove his testicles plus use his penis to construct a "vagina."

But if the view that my feelings about myself and my identity are trump is true, what follows?

It means that we must accept the claims of "otherkin" as true. Otherkin are people who self-identify as—i.e., who believe they actually are, at least in part or wholly—non-human. They believe they are cats, foxes, dragons, etc. If feelings are trump, then they are non-human in fact.

Moreover, it means we must accept the claim of Adrian Van Oyen, who in a YouTube "coming out" video, claims to be a dinosaur. Yes, a dinosaur. And, according to Van Oyen, if you don't accept him for who he is, you are "transdinophobic."

(Note: Van Oyen's two-minute video is a stunt, ending with an image of a "facepalm" to the forehead; nonetheless, it makes an insightful philosophical point.)

Surely, however, the alleged truth of the thesis that my feelings about myself and my identity are trump lands us logically into obvious absurdities and falsehoods. Regardless of what a man feels, he is in reality not a dinosaur, nor a cat, nor a woman.

Feelings are not trump. Reductio ad absurdum.

Objective truth and reality are trump.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

ADDENDA

A. Here are a couple  interesting reductio-ad-absurdum-related bits located here because of space limitations in the main body of my column:

1. If my feelings about myself and my identity are trump, then we should also accept the claims of the "transabled." The transabled are people who feel that they are imposters if their body is in full working order, so they seek to amputate a limb or otherwise mutilate/ disable themselves. But the truth is that you are not in fact an imposter if your body is in full working order. Again, the alleged truth of the thesis that my feelings about myself and my identity are trump lands us logically into obvious absurdities and falsehoods.

2. The Bible is no stranger to logic (which makes good sense because God is the Logos). In fact, the reductio ad absurdum is employed in the New Testament. Paul preaches the resurrection of Jesus (which he and others know to be true) and Paul addresses those who say there is no resurrection of the dead. He argues "if there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been raised" (1 Cor. 15:13). But Paul adds that he testifies to Christ being raised: "Christ has indeed been raised from the dead" (1 Cor. 15:20a). That is, Paul and others know this to be true. D.J. Hill, in New Dictionary of Apologetics, concludes: "So, Paul shows that the assumption that there is no resurrection leads to the contradiction that Christ has both been raised and not raised from the dead." In other words, in view of the known fact that Jesus was in fact raised from the dead, the claim that there is no resurrection reduces to the absurd.

B. For further discussion of reductio ad absurdum arguments, see:

1. Julian Baggini & Peter S. Fosl, The Philosopher’s Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods, 2nd edition (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 121-122.

2. D. J. Hill, “Reductio Ad Absurdum,” in New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics, edited by W. C. Campbell-Jack & Gavin McGrath (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2006), 602-603.

Ducks, Hate, and Logic (part 1)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, January 9, 2014

Ducks, Hate, and Logic (part 1)

Much has been written about duck-hunter Phil Robertson, the patriarch of Duck Dynasty (an extremely popular A&E television show), and his alleged "anti-gay" comments in Gentleman's Quarterly (GQ magazine). Robertson stated publicly, albeit bluntly and explicitly, that the Bible says same-sex sex is morally wrong—i.e., it's a sin, among other sins, including bestiality, heterosexual fornication and promiscuity, greed, drunkenness, slandering, and swindling.

While acknowledging that Robertson is not the most polished and sensitive communicator (his words are sometimes coarse, though, it seems to me, not as coarse as some of the GQ interviewer's words), and while risking the appearance of flogging a dead horse (an apt expression, from what I can gather about Duck Dynasty culture), I would like to address the objection that Robertson equated or compared same-sex sex to bestiality. As one gay commentator complained, Robertson is equating the commentator's sexual partner to a dog, and thus Robertson diminishes the humanity of persons who engage in gay sex—and thereby Robertson incites hatred toward gays.

With much help from philosopher of law Robert P. George, I will argue that the objection is false.

Before I begin, let's consider the following as context to help us interpret Phil Robertson's remarks charitably as well as accurately.

Robertson, who describes himself as a "Bible-thumping" Christian, is clearly aware of the Bible's contents relating to same-sex sex. Also, Robertson issued this statement of clarification, which echoes his comments in GQ and nicely summarizes Jesus' teachings on love: "I would never treat anyone with disrespect just because they are different from me. We are all created by the Almighty and like Him, I love all of humanity. We would all be better off if we loved God and loved each other."

Also, in his discussion with the GQ correspondent about humanity's turn away from God and America's need for repentance, Robertson says this: "Everything is blurred on what's right and what's wrong… Sin becomes fine."

The GQ correspondent then asks: "What, in your mind, is sinful?" To which Robertson answers: "Start with homosexual behavior and just morph out from there. Bestiality, sleeping around with this woman and that woman and that woman and those men."

(Note: Robertson's phrase "morph out from there" is not wholly clear, but, given the context, which will become clearer below, it's reasonable to think that it means something along the lines of changing/ transforming/ moving/ expanding/ extrapolating in accordance with what's relevantly similar. What is relevantly similar will become clearer below, too.)

Robertson immediately adds (paraphrasing 1 Corinthians 6:9-10): "Don't be deceived. Neither the adulterers, the idolaters, the male prostitutes, the homosexual offenders, the greedy, the drunkards, the slanderers, the swindlers—they won't inherit the kingdom of God. Don't deceive yourself. It's not right."

Is it true, then, that Robertson equates or compares same-sex sex with bestiality? I think the answer is No.

Yes, Robertson puts homosexual sex in a list of sins which includes bestiality. But, we should notice, to include an item in a list is not to equate the members of that list. Also, to set out a list is not necessarily to liken the members of that list in all major respects. All members of the list may be sins, but it doesn't follow that all are wholly equal or equally grievous.

What, then, is the significance of Robertson's list? It is reasonable to interpret Robertson's list to be merely a part of a reductio ad absurdum argument.

(In a reductio ad absurdum argument, one teases out logical implications from a position, implications that are false or absurd, and these count against the truth of the position under examination.)

Princeton University professor of jurisprudence Robert P. George explains:

"If I've understood [the] argument about [Phil Robertson] 'comparing' homosexual conduct with bestiality, I don't think I can agree with it. I myself, like most philosophers working in moral and political philosophy, often challenge claims to the moral legitimacy of X (which an interlocutor is defending) by arguing that if one accepts X then there is no ground of principle for rejecting Y, which one's interlocutor would not want to accept. It's in the form of the reductio ad absurdum, and has never, so far as I am aware, been regarded as an invalid or illegitimate (much less unethical) form of argumentation.

"[I]t sounded to me as though [Robertson] was saying that once you embrace the basic liberal (which he regards as relativistic) position on sexual ethics (where the only norms distinguishing morally acceptable from unacceptable conduct are those forbidding coercion and deception) just about anything goes: same-sex conduct, sex with animals, promiscuous sex, and so on.

"In his own rough way, I suspect that he is pointing out that Christian teaching [e.g., as found in Corinthians and in Leviticus] does not accept the reduction of sexual morality solely to norms against coercion and deception. Even consensual sexual activity, when it is intrinsically or de facto non-marital, is contrary to scripture … and sinful. I myself don't see anything disrespectful or illegitimate about this." (Robert P. George, Facebook discussion, December 19, 2013.)

(Not so incidentally, the Apostle Paul, the author of the Corinthians passage Robertson paraphrases, uses other forms of the reductio ad absurdum argument elsewhere in Corinthians, and so the reductio ad absurdum interpretation is strengthened even further. See the entry "Reductio Ad Absurdum" in New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics, edited by W. C. Campbell-Jack and Gavin McGrath [InterVarsity Press 2006], 602-603.)

Again: Contrary to what some critics allege, it's reasonable to think that Robertson did NOT equate or compare same-sex sex with bestiality. To think that he did suggests that these critics are not aware of the logic at hand.

All this to say, to paraphrase C. S. Lewis's wise old professor in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe: "Logic! Why don't they teach logic in schools these days?!"

May 2014 be a year in which there is less hate and more love—and more logic.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

For further thought:

● Philosopher Jerry Walls, "Duck Dynasty, Bestiality, and Ultimate Reality" (article in School of Christian Thought, Houston Baptist University)

● Bible scholar Michael Brown on Piers Morgan Live (15 minute video)

● Author and debate moderator Larry Taunton, "The Genuine Conflict Being Ignored in the Duck Dynasty Debate" (article in The Atlantic)
● Phil Robertson interview on I Am Second (26 minute video)

Assessing Moral Relativism, continued

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, January 28, 2010

Assessing Moral Relativism, continued

A presently popular view of ethics is moral relativism. According to moral relativism, there are no moral principles or values objectively real and applicable to everyone; rather, what’s right/wrong and good/bad essentially depends on individual preference or culture, and this varies from person to person or group to group.

Moral relativism seems tolerant (“you do your thing and I’ll do mine”), but is it reasonable to believe? We should think not.

First, let’s get clear on moral relativism by looking at it in its group or cultural form; let’s call it cultural relativism (CR for short). (Last time we looked at individual/subjective relativism.)

According to CR, ethics essentially depend on one’s culture or tribe. That is, CR says action X is right or good if culture says X is right or good, and X is wrong or bad if culture says X is wrong or bad. Action X may be right in one culture but wrong in another. Our culture may hold that apartheid is wrong, but another culture may be okay with apartheid, because of a difference in the history of interracial relations.

On CR, then, morality is wholly a matter of cultural invention, i.e., social construction, to cope with historical circumstances, and because such circumstances vary from group to group, so do the constructed moralities. Thus, we shouldn’t impose our culture’s moral values on others, and others shouldn’t push theirs on us.

CR sounds good, but is it sound? To show that CR is not sound (i.e., is not reasonable to believe), let’s assume, temporarily for argument’s sake, that CR is true. If the logical consequences of CR’s assumed truth are false or otherwise deeply problematic, then it follows logically that CR is false or otherwise deeply problematic, or both. (This argument strategy is known as reductio ad absurdum or the absurd consequences move.)

If CR is true, then six problems result.

1. CR ends up giving support to obviously evil regimes and evil cultural practices. On CR it becomes impossible to criticize the Nazis. If Nazi culture says that genocide is right, then, for Nazi Germany, genocide is right. In other words, if CR is true, then we cannot condemn the following: the Jewish Holocaust, Stalin's murder of millions, human trafficking in Asia and eastern Europe, torture of political prisoners in Afghanistan, the Hindu practice of Suttee (cremation of a widow on her husband's funeral pyre), the African practice of clitoridectomy (wholly or partially removing a woman's clitoris so she will not be distracted from her family duties), Chinese foot binding (so women’s feet remain tiny and pretty, albeit crippled).

Moreover, if CR is true, then we cannot condemn atrocities committed by Christians in the Crusades and in the Spanish Inquisition. It was just their culture, after all. But we think—we know—that we can and should condemn such regimes and practices.

2. If CR is true, then internal cultural reform is disabled. On CR what the culture says is right is right, so it's not possible for one's culture to be mistaken let alone reformed. Yes, one can critique acts according to cultural standards, but it's not possible to criticize one's own cultural standards. The result: moral quietism—no prophets or independently-minded moral reformers could arise to preach a social justice hitherto unknown.

But, obviously, they do arise. Examples: Old Testament prophets, Jesus, William Wilberforce, Martin Luther King Jr., Ghandi, etc. In other words, the existence of cultural reformers is a fact, and this fact counts against CR.

3. CR self-refutes. If CR is true, it allows for the possibility of a society having a non-relative or absolute morality. That is, on CR a society could hold that CR is false, and CR would say that this morality is true. So, if CR is true, then CR also is not true. This is a serious logical problem.

4. CR has a practical problem. According to CR, what the culture says is right is right. But the question arises: Which culture? The one you're born into or the one you presently occupy? I asked this question when I visited a university in Russia a few years ago: What should I do, since I was born in Venezuela, grew up in a Dutch family, became a Canadian as a teen, teach at a Christian college, study at a secular university, and yet I was spending some time in Russia?

And what about the Arab-American father who kills his daughter in accordance to Arab custom, because she refuses to marry the man the family had arranged for her to marry? American culture says this is wrong, but the father’s Arab culture says this is right. Which culture should be followed? These questions throw a wrench into the practice of CR.

5. CR does not provide a satisfactory answer to yet another important question, specifically: Why obey the tribe’s rules? Tribe's answer: Because the tribe says. But it makes good sense to ask: Why? Significantly, any non-question-begging answers (i.e., any answers other than “culture says its rules are right because culture says its rules are right”) lead us to reasons other than mere accordance to what culture says. But this means that culture is no longer the fundamental ground for ethics.

If we are told to follow culture because, say, human life has intrinsic worth, then intrinsic worth of human life is what's most important, not culture. But this means ethics are not essentially dependent on culture, and so any good reason for CR actually counts against CR. This nuttiness counts against CR too.

6. CR, if true, is useless in conflict resolution. CR says, “You’re right because your culture says you’re right.” But saying this to a bully-nation and a bullied-nation—that is, saying this to Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied Netherlands, or to a Holocaust-denying nuclear-armed Ahmadinejad-ist Iran and its Jewish targets—is a recipe for disaster. Morality is usually thought to be useful in social conflict. CR, however, simply stares blankly and shrugs its shoulders.

In view of these problems which arise logically from CR, it’s reasonable to conclude that cultural moral relativism is flawed—logically, factually, and morally—and so should be rejected.

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

Assessing Moral Relativism

(Click on graphic to see details and source more clearly.)
APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, January 14, 2010

Assessing Moral Relativism

A presently popular view of ethics is moral relativism. According to moral relativism, there are no moral principles or values objectively real and applicable to everyone; rather, what’s right/wrong and good/bad essentially depends on individual preference or culture, and this varies from person to person or group to group.

Moral relativism seems tolerant (“you do your thing and I’ll do mine”), but is it reasonable to believe? We should think not.

First, let’s get clear on moral relativism by looking at it in its individualistic form; let’s call it individual relativism (IR for short). (Next time we’ll look at the cultural or group version, a.k.a. cultural relativism.)

According to IR, ethics are merely a matter of individual preference. That is, IR says action X is right or good if I like X, and X is wrong or bad if I don’t like X. Depending on our feelings, action X may be right for you but wrong for me. You may not like abortion, but I may be okay with abortion, if my feelings are not as troubled by it as yours are. Morality, then, is basically a matter of taste, and tastes vary. I shouldn’t impose my tastes on others, and others shouldn’t push their tastes on me.

IR sounds good, but is it sound? To show that IR is not sound (i.e., is not reasonable to believe), let’s assume, temporarily for argument’s sake, that IR is true. If the logical consequences of IR’s assumed truth are false or otherwise deeply problematic, then it follows logically that IR is false or otherwise deeply problematic, or both. (This argument strategy is known as reductio ad absurdum or the absurd consequences move.)

If IR is true, then six problems result.

Problem 1: Intra-personal criticism is lost. If IR is true, whatever we feel is right is right. In other words, on IR we can never be wrong morally and we cannot criticize ourselves (all we can be is true to our feelings). This is not a knock-down argument against IR, but it serves as a red flag against IR, because our pre-theoretic experience of morality is that we sometimes make moral mistakes, in spite of our feelings.

Problem 2: Inter-personal criticism is lost. If IR is true, then we cannot criticize others. On IR we can’t truly morally condemn the behaviour of, say, Robert Picton (the British Columbia pig farmer who murdered as many as dozens of women) and Josef Fritzl (the Austrian man who locked his daughter in his basement for 24 years and raped her repeatedly, fathering as many as seven children, three of whom were also locked up in the basement). After all, Picton probably liked killing the women and Fritzl probably liked raping and wielding power over his daughter.

On IR, the feelings of these men justified their actions. In other words, according to IR: Who are we to judge them? I have my feelings; they have theirs. I like chocolate ice cream; Picton and Fritzl like strawberry ice cream. Sure, if I had the power to stop them, I would; but then, on IR, I’m just reinforcing my taste with power, so might makes right. It turns out that Picton and Fritzl were the more powerful in their situations, so, on IR, they were still right. Surely, though, this is morally wrong—and we know it to be a fact.

Problem 3: IR has a practical problem: it seems psychologically impossible to practice. For example, for IR to work I should be able to believe that it’s wrong, say, for me to torture my sons for fun, but okay for others to do so if they want to. But I simply cannot believe this. This is a serious practical/psychological problem for IR. (Interestingly, if somebody can practice IR, then what IR upholds as a moral model is the psychopath. That is, someone like the Joker in the Batman film The Dark Knight would be our moral model. This seems wrong, plain and simple.)

Problem 4: IR self-refutes. If IR is true, it allows for the possibility of an individual having a non-relative or absolute morality. That is, on IR an individual could feel that IR is false, and IR would say that this morality is true. So, if IR is true, then IR also is not true. This is a serious logical problem.

Problem 5: IR proponents tend to be inconsistent in the face of IR’s (alleged) truth. If, say, we were to abuse the proponent of IR, the abused proponent would probably say that the abuse is wrong—truly wrong—i.e., actually wrong for all, not just for him/herself. A person may mouth IR, but when I steal his iPod, he will probably say that’s truly wrong. A student may mouth IR but when I give her an F for actually excellent school work, she will probably say that’s truly unfair. This counts against IR. (Interestingly, if the IR proponent is okay with others abusing him/her, then the moral ideal/model that IR upholds is the masochist. Surely, this is weird, and also counts against IR.)

Problem 6: IR, if true, is useless in conflict resolution. Saying “You’re right if you feel you’re right” to a bully and the bullied, or to the abortionist doctor and the person who kills abortionist doctors, is a recipe for disaster. Morality is usually thought to be useful in social conflict. IR, however, simply stares blankly and shrugs its shoulders.

In view of these problems which arise logically from IR, it’s reasonable to conclude that individual moral relativism is flawed—logically, factually, and morally—and so should be rejected.

For additional reading: Assessing Moral Relativism, continued

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

Aborting an abortion argument

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, September 18, 2008

Aborting an abortion argument

Here is an oft-heard argument in favour of abortion (I call it the body-part-control argument):

· Premise 1: Every woman has the right to control her own body.
· Premise 2: The fetus is a part of the pregnant woman’s body.
· Conclusion: Women have the right to abortion.

The argument sounds good, but is it sound?

Consider the following reasoning.

First, assume (for the sake of argument) that the second premise is true. That is, assume that the fetus is a part of the pregnant woman’s body.

Second, consider the logical relation of transitivity. If A is a part of B, and B is a part of C, then A is a part of C. If a brick is part of a wall, and the wall is part of a house, then the brick is part of that house.

Third, keep in mind two facts: (1) a woman has two feet; and (2) a fetus has two feet.

Now, consider the following: if a fetus’ two feet are a part of the fetus, and if the fetus is a part of a pregnant woman, then the fetus’ two feet are a part of that woman. Hence, the woman has four feet.

Now, also consider the fact that the male fetus has a penis. If the penis is a part of the fetus, and if the fetus is a part of the pregnant woman, then the woman has a penis. (Think, too, about the possibility of male triplets.)

Since absurdities follow logically from the assumed truth of the second premise, we can conclude that the second premise is false.

Significantly, premise 2 fails to recognize the distinction between the concepts of part and connection. An object A can be connected to object B, yet object A need not be a part of B. The piano in a mover’s truck is connected (via straps, etc.) to the truck, yet the piano is not a part of that truck. Similarly, the fetus is connected to a woman’s body, yet the fetus is not a part of the woman’s body.

Sure, every woman has the right to control her own body. But aren’t there two bodies involved in an abortion?

In other words, the crucially important moral status of the prenatal child needs to be addressed, but isn’t. Thus, the body-part-control argument fails to justify abortion.



Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, located in Otterburne, Manitoba, Canada.


Acknowledgement/ thanks: The main argument in my above column comes from philosopher Peter Kreeft's book The Unaborted Socrates: A Dramatic Debate on the Issues Surrounding Abortion (InterVarsity Press, 1983), a book I recommend highly.

Other APOLOGIA columns concerning abortion, for further reading: 

• About my abortion columns, October 26, 2017
• Resisting the Culture of Death, October 11, 2017
• Ideological investigative journalism, February 16, 2017
• Abortion, February 2, 2017
• About outlawing abortions, November 24, 2016
• Untangling abortion arguments, November 9, 2016
• We need an abortion law, October 12, 2016
• Beyond the abortion wars, August 8, 2016
• We need an abortion law, September 3, 2015
• We need an abortion law, May 29, 2014
• Aborting the least of these, May 15, 2014
• Euphemisms: The good, the bad, and the ugly, March 28, 2013
• Reflections on Motions 312 and 408, October 4, 2012
• Is the fetus a human being? May 10, 2012
• Abortion in the news (part 2), November 9, 2011
• Abortion in the news (part 1), October 20, 2011
• On abortion, again, October 16, 2008
• Acorns and oak trees…and abortion, October 2, 2008
• Aborting an abortion argument, September 18, 2008
• Morgentaler's abortion of logic, September 4, 2008

 For support for crisis pregnancy: 

• Crisis Pregnancy Centre of Winnipeg