Showing posts with label Pragmatic theory of truth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pragmatic theory of truth. Show all posts

June 09, 2011

Pragmatic theory of truth...is false

Veritas by Walter Seymour Allward
(Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa)
APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, June 9, 2011)

Pragmatic theory of truth ... is false

What is truth? In an attempt to answer this question, I will do three things: First, I will explain the pragmatic theory of truth; second, I will show that this view of truth is problematic; third, I will set out what I (and many others) believe is the correct theory—i.e., the correspondence theory of truth.

1. According to the pragmatic theory of truth, truth is defined as usefulness. That a statement is true means that it is useful—truth means "what works."

According to pragmatist philosopher and psychologist William James (1842-1920), “Truth is expedience. By truth we mean that a statement brings the right results or successful predictions.”

On the pragmatic view, then, for a belief to be true means that it guides us successfully when we act on it. By "truth" we mean whatever helps us achieve our values or goals.

Here is an example from science. To believe that it is true that there are causal laws means (merely) that my belief in causal laws is useful in letting me get to the moon (or wherever).

Here is an example from religion. To believe that "Jesus loves me" is true means (merely) that this belief is useful for me, i.e., it gives me peace and meaning in my life. For others, peace and meaning come from, say, Buddhism, or Islam, or the New Age—so "Jesus loves me" is not true for them. In other words, what works for me does not work for them. I have my truth, and they have theirs.

Clearly, the pragmatic theory of truth is popular in our culture.

2. Should we accept the pragmatic theory of truth? I think we should not, for two reasons.

First, although actions based on truth often lead to success, from this fact it does not follow logically that all successful actions are based on truth. It turns out that falsehoods can be useful, too. And we know this.

Think about a court of justice. I promise to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth; I do not promise just to say what works (for me) and only what works (for me). In a legal context, an understanding of truth as merely that which is expedient will be regarded (rightly) as perjury.

Or think about placebos. A placebo isn’t real medicine, but a patient’s belief that it is can sometimes result in a relief of symptoms. Relief of symptoms or not, the patient’s belief is mistaken—and it doesn’t turn a sugar pill into ibuprofen.

“Hence,” contemporary philosopher Richard Creel correctly concludes, “we need a distinction between a belief that is true and a belief that works.” But the pragmatic definition of truth fails to make this distinction.

Second, it is a plain fact that many truths simply cannot be regarded as solutions to problems or as useful. They just are. Think of the truths that there is a bit of dust under your desk, that there is a leaf on the window ledge, etc. These truths hold whether I use them (e.g., in this column) or not.

Thus, the pragmatic theory of truth should be rejected. It fails to account for our pre-theoretic distinction between truth and what works, and it fails to account for the fact that some truths just are, whether they work or not. That a belief works may count to some extent as evidence for the belief's truth, but it's not what truth means.

3. What's the philosophical upshot? It turns out that the above shortcomings of the pragmatic theory reveal a concept of truth that's more fundamental than the pragmatic concept. Enter: the correspondence theory of truth.

According to the correspondence theory, truth is a condition or state of affairs which exists when a statement of what is the case is the case. A truth about the world (reality) is a statement that corresponds to the way things actually are. That a statement is true means that it corresponds with, i.e., appropriately represents, what is the case in reality. As one wag has said, "Truth is telling it like it is."

Falsity, on the correspondence view, is a condition or state of affairs which exists when a statement of what is the case is not the case. Lies are deliberate falsehoods, i.e., lies are falsehoods intentionally presented as truths. Of course, falsehoods and lies can be expedient (for examples, think of Nazi and Soviet propaganda, Watergate, Enron, Bernie Madoff, some political promises, etc.), but this doesn’t mean they are true.

Significantly, the correspondence view of truth allows us to distinguish between (a) what's true and (b) what works but isn't true.

Therefore, the pragmatic theory of truth is false—even though it's useful in showing us that the correspondence theory of truth is the way to go!

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence College, Canada. See too Hendrik’s columns on Friedrich Nietzsche's denial of truth [Apologia, November 25, 2010] and Pontius Pilate's question "What is truth?" [Apologia, November 13, 2008]. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)