January 30, 2018

Aborting Trudeau's (other) abortion argument

Canada's Prime Minister posing thoughtful.
(Vogue Magazine, January 2016.)
APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, February 8, 2018
(This is my original. An edited, less clear version appeared in the newspaper.)

Aborting Trudeau’s (other) abortion argument

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has been criticized rightly about his recent false claims that Canadian women have a constitutional right to abortion (fact check: Canada’s Charter does not set out such a right). Yet, Trudeau goes on to justify abortion because, according to Trudeau, women have “the right to control their own bodies.”

This justification should be criticized, too.

Why? Because it's absurd.

Trudeau’s justification of abortion works only if the following argument works (I call it the body-part-control argument):
  • Premise 1: Every woman has the right to control her own body.
  • Premise 2: The fetus is a part of the pregnant woman’s body.
  • Conclusion: Women have the right to abortion.

The argument sounds good, but is it sound?

Nope, it is NOT sound. Consider the following reasoning.

First, assume (for the sake of argument) that the second premise is true. That is, assume that the fetus is a part of the pregnant woman’s body.

Second, consider the logical relation of transitivity. If A is a part of B, and B is a part of C, then A is a part of C. If a brick is part of a wall, and the wall is part of a house, then the brick is part of that house.

Third, keep in mind two facts: (1) a woman has two feet; and (2) a fetus has two feet.

Now, consider the following: if a fetus’ two feet are a part of the fetus, and if the fetus is a part of a pregnant woman, then the fetus’ two feet are a part of that woman. Hence, the woman has four feet.

Now, also consider the fact that the male fetus has a penis. If the penis is a part of the fetus, and if the fetus is a part of the pregnant woman, then the woman has a penis. (Note: We’re not talking intersex here, we’re talking about a pregnant woman.)


Think, too, about the possibility of male triplets.

Since absurdities follow logically from the assumed truth of the second premise, we can conclude that the second premise is false. (This is a reductio ad absurdum argument.)

Significantly, premise 2 fails to recognize the distinction between the concepts of part and connection. An object A can be connected to object B, yet object A need not be a part of B. The piano in a mover’s truck is connected (via straps, etc.) to the truck, yet the piano is not a part of that truck. Similarly, the fetus is connected to a woman’s body, yet the fetus is not a part of the woman’s body.

Sure, every woman has the right to control her own body. But there two bodies involved in an abortion.

Dear Prime Minister Trudeau: Please notice that it’s one thing to control one’s own body—it’s  quite another to kill the body of another!

---

Postscript: An objection and a reply

Objection: In 2014 there was a case in China of a baby conjoined at the torso to a headless parasitic twin, so the baby had extra legs, arms, etc. This case counts against the alleged absurdity of a woman having more than two feet or two hands (e.g., eight of each) and so on (e.g., three penises). So the above critique of the body-part-control argument fails.

Reply: Nope, it’s the objection that fails. Why? Because the limbs etc. of the headless parasitic twin are ATTACHED to the baby, but are NOT PART of the baby—they are properly a part of the headless parasitic twin that's conjoined/ connected to the baby. To think otherwise is to continue confusing / not distinguishing the notions of ‘part of X’ and ‘connection to X.’ (Happily, the limbs etc. of the headless parasitic twin were successfully detached surgically from the baby.)


Recommended book (from which the above reductio ad absurdum argument is gotten):

Peter Kreeft, The Unaborted Socrates


Past APOLOGIA columns concerning abortion:
                    
Canada Summer Jobs kerfuffle, January 18, 2018 
About my abortion columns, October 26, 2017
Abortion, February 2, 2017
About outlawing abortions, November 24, 2016
We need an abortion law, October 12, 2016
Beyond the abortion wars, August 8, 2016
We need an abortion law, September 3, 2015
On abortion, again, October 16, 2008
Aborting an abortion argument, September 18, 2008


For support for crisis pregnancy:





Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College, Otterburne, Manitoba. The views expressed in APOLOGIA do not always reflect the views of Providence.

9 comments:

Brian said...

Welcome to Gilead.

I recently watched the TV series "The Handmaid's Tale" which a retelling of a dystopian novel published more than 20 years ago. The story explores the themes of female subjugation, misogyny, totalitarianism and religious fundamentalism.

When I conducted some research after viewing, which is something I often do with great pieces of art, is that the author had not taken many liberties in her story telling. All of the horrible actions taken against women actually have occurred in our recent history.

I can see how this happens. It's columns and articles like this one above that start that rolling. This drivel that you have produced is ill informed and you have no basis to understand the decisions that others need to make. Make or female, christian or otherwise you have no true understanding regardless of your degree or your status in the community. As a 21st century parent, I am teaching my daughter her value in this world, and that value is not determined by the wants and opinions of others.

I know that Gilead will never exist. But we have to fight for that freedom.

Praise be.

Brian

Jordan Wiebe said...

Brian,

It seems you have set forth very little in terms of responding to the argument Dr. Van der Breggen has articulated. In order to show an argument to be false you need to respond to one or more of the premises and also show why it is incorrect. You appear to have done nothing but assert that his article is “ill-informed” and “drivel.” What reasoning do you have for such claims? Before saying too much more I would like to give you more time to back up your claims. I wish to understand the views of those around me and be respectful to everyone.

I will however make the point that a baby’s sex is determined at conception. So, what about the value of those future women that are being aborted?

I myself have two daughters and wish to teach them that their value is not based on the wants and opinions of others. Instead, it is based on their being made in the image of God. I hope to teach them to respect all life, wether inside or outside the womb and regardless of sex, race, religion, etc. All people have equal value (but not all ideas do!)

Looking forward to hearing your response and having a respectful conversation. All the best,

Jordan

Brian said...

Jordan,

The point of my rebuttal is not about rebutting the author's arguments. His arguments are math (A=B B=C so A=C). Torture the statistics until they tell you what you want to hear. I'm not going to argue when the exact moment a fetus becomes a person. It's a pointless argument. But it's used as propaganda to promote a theological belief. A theological belief that the author wishes to push onto all Canadians through politics and national policy.

Mixing theological beliefs with politics is the slope in which belief becomes fundamentalism. We have enough of that in this world already.

Brian



Jordan Wiebe said...

I don't believe it is a rebuttal if you don't address any of the author's points. It just irrelevant pontificating on your point using someone else's platform.

I'm not quite sure to what you are referring when you mention statistics. I think knowing when human life begins is very much the point that needs to be addressed.

I'm also not sure what theological belief is being promoted. Clearly, it's not functioning as very good propaganda if that is his intention. Perhaps you can clarify what you mean by that?

A pro-life viewpoint is not a uniquely Christian idea (if that is what you are implying). There are various religions and worldviews that incorporate pro-life philosophy. There are atheists who are pro-life, and there are women who are pro-life as well. I would also add that everyone has theological beliefs. Even a belief that there is no God is theological. And so, everyone brings their theological beliefs to the table, for better or for worse. Again, perhaps you can clarify your statements for me re: fundamentalism? Cheers,

Jordan

Hendrik van der Breggen said...

Thanks for the comments. I think Jordan has responded well to Brian, so I won't add anything here other than to recommend some further readings. About The Handmaid's Tale, see my column (and comments) Steinbach's Life Hike 2019. About the abortion issue more generally, see my article Untangling popular "pro-choice" claims and arguments concerning abortion".

Alex said...

A fetus is a hypothetical person in the same way a blueprint or a construction company is a hypothetical house: something does physically exist (a blueprint; tractors and managers); but it isn’t the thing in itself. Neither a construction company nor a blueprint is a house. Likewise a fetus is not a person (not even partially). Until (at least possibly) the third trimester, when enough machinery exists to start building a person, so (for all we know) that’s underway then. By a certain point, an incomplete person experiencing consciousness is still a person in the same way that by a certain point, an incomplete house you can shelter in is.

You have no obligations to hypothetical people (until they are not longer hypothetical). Those people don’t exist yet, so they have no interests (unless they are effectively certain to exist, but that then depends on some actual, not hypothetical, person’s decision to build them).

For the purposes of moral consideration there is no meaningful or relevant difference between a fetus and a sperm or egg. You have no obligation to the hypothetical children you “could” have—no matter whether there’s just a cell or an unfinished body sans cerebral cortex—until such time as you actually commit to having them (and thus, you have obligations to the future people others have committed to having, e.g. to leave the world in a better shape for them). Otherwise, until some actual person decides to proceed, a fetus and a cell are both just blueprints and construction companies; neither contains a person or even the ability to be generating one.

This is an ontological fact. So there is a real difference between a “hypothetical” cognitive future, and an actual cognitive future. Only actual cognitive machines can “have” the latter (as in, actually possess it: there is at least a partial, actual, existing person then, consciously present, who possesses a thing, a future). Hypothetical things cannot “have” futures (other than purely hypothetical ones). Because things that don’t exist can’t possess things.

Thus, when all you have is a blueprint or construction company, the decision whether to actually start and continue building has yet to be made, and there is no “person” existent who can make that decision—except the one whose womb is being used for the project. Once you have at least a person-in-progress (an actual cognitive machine with partial personal characteristics and active consciousness), then it exists, and thus it has interests (actual ones; not hypothetical ones). So it is then no longer the case that only one person is around to have an interest in what then happens.

Hendrik van der Breggen said...

Thanks for your thoughts, Alex.

Before I address your argument I would like to set out a reminder about what we are discussing.

Reminder: Keep in mind that abortion kills the human fetus, which is a pre-natal human being—a human child. (The term “fetus” is merely Latin for unborn offspring or little one.) This means that if there are reasonable doubts about arguments against the fetus’s status as a person (a human being with the right to life), then it’s wise to err on the side of life. Just as if I’m not sure there isn’t a fellow deer hunter rustling in the bush, then it’s wise for me not to shoot into the bush. Indeed, morally, I should not shoot.

OK, let’s take a look at your argument against the personhood of the human fetus. I believe it’s got a couple of serious problems—we can have some reasonable doubts.

Reasonable doubt 1

You wrote: “A fetus is a hypothetical person in the same way a blueprint or a construction company is a hypothetical house: something does physically exist (a blueprint; tractors and managers); but it isn’t the thing in itself. Neither a construction company nor a blueprint is a house. Likewise a fetus is not a person (not even partially).” And you go on to point that for the fetus to be a person, it must be “experiencing consciousness” and that to be a “person-in-progress” it must have “an actual cognitive machine [cerebral cortex] with partial personal characteristics and active consciousness.” And you claim of the fetus and zygote that “neither contains a person or even the ability to be generating one.”

My reply: Yes, neither a blueprint nor construction company is an actual house. But what if a house, a very tiny house, is such that it essentially is its own blue print, construction company, and more all rolled up into one unit—and will grow into a larger house if we don’t destroy it? I think the fetus is, actually, such a house.

The fetus is a tiny house that not only contains within itself its own blueprint and construction company (for it to grow into a larger house) but also is alive and managing its own dynamic process of growing (into its later developmental stages, i.e., stages of being an older and bigger house). In fact, as biology tells us, the fetus is a genetically distinct, self-governing, whole living organism that is a distinct individual member of the human species. It’s a whole and living human being.

In other words, that tiny human house already has enough machinery to build—and, because it’s alive, is already building and directing the building of—what’s needed to experience actual consciousness. Thus, whereas a blueprint or construction company isn’t an actual house, the living pre-natal human being is an actual human person.

(Continued below.)

Hendrik van der Breggen said...

At this juncture, it’s important not to forget that we’re talking about the human fetus, i.e., a living thing (not an inanimate object), and that there is a distinction between two sorts of capacities in living things: (1) an immediately exercisable capacity to engage in a function (e.g., consciousness), and (2) a basic/ fundamental capacity to develop the immediately exercisable capacity.

Alex, your argument makes the assumption that the immediately exercisable capacity for consciousness is a necessary condition for personhood. But the fact is that having such a capacity is merely a sufficient condition. Sure, if a human being exercises its immediately exercisable capacity for consciousness, that’s enough, i.e., sufficient, for it being a human person. But it’s not a necessary condition.

If, for the sake of argument, we accept your assumption that the immediately exercisable capacity for consciousness is a necessary condition for personhood, then human beings who are in a temporary coma would not be persons. But they are persons, even if they have always been in a coma since the get-go. And so your assumption is false. It’s not the case that immediately exercisable capacity for consciousness is a necessary condition for personhood.

What is the necessary condition? Answer: having a basic/ fundamental capacity to develop the immediately exercisable capacity for human consciousness. Significantly, a human being in a temporary coma (even from, say, its earliest prenatal days) has the fundamental capacity for consciousness. Such a capacity is real, not hypothetical. Significantly, too, it turns out that the fundamental capacity for consciousness exists in the human fetus. Such a capacity is real, not hypothetical. If no malfunction or interference occurs, the human fetus, like the human being in a non-permanent coma, will gain consciousness—the human being will awaken. Not hypothetically. Really. This is a real cognitive future.

Also, being a human being who will have consciousness is a hugely morally significant kind of thing. That’s why we don’t kill human beings who have non-permanent comas, and that’s why we would not kill people who (hypothetically) have been in a coma all their previous life but we know will waken and will become conscious.

The fetus is a kind of living being that is morally similar to us in the fact that, like when we’re in a non-permanent coma (or asleep), it gives rise to consciousness. Really. Actually. Not hypothetically. So, like us, that human being is a person.

Perhaps think of the matter this way. If we had a magical brick that would on its own become (if we provided water and cement) a unique mansion complete with its own heating system, air conditioning, windows, beautiful blue curtains, wildly-complex computer technology, and plumbing (that leaks a bit in the early stages of development), then I’m pretty sure we would all consider that brick to be hugely valuable. The human embryo and fetus are like that magical brick.

(Continued below.)

Hendrik van der Breggen said...

Reasonable doubt 2

You write: “For the purposes of moral consideration there is no meaningful or relevant difference between a fetus and a sperm or egg.”

No, that is mistaken. A human sperm or a human egg when left alone remains a sperm or egg—and dies. But when a sperm and egg unite, a fusion occurs and a new organism comes onto the scene—a new and living human being. These are facts of biology. Biology 101. Surely, if living human beings matter morally, which they do, then there is a meaningful and relevant difference between a human fetus and a sperm or egg. The fetus is a human being, and thus matters morally, whereas the sperm and egg are not human beings, and thus do not matter morally.

You try to dismiss the moral significance of the human being when it is at an early stage of its development, i.e., when it’s a fetus (reminder: “fetus” is merely Latin for unborn offspring or little one). You dismiss the moral significance because it hasn’t yet got a cerebral cortex. But this is again to confuse the two sorts of capacities I discussed above. You continue to assume that the immediately exercisable capacity for consciousness is a necessary condition for personhood. As I have argued above, however, this is to confuse a sufficient condition for a necessary condition. What’s necessary is the basic/ fundamental capacity to develop the immediately exercisable capacity—which is a capacity that the human fetus has.

Thanks again for your thoughts, Alex. I hope my reply is helpful. At the very least, I think my reply has cast some reasonable doubt onto your argument.