June 12, 2014

Doubting Euthanasia

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, June 12, 2014

Doubting Euthanasia

Is it wise to legalize euthanasia (a.k.a. physician-assisted suicide/ doctor-assisted death)? I doubt it, for five reasons.

1. The popular argument for euthanasia hinges on a false dichotomy: euthanasia or painful death. Significantly, there's a third option: palliative care.

Doris Barwich, M.D., President of Canadian Association of Palliative Care Physicians: "Pain is rarely the reason patients ask for hastened death—it more often comes out of a desire to control the circumstances surrounding death. Fortunately, we can assure our patients that with Palliative Care tools and resources, pain and other distressing symptoms can usually be controlled and support provided to ensure comfort and quality of life."

2. Instead of euthanasia for the (rare) difficult cases, there is palliative sedation.

Journal of the American Medical Association: "Palliative sedation is the use of sedative medications to relieve extreme suffering by making the patient unaware and unconscious (as in a deep sleep) while the disease takes its course, eventually leading to death. The sedative medication is gradually increased until the patient is comfortable and able to relax. Palliative sedation is not intended to cause death or shorten life."

If, foreseeably, palliative sedation hastens death, it needn't be judged unethical. According to ethicist Margaret Somerville, just as death isn't the intended effect of high risk surgery (needed to relieve pain), and so such surgery isn't immoral if death occurs, so too if death isn't the intended effect of high risk pain management, yet death occurs, then such pain management isn't immoral either.

There's an important moral difference between engaging in a procedure with intent to kill (euthanasia) rather than not (palliative sedation). Euthanasia takes the lower moral ground.

3. Allowing terminally ill patients to die from their illness via termination of life support by withdrawing/ withholding extraordinary, burdensome, or medically useless treatment is already a legal and ethical part of palliative care—and doesn't require euthanasia.

Ethicist Scott Rae: "Physicians need not always 'do everything' to stave off death, especially when it involves no more than simply delaying an inevitable death…. Choices about CPR, respirators, and intravenous procedures in the last weeks of life should not be viewed as choices for death."

Euthanasia isn't needed, in other words.

4. Euthanasia imposes a terrible burden on the vulnerable. If life is no longer society's default position, then the most vulnerable members of our society—the elderly, terminally ill, disabled—must justify their continued existence.

This is just plain nasty.
 
5. According to philosopher Paul Chamberlain, a logical-legal slippery slope looms large.

Consider the notion of patient autonomy and the fact that reasons for one action sometimes also justify unintended actions.

In the context of legalized euthanasia, patient autonomy becomes understood in terms of the following fundamental principle: the sufferer has the right to doctor-assisted death to end his/her suffering.

Significantly, accepting euthanasia as a legal right on the basis of this fundamental principle opens up and justifies many other situations in which persons suffer and request death. These situations include the non-terminally ill, the elderly, the disabled, persons with chronic back pain, the depressed teenager, etc.

Trust legislative safeguards for protection? Good luck. Aside from abuse (one third of Belgium's euthanasia deaths were illegal and lacked patient consent), safeguards fail because courts will do what courts do—promote consistency. Consistency demands that all of the above-mentioned persons, if suffering, and if desiring death (and if represented by a smart lawyer), can be reasonably seen to have the right to death as well.

After all, at the core of these other situations is a sufferer who requests doctor-assisted death, rendering situational differences incidental.

Legalizing euthanasia, then, puts us on a non-fallacious slippery slope that embraces death as a solution.

But medical, social, and psychological problems require medical, social, and psychological solutions—not killing.

Surely, legalizing euthanasia is not wise.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University CollegeThe views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

P.S. For further reading on euthanasia/ physician-assisted suicide, see the following APOLOGIA columns:
P.P.S. See too Dutch ethicist Theo Boer's views on the recent euthanasia experience of The Netherlands:

May 29, 2014

We need an abortion law

LIFE Magazine, April 30, 1965
APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, May 29, 2014

We need an abortion law

Abortion in Canada is legal right up to birth. Yes, most abortions occur much earlier, and most doctors don't do late-term abortions. But wouldn't a law be appropriate to protect, say, those few children in their last trimester who risk an unjust death by abortion?

Also, wouldn't a law be appropriate to protect children from increasingly popular sex-selective abortion (gendercide), the killing of children merely because they are girls? And wouldn't a law be appropriate to protect the many children who risk being killed merely because they have Down syndrome?

Such a law could save hundreds of lives, probably thousands, yearly. Such a law could be supported by all Canadians, surely.

Still, some object to any legislation that restricts abortion. No law is needed, we are told. We should all be "pro-choice," we are told.

We are even told that abortion legislation is misguided: we should instead deal with the underlying causes that drive women to abortion. A pregnant woman may be facing, say, psychological problems, so we only need to deal with that.

But this objection is weak.

First, keep in mind that abortion kills an unborn child—a human being.

Second, consider what Scott Klusendorf, a pro-life activist, writes about the deal-only-with-underlying-causes argument:

"[T]his is like saying that the 'underlying cause' of spousal abuse is psychological; so instead of making it illegal for husbands to beat their wives, the solution is to provide counseling for men."

Klusendorf adds: "There are 'underlying causes' for rape, murder, theft, and so on, but that in no way makes it 'misguided' to have laws banning such actions."

Think about it: psychological problems require psychological solutions, not the killing innocent children. So, to protect the children, we need a law.

Or, if the underlying causes that drive women to abortion are social or economic, then we require social or economic solutions, not the killing of innocent children. So, again, to protect the children, we need a law.

At this juncture, someone might object that Canada's criminal code presently tells us that the unborn child becomes a human being only after he/she is born. Yes, this is what our law says.

But Canada's criminal code is mistaken.

Enter 21st-century science. Contemporary science—embryology, fetology, and biology—tells us that the human fetus is in fact a human being, i.e., it's a genetically distinct, self-governing dynamic entity which belongs to the human species. It's not feline or canine; it's human. It's not a cat being or a dog being; it's a human being. It's not a kitten or a puppy; it's a human child.

At this juncture, one might grant that the unborn child is in fact a human being, but object that it isn't a "person." That is, the unborn human being lacks that specific developmental feature which confers "personhood." When it has that feature, only then does it have the right to life.

This is known as a "decisive moments" approach to personhood, which is deeply problematic. The allegedly decisive features fail because they rule out various persons who clearly already have the right to life. As a result, the equality of equal rights gets ungrounded.

For example, if complex personal consciousness is the criterion of personhood, then sleeping or stunned persons lose their right to life. If viability is the criterion, then personhood measures not actual humanity but instead hospital technology, the sophistication of which varies from place to place, rendering same-aged children persons in some hospitals and non-persons in other hospitals.

What about the unborn child's lack of brain activity (in its early stages), which in adults indicates death? Nope. This personhood criterion confuses death and development: end-of-life permanent cessation doesn't equal pre-natal temporary absence with capacity to bloom.

For the sake of children, we need a law. See WeNeedaLAW.ca.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

More APOLOGIA columns on abortion:
Further reading:

May 15, 2014

Aborting the least of these

Warning: graphic photo below (at end of column)
APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, May 15, 2014

Aborting the least of these

Recent news about abortion—the deliberate destruction of unborn children—breaks my heart.

Of course, we should help pregnant women whose problems push them to contemplate abortion. Happily, over past decades pregnancy crisis centers and churches have been providing much practical hands-on help. This effort should definitely continue.

Nevertheless, my heart breaks at the growing indifference towards the deliberate deaths of unborn children. Consider these examples from the news.

News agencies recently revealed that two hospitals were supplying aborted fetuses as fuel for incinerators that provide electricity. One hospital is located in England. The other is located in British Columbia. The latter shipped its fetal parts, along with the regular biomedical trash, to a power plant in Oregon.

The killing of children is itself a horror, but an additional horror is the calm, systematic, efficient, environmentally-friendly, and impersonal handling of the incineration of the children's bodies. Internet commenters have suggested that this practice constitutes a responsible and steward-like use of energy. This strikes me in some sense eerily analogous to the mindset of those who incinerated Jews.

On my Facebook page someone even wrote: "Reduce, reuse, recycle."

More news: Emily Letts, an American 25-year-old actress and abortion clinic counselor made a YouTube video of her own abortion. Why? To portray "a positive abortion story."

During the video Miss Letts hums happily. She describes the abortion experience as "birth-like." She adds: “I don't feel like a bad person. I don't feel sad. I feel in awe of the fact that I can make a baby, I can make a life.” She expresses no moral qualm about taking her child's life.

Miss Letts' film even won a video contest with Abortion Care Network, and Cosmopolitan published Letts' story.

Reality check: many abortion stories are in fact not positive, as many post-abortive women testify. Also, abortion kills a human being.

Yes, it should be acknowledged that not all "pro-choice" advocates approve of Letts' video, and many express dismay at her callous and cavalier attitude.

But we ought to maintain perspective. Letts is not an anomaly in the "pro-choice" camp, as, say, a killer of abortion doctors is an anomaly in the pro-life camp. Whereas the killing of abortionists is roundly (and rightly) rejected by the mainstream pro-life movement, the fact is that apparently quite a few "pro-choice" advocates do promote a callous, cavalier attitude similar to that of Letts. (For substantiation, see the latter portion of "Abortion counselor videotapes her own abortion, posts to YouTube," LifeSiteNews, May 6, 2014.)

More news: Canada's federal Liberal leader Justin Trudeau says people with pro-life views on abortion are not welcome in the Liberal party. Liberal MPs may not speak in defence of innocent pre-natal children.

Ongoing news: The leader of Canada's federal Conservatives, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, continues his refusal to countenance discussion in parliament on the abortion issue, and Conservative MPs are pressured not to disagree with the PM. (For the record: there are more pro-life MPs in the Conservative party than in other parties.)

What is going on?

Human beings are aborted at such a rate that their corpses can be incinerated to provide energy and many people are okay with this? A human being is aborted not for the mother's health's sake but to win a video contest? People who think human life before birth is worthy of protection are not welcome to speak out in (at least two of) Canada's major political parties?

Surely, this is outrageous!

I call on fellow citizens to resist this growing darkness, this culture of death, this moral rot.

Think about it: Social, psychological, and economic problems require social, psychological, and economic solutions—not the killing of innocent children.

Surely, we must rouse ourselves from our moral stupor. Surely, we must be silent no more. Surely, we must speak out in defence of the "least of these"—i.e., those human beings who cannot speak for themselves.

For Christ's sake, folks, wake up.



(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Canadian abortion statistics: Abortion & Canada (National Post graphic) 

May 01, 2014

Self-defeat, self-deceit, and freedom of speech

SO MUCH PUN.COM
APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, May 1, 2014

Self-defeat, self-deceit, and freedom of speech

I shake my head in disbelief at logically self-defeating statements, especially when behind the logical self-defeat there lurks a self-deceit that squelches dissent. The antidote? Truth-seeking use of reason coupled with respectful exercise of free speech.

The following examples (which I've stumbled across over the years) will clarify.

“There is no truth.” Umm. Is this true? I suspect that the person saying this is deluded about and hiding from—you guessed it—truth.

“Language does not communicate truth.” Oh really? If it's true, then it's false. If it's false, well, then language does communicate truth.

“All observation is theory-laden,” and so, it is sometimes (often) implied, all observations should be dismissed as biased. Okay, but isn't this an observation? And so isn't it biased, too? Surely, at least some observations are informed by, and actually get at, the real world—and thereby allow us to test against bias.

“Don't be judgmental.” If set out as a condemnation (as is typical nowadays), then is this a case of being judgmental? Surely it is. As such, it's a judgment pretending not to be a judgment. It would be better to encourage an accurate and wise judgment.

“Our organizational culture reflects diversity and inclusiveness.” This is web/software organization Mozilla's justification for pushing CEO Brendan Eich out from his job. Eich had supported—gasp!—traditional (non-gay) marriage. Apparently, Mozilla's pretense concerning “diversity” and “inclusiveness” excludes those who differ.

“Don't be intolerant.” Yes, this seems tolerant. But it isn't. It's a case of intolerance of intolerance—and thinking otherwise is self-delusion.

For many persons the intolerance of intolerance presents an intellectual impasse, so I'll say more.

Recently a group of citizens from Weyburn, Saskatchewan (my hometown), attempted to block a U.S.-based critic of same-sex sex and same-sex marriage from speaking at a public meeting in Weyburn, a meeting to which the speaker was invited. (The speaker was detained temporarily by Canadian border officials at Regina airport, and was arrested later for speaking at University of Regina without invitation or permission.) The reality of the Weyburn group's intolerance was clearly lost on the group's members, who called themselves, ironically (and I'm not kidding), Intolerance Free Weyburn.

How do we get past the apparent impasse of the intolerance of intolerance? A first step is to realize that not all intolerance is bad and not all tolerance is good.

Intolerance of student cheating is good, and tolerance of student cheating is bad. Intolerance of drunk-driving is good, tolerance of drunk-driving is bad. Intolerance of child abuse is good, and tolerance of child abuse is bad.

The issue in the larger democratic, social realm is to figure out which is which: of what should we be tolerant, of what should we be intolerant?

How do we best figure this out?

I submit that it's via encouraging the exercise of free speech (done respectfully) to set out publicly accessible reasons (not mere in-house faith reasons) aimed at truth and the common good. And then build on that.

(This gives us grounds for thinking that shutting down freedom of speech à la Intolerance Free Weyburn is a bad form of intolerance.)

Surely, the free exchange of ideas—even deeply controversial ideas—done carefully for the sake of truth-seeking is what makes democracy great. Surely, respectful and open-minded discussions are crucially important for the preservation of liberty. Surely, mere disagreement does not equal hate.

Sometimes lurking behind logical self-defeat is self-deceit, and sometimes lurking behind “non-judgmentalism,” “diversity,” “inclusiveness,” and “tolerance” is an ideology that's grossly intolerant of dissent.

All this to say: We who live in a democratic society have a responsibility to discern what is true and good, express our findings freely, show respect to those with whom we disagree, plus urge those with whom we disagree to do likewise.


(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College.)