Did the Easter miracle happen?

Note: The following article was published in 2004 in The Record (a Kitchener-Waterloo newspaper) and I post it here to make it available to interested readers. The article was the 2005 winner of the General Readership category (newspaper article) awarded by The Word Guild.

A scene from the 2004 film The Passion of The Christ, directed by Mel Gibson

Did the Easter miracle happen?

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Record, April 10, 2004

Think of Easter and immediately bunnies and coloured eggs come to mind. However, as Mel Gibson's film The Passion of the Christ has reminded us, Easter has more to do with Jesus and the Christian gospel than it has to do with chocolate.

The traditional Christian gospel or good news is that God (God the Son) came to Earth in the man Jesus, He took our punishment for sin onto Himself by suffering and dying on a cross, and then God (the Father) raised Jesus from the grave (tomb). Jesus' resurrection, that is His return to life in the same body but somehow wonderfully renewed, is said to be a glorious sign to help us believe—accept by faith—the good news.

Of course, this begs the question: Is it reasonable to believe that Jesus actually resurrected?

In the little book The Case for Easter: A Journalist Investigates the Evidence for the Resurrection (Zondervan 2003), former journalist and former spiritual skeptic Lee Strobel argues that, yes, it is reasonable to believe that Jesus actually resurrected.

Strobel makes his case for Jesus' resurrection by appealing to, and defending, three historical facts:

○ Jesus was actually killed by crucifixion;

○ The tomb in which Jesus' dead body was placed was found empty a couple days later;

○ And Jesus was subsequently seen alive and well for several weeks in various locations, not only by a skeptic who touched Him to make sure He wasn't a ghost, but also by other individuals and variously sized groups of people, many of whom engaged Jesus in conversation and had meals with Him—and would later endure torture and death rather than recant their testimony.

THERE ARE OTHER EXPLANATIONS

Strobel also considers alternative, non-resurrection explanations—such as Jesus didn't really die, the witnesses hallucinated, a conspiracy occurred or it's all legend—but argues that they are all weak. Strobel's arguments are, I believe, strong, but because of space limitations I won't discuss those arguments here. I recommend that anyone who is interested in the problems with the non-miracle theories check out Strobel's book.

What I find interesting is that the alternative non-resurrection explanations, even the most outlandish ones which haven't a shred of evidence in their favour, such as Jesus has an unknown twin who pretended to be the resurrected Jesus after Jesus died, tend to be set forth by many—and clung to—primarily because of a philosophical reason.

How so? The proponents of the far-fetched have been infected by a skeptical philosophical view that has been transmitted to us from the Scottish philosopher David Hume.

If your son or daughter goes to university today and takes an introductory philosophy class, he or she will probably run into David Hume. Well, not David Hume in person, but a philosophy professor who is a kindred spirit.

Hume lived from 1711 to 1776. He is famous, rather notorious, for, among, other things, his argument against miracles. According to Hume, no matter how good the historical evidence is for a miracle such as Jesus' resurrection—even if the miracle actually occurred—the evidence is never good enough.

Hume argues that a miracle is a violation of a law of nature and that the laws of nature are very well established. The result, according to Hume, is that a miracle's occurrence is maximally improbable, and this maximal improbability counts against any good testimony for a miracle, either balancing the testimony (thereby providing grounds to suspend belief) or outweighing it (thereby providing grounds for disbelief). In reality, Hume thinks the latter is the case. Either way, though, Hume would have us dismiss miracle testimonies as unreasonable to believe.

CIRCULAR REASONING

Having studied Hume's argument for my master's thesis in philosophy at the University of Windsor and for my PhD dissertation in philosophy at the University of Waterloo, I have come to conclude that Hume's argument fails.

His argument fails because it begs the question. It “begs the question” in the sense that it engages in circular reasoning, it assumes as proven that which is at issue, and it sneaks the conclusion into the premises.

As mentioned, Hume takes the violation-of-law-of-nature aspect of a miracle to be sufficient grounds for counting the violated laws of nature wholly and destructively against miracle testimony—to judge the miracle to be maximally improbable.

Interestingly, in the case of Jesus' resurrection, such an event is maximally improbable, given the laws of nature and given that there is no intervention from outside the physical system. Significantly, this brings to light the fact that Hume makes the assumption that to make a probability judgment all that is needed is our knowledge of the relevant laws of nature.

But, it should be emphasized, we are supposedly talking about a miraculous resurrection (as suggested by the evidence), and so, although we are given the laws of nature, we are not given that there is no intervention from outside the system.

So in assuming that all that is needed is our knowledge of the relevant laws of nature and nothing about any possible intervention from outside of nature, Hume is, in effect, assuming that either God does not exist (and so God never intervenes via miracles) or, if God does exist, God's intentions concerning nature are shown to us wholly by the laws of nature (and so God never intervenes via miracles).

But if, as Hume assumes for the sake of argument, there is good evidence for what seems very much to be a miracle—Hume even allows it to be a real miracle—then Hume's assumption about the background knowledge is at issue.

In other words, in order for Hume's argument to work, it requires the assumption that the laws of nature express either all the goings-on of a universe without God or, if God exists, all of God's intentions concerning the universe. But the truth of this assumption must be put on hold when a miracle (whether actual or alleged) is supposed to be under investigation.

Indeed, for one's mind to be actually open to the possibility of the occurrence of an occasional real miracle—a possibility Hume allows, at least for the sake of argument—requires that the assumption Hume makes be suspended—at least when one is purportedly investigating the evidence for a miracle.

In other words, Hume's argument works only if we assume that there is no God who on rare occasions intervenes in nature, but this assumption is at issue when we are considering any alleged evidence for miracles.

LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE

Thus, by assuming the above-described background knowledge, Hume mistakenly begs the question which only the (alleged) miracle evidence can answer.

Hume's mind is already made up then, and not open to what the evidence suggests.

The upshot is that if your mind is not already closed to the possibility of a God who occasionally does a miracle, that is, if your mind is open to the possibility of God's existence and the possibility of this God intervening in nature, then the facts surrounding Jesus' alleged resurrection may make a miraculous resurrection explanation plausible, and even reasonable to believe.

If you weren't a believer in the past, Easter might now take on a whole new meaning.

Postscript (September 17, 2016): The notion of God “intervening” in nature can also be understood as God engaging in a special act vis-à-vis God's ongoing act of sustaining the creation. Space limitations in a newspaper article are not conducive to adding philosophical-theological nuance.

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Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College.

Miracles and historical investigation

Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, January 21, 2016

Miracles and historical investigation

Theologian Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) argues it's not reasonable to discern that a miracle has occurred in history. But his argument fails.

According to Troeltsch, on the basis of analogy to events known to us coupled with the assumption that nature behaves uniformly, we apply what we know about the present onto evidence having to do with the past, and thereby we extend our knowledge into the realm of the past.

But we have no knowledge (supposedly) of miracles occurring today (e.g., all dead men stay dead), so when we are given historical evidence for a miracle (e.g., testimony that Jesus allegedly resurrected) we infer by analogy from the present that no miracle occurred in the past (i.e., no resurrection of Jesus occurred).

Troeltsch's use of analogy is an epic fail, however.

Theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014) correctly points out that Troeltsch confuses a principle of method with a principle of content.

As a principle of method, the appeal to analogy should work like this: To say that a miracle didn’t occur requires positive knowledge of analogy of miracle testimonies to testimonies for which we know no actual object corresponds, whereas to say that a miracle did occur requires positive knowledge of analogy of miracle testimonies to testimonies for which we know a real object corresponds. The analogy should be between the testimonies per se, not that to which they testify.

But Troeltsch mistakenly uses analogy as a principle of content concerning what is to be known (i.e., the object of knowledge) rather than as a principle of method which works as a tool (i.e., the basis) by which we discern what is to be known.

Think of it this way. For testimonial evidence to allow us to come to knowledge of the past what we need is a positive analogy between past testimony and present known-to-be-true testimony (i.e., their comparable characteristics or virtues as credible testimonies/ sources); we do not need an analogy between the things testified to (i.e., the testimony's contents). Significantly, if uniqueness of what's testified to counts against a testimony, then nothing new would ever be learned from others!

Again, it is not the lack of a present-day analogy to the object of a testimony that counts against testimony; rather, what counts against a testimony is its positive analogy to present-day testimony to which we know no testified-to object conforms—i.e., what counts against a testimony is its positive analogy to known-to-be-false testimonies such as those of people who are known to exaggerate or hallucinate or lie.

In the case of reports of alleged miracles, to think that there must always be an analogy between the things (objects) testified to is to assume that there is no possibility of a special action by a supernatural cause such as God. But, if the issue is whether such an action actually occurred, this is to beg the question, i.e., assume as proven that which is at issue (a logical "sin").

Troeltsch's appeal to analogy presumes the nature of the object of a testimony because it (his appeal to analogy) requires that all events must be non-miraculous events like the (allegedly) non-miraculous events we see today. However, if the issue is whether all events are non-miraculous—which is the issue if we’re trying to determine whether an actual miracle has occurred by investigating evidence—then Troeltsch smuggles a predetermined outcome into an alleged investigation. He puts the cart before the horse.

At this juncture, one might follow philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) and object that a miracle such as Jesus' resurrection is maximally improbable. But this objection assumes either we know that God doesn't exist (so miracles are maximally improbable) or we know that, if God exists, God's intentions are wholly revealed by the laws of nature (so miracles are maximally improbable). But we don't know this! These assumptions are question-begging, too, if the issue is whether a God-caused event (such as Jesus' resurrection) has actually occurred and is evidence for a God who sometimes engages in special actions.

All this to say: miracles can be studied historically.

In view of competing worldview claims—e.g., Christianity vs. Islam vs. Atheism—such study should be done.

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

Further reading:

• Easter and Historical Investigation (Apologia, April 17, 2014)
• Do Jesus’ miracles violate the laws of nature (Apologia, April 3, 2014)
• Easter and Philosophy (Apologia, April 8, 2010)
• Believing Christmas because of Easter (Apologia, December 17, 2009)
• Did Easter happen? (Apologia, April 8, 2009)

• Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament, by Craig Keener
• "History and Miracles," by Francis Beckwith (In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God's Action in History)
• "Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science," Ph.D. dissertation by Henry Van Der Something-or-other (see chapter 5, pp. 360-374)

Question-begging, golden nuggets, and Jesus' resurrection

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, February 5, 2015

Question-begging, golden nuggets, and Jesus' resurrection

Question-begging (a.k.a. circular reasoning) is a mistake in reasoning which occurs when an argument assumes as proven that which is at issue. The conclusion, which is the claim in dispute, is used/ assumed as a premise, which is provided as support for the claim in dispute—so the disputed claim is provided as support for itself.

Brooke Noel Moore and Richard Parker provide a fun example in their book Critical Thinking (2012):

Two gold miners roll a boulder away from its resting place and find three huge gold nuggets underneath. One says to the other, “Great! That’s one nugget for you and two for me,” handing one nugget to his associate.

“Wait a minute!” says the second miner. “Why do you get two and I get just one?”

“Because I’m the leader of this operation,” says the first.

“What makes you the leader?” asks miner number two.

“I’ve got twice the gold you do,” answers number one.

The humour arises because having twice the gold is assumed as settled and offered as support for having twice the gold while that is the very issue in dispute.

More seriously, consider the argument against reasonable belief in miracle reports by the skeptical philosopher David Hume (1711-1776). Hume's argument is aimed at Jesus' resurrection, which, if it occurred, vindicates Jesus' claims to be and reveal God (but Hume apparently wants to resist Jesus' claims).

Hume defines miracle as a violation of the laws of nature due to the volition of a deity. Hume then takes the violation-of-law-of-nature aspect of miracle to be sufficient grounds for counting the violated laws of nature wholly and destructively against miracle testimony.

Hume's argument can be summarized as follows:

• Miracles violate nature's laws (i.e., go against nature's usual course).
• Nature's laws are super well established.
• Therefore, miracles are maximally improbable.
• Therefore, disbelieve miracle reports.

See the question-begging?

Yes, in the case of Jesus' resurrection such an event is maximally improbable, given the laws of nature and given that there is no intervention from outside the system. But notice: Hume assumes that no other background knowledge is needed to make a probability judgment—all that's needed is our knowledge of the relevant laws of nature.

But we are supposedly talking about a possibly miraculous resurrection, and so, although we are given the laws of nature, we are not given that there is no intervention from outside the system.

In making his assumption, then, Hume is assuming that either God does not exist (and so God never intervenes via miracles) or, if God does exist, God's intentions concerning nature are shown to us wholly by the laws of nature (and so, again, God never intervenes via miracles).

But if the issue is whether a miracle has occurred, then Hume's assumption about the background knowledge is at issue.

For Hume's argument to work requires the assumption that the laws of nature express either all of the goings-on of a universe without God or, if God exists, all of God's intentions concerning the universe—but the truth of this assumption must be put on hold when a miracle (whether actual or alleged) is supposed to be under investigation!

Indeed, for one to be actually open to the possibility of the occurrence of an occasional real miracle, requires that the assumption Hume makes be suspended, at least when one is purportedly investigating the evidence for a miracle.

In other words, Hume's argument works only if we assume that there is no God or God-like being who on rare occasions intervenes in nature, but this assumption is at issue when we are considering any alleged evidence for miracles.

Thus, by assuming the above-described background knowledge, Hume mistakenly begs the question that only the miracle evidence can answer. He assumes what is at issue. He sneaks his conclusion into his premises.

The question-begging fallacy—don't let it rob you of nuggets of gold or knowledge of God!

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)

Further reading:

• “Question-begging fallacy, God’s Word, and Apologetics” (Apologia, October 22, 2009).

• “The Seeds of Their Own Destruction: David Hume's Fatally Flawed Arguments against Miracle Reports,” Christian Research Journal, Volume 30, Number 1 (January/February 2007): 30-38.

The Question-Begging Fallacy, God's Word, and Apologetics

APOLOGIA 
By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, October 22, 2009

The Question-Begging Fallacy, God’s Word, and Apologetics

A fallacy is a mistake in reasoning or argument. Some fallacies are so common that they have been given their own names. The fallacy of question-begging occurs when an argument assumes as proven that which is at issue. In other words, the conclusion, which is the claim in dispute, is used as a premise, which is provided as support for the claim in dispute—and the result is that the disputed claim is provided as support for itself. Appropriately, the fallacy of question-begging is also known as circular reasoning.

Sometimes the question-begging fallacy is easy to spot. Consider the following lone argument presented by a lawyer whose job is to establish the defendant’s guilt in a murder trial: “Joe is the murderer, therefore he should be found guilty of murder.” Clearly, if the issue is whether Joe actually did the crime, then merely asserting that Joe is the murderer is to assume as proven that which is at issue, which is to beg the question.

In other words, the argument is circular: Joe is guilty (conclusion), because Joe is guilty (premise). [The disputed claim is offered as support for the disputed claim, i.e., the conclusion is offered as the premise.] What is needed is evidence of Joe’s actual doing of the crime, that is, what is needed are grounds which establish Joes’ guilt. Such evidence could consist of an accumulation of the following: Joe’s footprints at the scene of the crime, Joe’s fingerprints on the murder weapon, gun powder residue on Joe’s hand, the victim’s blood on Joe’s jacket, credible testimony from a witness who saw Joe commit the killing, etc. (For more about this sort of evidence, see TV shows such as CSI New York, CSI Miami, CSI Las Vegas, CSI Ad Infinitum, CSI Ad Nauseum.)

Sometimes the question-begging fallacy is not quite as easy to spot, especially when it comes to religious or worldview matters. Consider the argument set out in the following discussion:

• Believer: “The Bible (or Qur’an, etc.) is the Word of God.”
• Skeptic: “Why should I think that?”
• Believer: “The Bible (or Qur’an, etc.) says it’s the Word of God, and we should believe whatever the Bible (Qur’an, etc.) says, because it’s the Word of God.”
• Skeptic: “Umm, there’s something wrong here.”

It seems to me that the skeptic is correct here. If the issue (point of dispute) is whether the Bible (or Qur’an, etc.) is the Word of God, then simply restating the issue (point of dispute) as a premise—i.e., that the Bible (etc.) is the Word of God—in support of the conclusion—i.e., that the Bible (etc.) is the Word of God—is to commit the question-begging fallacy. It’s to assume as established that which is at issue. It’s to argue in a circle.

In such a dispute, what is needed is some way to break out of the circle. That is, what is needed is some evidence or grounds for thinking that the Bible (or Qur’an, etc.) is true or at least contains important truths—in the mundane, everyday, lower-case “t” sense of “truth”. Such evidence or grounds could consist of an accumulation of the following: the book’s historical accuracy (especially concerning its central figure), its fit with what we know of the cosmos (especially the findings of the sciences as well as the very possibility of doing science in the first place), its accuracy in understanding the human condition (including our apparent brokenness or penchant to fail at love), plus its moral fruit (that is, its overall impact on the world in spite of the obvious failures of those who don’t practice its core doctrines).

In a world in which various worldviews (whether religious or secular) compete for our deepest allegiances, but are in their core tenets mutually contradictory (e.g., the Bible teaches that Jesus is God in the flesh and that Jesus was killed and subsequently resurrected; the Qur’an denies both of these teachings), to commit the question-begging fallacy in defence of one’s worldview is not at all helpful for those who desire to know or reasonably believe which worldview (if any) is really the way, the truth, and the life.

Hence, there is a need for truth-seeking apologetics, done by Christians, Muslims, Atheists, and whomever—and, of course, done with gentleness and respect.

P.S. On a more personal note, in my journey through life I have come to believe that the New Testament documents of the Bible provide us with good publicly-accessible historical reasons for thinking that the man Jesus, who identifies himself as the biblical God, actually lived and died and resurrected bodily from death. This, it seems to me, is good grounds for taking Jesus’ teachings to heart and worshipping Him as Lord.

Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.