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| Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) |
APOLOGIA
By
Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, January 21,
2016
Miracles and
historical investigation
Theologian
Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) argues it's not reasonable to discern that a
miracle has occurred in history. But his argument fails.
According
to Troeltsch, on the basis of analogy to events known to us coupled with the
assumption that nature behaves uniformly, we apply what we know about the
present onto evidence having to do with the past, and thereby we extend our
knowledge into the realm of the past.
But
we have no knowledge (supposedly) of miracles occurring today (e.g., all dead
men stay dead), so when we are given historical evidence for a miracle (e.g.,
testimony that Jesus allegedly resurrected) we infer by analogy from the present
that no miracle occurred in the past (i.e., no resurrection of Jesus occurred).
Troeltsch's
use of analogy is an epic fail, however.
Theologian
Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014) correctly points out that Troeltsch confuses a
principle of method with a principle of content.
As
a principle of method, the appeal to analogy should work like this: To say that
a miracle didn’t occur requires positive knowledge of analogy of miracle
testimonies to testimonies for which we know no actual object corresponds,
whereas to say that a miracle did occur requires positive knowledge of analogy of
miracle testimonies to testimonies for which we know a real object corresponds.
The analogy should be between the testimonies per se, not that to which they
testify.
But
Troeltsch mistakenly uses analogy as a principle of content concerning what is
to be known (i.e., the object of knowledge) rather than as a principle of
method which works as a tool (i.e., the basis) by which we discern what is to
be known.
Think
of it this way. For testimonial evidence to allow us to come to knowledge of
the past what we need is a positive analogy between past testimony and present
known-to-be-true testimony (i.e., their comparable characteristics or virtues
as credible testimonies/ sources); we do not need an analogy between the things
testified to (i.e., the testimony's contents). Significantly, if uniqueness of
what's testified to counts against a testimony, then nothing new would ever be
learned from others!
Again,
it is not the lack of a present-day analogy to the object of a testimony that
counts against testimony; rather, what counts against a testimony is its
positive analogy to present-day testimony to which we know no testified-to
object conforms—i.e., what counts against a testimony is its positive analogy
to known-to-be-false testimonies such as those of people who are known to
exaggerate or hallucinate or lie.
In
the case of reports of alleged miracles, to think that there must always be an
analogy between the things (objects) testified to is to assume that there is no
possibility of a special action by a supernatural cause such as God. But, if
the issue is whether such an action actually occurred, this is to beg the
question, i.e., assume as proven that which is at issue (a logical
"sin").
Troeltsch's appeal to analogy presumes the nature of the object of a testimony
because it (his appeal to analogy) requires that all events must be non-miraculous events like the (allegedly)
non-miraculous events we see today. However, if the issue is whether all events are non-miraculous—which is the issue if we’re trying to
determine whether an actual miracle has occurred by investigating evidence—then
Troeltsch smuggles a predetermined outcome into an alleged investigation. He
puts the cart before the horse.
At
this juncture, one might follow philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) and object that
a miracle such as Jesus' resurrection is maximally improbable. But this objection
assumes either we know that God doesn't exist (so miracles are maximally
improbable) or we know that, if God exists, God's intentions are wholly revealed
by the laws of nature (so miracles are maximally improbable). But we don't know
this! These assumptions are question-begging, too, if the issue is whether a
God-caused event (such as Jesus' resurrection) has actually occurred and is
evidence for a God who sometimes engages in special actions.
All
this to say: miracles can be studied historically.
In
view of competing worldview claims—e.g., Christianity vs. Islam vs. Atheism—such
study should be done.
Hendrik van der
Breggen, PhD, teaches philosophy at Providence University College.
Further
reading:
- Easter and Historical Investigation (Apologia, April 17, 2014)
- Do Jesus’ miracles violate the laws of nature (Apologia, April 3, 2014)
- Easter and Philosophy (Apologia, April 8, 2010)
- Believing Christmas because of Easter (Apologia, December 17, 2009)
- Did Easter happen? (Apologia, April 8, 2009)
- Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament, by Craig Keener
- "History and Miracles," by Francis Beckwith (In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God's Action in History)
- "Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science," Ph.D. dissertation by Henry Van Der Something-or-other (see chapter 5, pp. 360-374)
2 comments:
Good argumentation, and (I believe) accurate. I note that this is also an example of philosophy probing difficult questions with great precision--meat rather than milk.
Thanks Daryl.
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