God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 3)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, February 23, 2012)

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 3)

According to the God-of-the-gaps objection, science should not appeal to intelligent design (ID) to explain phenomena found in the natural realm. The concern is that ID will be applied inappropriately, filling gaps in our knowledge, gaps that science will explain via non-intelligent causes.

Philosopher David Hull warns, "Once [scientists] allow reference to God or miraculous forces to explain the first origin of life or the evolution of the human species, they have no way of limiting this sort of explanation." As biochemist Michael Behe observes, "There is the anxiety that if the supernatural were allowed as an explanation, then there would be no stopping it—it would be invoked frequently to explain many things that in reality have natural explanations."

In other words, at the heart of the God-of-the-gaps objection is the idea that the application of a hypothesis must be guided by reasonable constraints but, or so the objection goes, the ID hypothesis has none. Thus, we must always appeal to non-intelligent causes.

Last time I argued that the God-of-the-gaps objection fails because it is too strong. Always ruling out ID runs the risk of ignoring actual limits to what non-intelligent causes can in fact do, and thus we end up always appealing to non-intelligent causes when an intelligent cause actually produced the event or structure. The result: We assume the outcome of an investigation before the investigation takes place (which is, to put it mildly, closed minded).

The time before last time, I argued that the God-of-the-gaps objection fails because the application of ID is not an appeal to ignorance or gaps in our knowledge; rather, ID is an appeal to positive knowledge. ID is appropriately applied when, and only when, two conditions are satisfied: (1) we have positive knowledge that non-intelligent causes clearly struggle/fail, and (2) we have positive knowledge that the phenomena to be explained clearly resemble the sorts of things that only known intelligent causes do. In other words, and contrary to what the God-of-the-gaps objection would have us think, the application of ID is guided by reasonable constraints.

Today I will argue that ID has yet another reasonable constraint to guide its application, and this constraint weakens the God-of-the-gaps objection even further. (This constraint may be a bit more difficult to understand than the constraints I set out previously, so please bear with me.)

The additional constraint is this: In many sciences, explanations that appeal to intelligent agency constitute a syntactically/ categorically inappropriate response to the question motivating those sciences, so in these sciences an appeal to ID is inappropriate from the get go, whereas in other sciences ID is not inappropriate.

Philosopher of science Stephen C. Meyer explains the constraint well, so I will follow him closely (subsequent quotes are from Meyer).

Meyer points out that the sciences can be divided into two broad categories: historical and nonhistorical.

The nonhistorical sciences consist of branches of physics, chemistry, and biology, and are "concerned primarily with the discovery and explication of general phenomena." The goal of these sciences is to investigate the world's regular operations, i.e., "to discover, classify or explain [via] unchanging laws and properties of nature."

The historical sciences, on the other hand, consist of such sciences as historical geology, evolutionary biology, and archaeology. Their concern is "to reconstruct the past and explain the present by reference to the past," i.e., to "explain events or data not primarily by reference to laws but by reference to past causal events or sequences of events—what might be called 'causal histories.'"

Whereas Meyer uses the terms "nonhistorical science" and "historical science", some thinkers use the terms "operation science" and "origin science," respectively. Operation science has to do with the ongoing regularities of nature; origin science has to do with historical singularities or beginnings in nature.

Clearly, an appeal to intelligent agency is not always inappropriate in the historical sciences. In archaeology it makes sense to claim that an intelligent agent was the cause of what appears to be a cave painting. Also, in historical biology it makes sense to claim that an intelligent agent may have been the cause of life's origin. Of course, these claims might be false. However, with respect to the motivating questions of the historical sciences—i.e., questions of the sort "What is the cause of X?"—they are not logically inappropriate responses.

On the other hand, in the nonhistorical sciences an appeal to intelligent agency is logically inappropriate always. The answer "an intelligent agent did it" fails to respond correctly to the kind of question motivating the nonhistorical sciences. Nonhistorical sciences ask questions concerning how nature operates normally, i.e., how nature operates without the interference or special actions of intelligent agency (whether human or divine or alien), and so these sciences seek answers which involve the descriptive and/or explanatory use of natural laws and non-intelligent processes.

Meyer puts it this way: “To offer ‘God did it’ as an answer to a question such as ‘How does weightlessness generally affect crystal growth?’ clearly misses the point of the question. The answer does not so much violate the rules of science as the rules of grammar.”

Appeals to intelligent agency in the natural realm, then, are constrained by the fact that they are syntactically inappropriate in the nonhistorical or operational sciences. This means that as a possible causal answer in the doing of science, ID is limited primarily to the category of historical or origin sciences. Significantly, this constraint reduces the chances of applying ID erroneously.

Therefore, because the application of the ID hypothesis is guided by this additional reasonable constraint, i.e., the constraint that ID is to be applied only (if at all) to historical sciences, the God-of-the-gaps objection to the scientific legitimacy of ID (arising from ID's alleged lack of reasonable constraint) is additionally weakened.

Stay tuned for part 4.

P.S. My quotes from Stephen C. Meyer are from his essay "The Methodological Equivalence of Design and Descent," in The Creation Hypothesis: Scientific Evidence for an Intelligent Designer, edited by J. P. Moreland (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 67-112. Meyer restates these points in his book Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 408-410.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College.)

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 2)

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, February 2, 2012)

God-of-the-gaps objection (Part 2)

According to the God-of-the-gaps objection, the intelligent design hypothesis is an illegitimate scientific explanation. The idea is that intelligent design (ID) is mistakenly used to cover gaps in our knowledge but, as science will show, non-intelligent causes do the job.

Last time I argued that ID, when properly applied, is actually an argument from positive knowledge, not from ignorance or gaps in our knowledge. I argued that ID is to be applied when, and only when, two conditions are satisfied: (1) we have positive knowledge of the capacities (or lack thereof) of non-intelligent causes, that is, we have good reasons for thinking that non-intelligent causes fail and will very probably continue to fail in their accounting of a particular event or structure, and (2) we have positive knowledge that the event or structure in question is the sort of thing known intelligent causes do.

Today I will set out another argument for thinking that the God-of-the-gaps objection, when aimed at ID, is problematic.

The God-of-the-gaps objection is too strong. The objection tells us that to avoid the risk of mistakenly appealing to an intelligent cause, we must always stick with non-intelligent causes. However, it turns out that always ruling out intelligent causes means that we must appeal to a non-intelligent cause even if an intelligent cause, in fact, produced the event or structure.

Indeed, if we accept the God-of-the-gaps objection, then we must always ignore known limits of what non-intelligent causes can in fact do, even when the known evidence points to intelligent design.

Surely, this is a problem.

To illustrate the problem, consider a Scrabble game (played at my home) where the letters are arranged as follows: DAD IT IS YOUR TURN TO BUY PIZZA. If we always disallow ID, then I would be committed to thinking that the letters arranged themselves, however improbably, without the benefit of intelligent causal input. But I know (have very reasonable belief) that there is a causal gap in the capacities of the Scrabble tiles to arrange themselves into a meaningful sentence, and I know that the arrangement in question is the sort of thing that intelligent causes do. The upshot: A constant appeal to non-intelligent causes will block what my sons actually communicated via the Scrabble board. Hence, no pizza.

Now, let’s think about God. If God really did create the universe a finite time ago (e.g., via a finely-tuned big bang), and if God subsequently really did act in the world in a special way (e.g., to create the first living organism), and if God actually left good evidence or traces of Himself in what He created (as the Scriptures suggest)—if these were all the case, yet science is never allowed to provide explanations that involve intelligent causation (whether divine or merely supernatural or whatever)—would our scientific theories miss something important?

It seems to me that they would. Our theories would always be plugging actual gaps in the non-intelligent causal capacities of reality with non-intelligent causes, even when the events and structures in question point to actual intelligent causation. That is to say, the requirement of a constant appeal to non-intelligent causes will block our knowledge of intelligent causation even if an intelligent cause actually produced the event or structure in the world.

Here's the lesson: The number 1 rule of science should be that we seek the best explanation of the evidence, period; we should not force the evidence to fit a philosophy.

Lehigh University biochemist Michael Behe illustrates the above lesson in a fun but deeply insightful way:

“Imagine a room in which a body lies crushed, flat as a pancake. A dozen detectives crawl around, examining the floor with magnifying glasses for any clue to the identity of the perpetrator. In the middle of the room, next to the body, stands a large, gray elephant. The detectives carefully avoid bumping into the pachyderm's legs as they crawl, and never even glance at it. Over time the detectives get frustrated with their lack of progress but resolutely press on, looking even more closely at the floor. You see, textbooks say detectives must ‘get their man,’ so they never consider elephants.” (Michael J. Behe, Darwin's Black Box [The Free Press, 1996], 192.)

In other words, the God-of-the-gaps objection assumes the outcome of our investigations before the investigations take place. Surely, this is closed-mindedness.

Thus, the God-of-the-gaps objection is problematic—and it shouldn’t block our scientific inquiries into evidence for intelligent design.

Stay tuned for part three.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College, Canada.)

for the BIBLE tells me so

Critical Review
By Hendrik van der Breggen



For the Bible Tells Me So, produced & directed by David Karslake (New York: First Run Features, 2007)

Recently I watched For the Bible Tells Me So, a documentary about religion and homosexuality in the U.S. The film well depicts the suffering some gays face and the struggles some Christian families encounter when a family member is gay, and thus the film presents some truly legitimate concerns. In fact, several of the concerns are heart-wrenching injustices. The abuse of homosexuals and the hate-mongering directed toward homosexuals are unjust—and all the more so when done in the name of Christ. Surely, followers of Christ should show genuine love to all persons, including persons who self-identify as gay or lesbian. Injustices done in the name of Christ hurt people whom Christ loves dearly. I, and no doubt many other Christians, find such injustices deeply troubling.

Having said this—and without making light of this at all—I wish to note that the film also has serious shortcomings. The documentary is misleading in at least four significant ways, which, as a Christian who is an academic, I find deeply troubling too.

First, the film poorly reports the science relevant to homosexuality. For example, the twin studies the film presents are dubious. According to the film, when one identical twin is gay the other is gay "up to 70% of the time," thereby (allegedly) demonstrating the role of genes in determining homosexuality. But, it turns out, more recent and more careful scientific investigation tells us that the actual percentage is somewhere between 11 and 20%. (For substantiation of this point, see my first recommended reading by Yarhouse below.) If science is to be taken seriously, it should be presented accurately.

(Ironically, in communicating its exaggerated report of the twin studies the film employs a cartoon featuring a character named "Christian" who displays a negative attitude toward science.)

Second, by using a cartoon the film unfairly represents those persons who successfully leave homosexuality: "We're still gay," whispers a lesbian cartoon character standing on a conveyor belt after coming out of an Ex-Gay Ministry machine. But, the careful viewer should ask: Where are the live interviews with people from ex-gay ministries such as Exodus International and National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH)? Where is the respected (if not infamous) Spitzer report concerning persons who have changed their orientation to a significant degree? Is the film suppressing the voices of ex-gays?

If one doubts the existence of ex-gays, one should see (for starters) the cover story of World magazine, December 17, 2011. This story features Alan Chambers, a long time ex-gay who is presently president of Exodus International. Joe Dallas, a previous president of Exodus International and author of The Gay Gospel? (Harvest House, 1996/2007), is another ex-gay who should be considered. Apparently, there are many ex-gays whose voices the film ignores.

(Are ex-gays rejected twice—first because of their homosexuality, and again because they are no longer gay? If the first is an injustice, then the second would seem to be an injustice too.)

Third, the film mistakenly suggests that all persons who are not pro-gay are homophobic. To be sure, some people are homophobic, that is, some people have an irrational fear of, or hatred for, homosexuals. But, it needs to be emphasized, many people who are not pro-gay are not homophobic. Why? Because they have reasonable concerns.

Some reasonable concerns about same-sex sexual behaviour stem from findings in the health sciences. For evidence, see the medical section of the Christian Medical and Dental Associations' statement on homosexuality (scroll to bottom for references). (CMDA is a Christian group, but the studies to which they appeal come from various secular scientific sources.) See too NARTH's medical issues page.

Moreover, some reasonable concerns stem from principled moral positions having to do with gay-related social issues such as same-sex marriage.

For evidence, take at look at the arguments of Margaret Somerville, professor of law at McGill University. See Somerville's essay, “What about the Children?”, in Daniel Cere and Douglas Farrow, editors, Divorcing Marriage: Unveiling the Dangers in Canada’s New Social Experiment (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); and see Somerville’s essay, “The other ‘rights question’ in same-sex marriage” at the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law and Culture.

By ignoring such reasonable concerns, the film gives the impression that disagreement on same-sex issues is fueled only by homophobia, not sober-minded rational concern. This impression is neither true, nor fair to critics, nor does it contribute positively to informed discussion.

Fourth, the film weakly and unfairly presents the hermeneutical/ interpretive issues involved in reading the Bible carefully. The film suggests that those persons who disagree with gay revisionists should be dismissed as "biblical literalists" or as having merely a "5th grade understanding." In fact, however, many who disagree with gay revisionist interpretations of Scripture do not always take texts literally and are highly educated.

Why didn't the film interview experts in Biblical scholarship pertaining to homosexuality who strongly disagree with gay revisionism, are not "biblical literalists," and have high academic credentials? I'm thinking here of Harvard and Princeton educated Robert A. J. Gagnon, PhD, author of The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics (Abingdon, 2001). Another important scholar is Andrews University’s Richard M. Davidson, PhD, author of Flame of Yahweh: Sexuality in the Old Testament (Hendrickson, 2007). The film is supposed to be taking the Bible seriously, isn't it?

There are more than four problems with the documentary, but these are sufficient for illustrating the grounds for my concern.

Where For the Bible Tells Me So is good, which is in many places, especially its depiction of the struggles of gay individuals in their Christian family contexts, it is really good; but where it is bad, which is in many places too, such as those I’ve presented above, it is really bad. The danger in this film is that the emotionally-charged good parts will probably jam (block, interfere with) those bad parts where careful thinking and background information are required, thereby letting poor reasoning and falsehoods slip by unchecked. As summary descriptors of the film, the words “propaganda” and “manipulation” come to mind, though these words are too strong. Probably a better word is "unbalanced."

My recommendation: See the film, take the good parts of its message to heart, but think very very carefully as you do—and maybe even do some research first.

P.S. A helpful, more-detailed review of For the Bible Tells Me So can be found at psychologist Mark Yarhouse's blog Limning the Psyche. A helpful resource for Christians dealing with gay issues on a more personal level can be found in Mark Yarhouse's book, Homosexuality and the Christian: A Guide for Parents, Pastors, and Friends (Bethany House, 2010).

P.P.S. Here are some additional Apologia columns that address homosexuality:
1. Homophobia, bigotry, intolerance?
2. It's all society's fault?
3. Born gay?
4. The ad hominem fallacy