Turning Hume’s argument against miracle reports onto its head

David Hume (photo credit: Wikipedia, plus help from my daughter-in-law Brittney)

 

Turning Hume’s argument against miracle reports onto its head

By Hendrik van der Breggen

(Note: This article is a slightly expanded version of a chapter with the same title from my book APOLOGIA: The Columns: A Defence of Mere Christianity. It is also a highly condensed version of my PhD dissertation Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science.)

 

Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) is notorious for, among other things, his argument against miracle reports. According to Hume, no matter how good the historical evidence is for a miracle such as Jesus’ resurrection—even if the miracle actually occurred—the evidence is never good enough. Hume (and his present-day followers) would have us dismiss the evidence at the get-go.

I will set out Hume’s argument and I will show it fails. In fact, Hume’s argument makes three mega mistakes. First, it misconstrues the concept of miracle. Second, it engages in question-begging. Third, it backfires. In effect, my assessment of Hume’s argument turns Hume’s argument upside down—so it serves to strengthen the evidential value of miracle reports for Jesus’ resurrection.

 

Exposition of Hume’s argument against miracle reports

As a brief preliminary, note that Hume does not overtly attack Jesus’ resurrection; rather, he does so in a veiled way, though the veil is quite threadbare in places. Nevertheless—veil or no veil—if Hume’s argument succeeds, then Christianity’s foundational belief in Jesus’ resurrection is not reasonable to hold.

Hume argues that in the case of a miracle report, even if we concede that the reported miracle actually occurred and has excellent evidence in its favor, something about what is reported is sufficient reason for not believing the report of its occurrence.[1] According to Hume, “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.”[2] So, according to Hume, miracle reports should not be believed. Hume even boasts that his argument against miracle reports is, at least for thinking people, “an everlasting check…useful as long as the world endures.”[3]

Some influential contemporary thinkers agree. According to philosopher A. C. Grayling, Hume’s argument definitively renders miracle evidence “nugatory” (i.e., trivial, of no importance whatsoever, or of no force).[4] Philosophers Chris Horner and Emrys Westacott even attribute the rational authority of contemporary science to Hume’s argument. They write: “Hume expressed the attitude of science well when he argued that it is always more reasonable to assume that the report of the miracle is mistaken than to believe that the laws of nature momentarily ceased to operate.”[5]

I suspect that Hume’s argument also lurks behind the dismissal of New Testament miracles by contemporary Jesus Seminar scholarship—and thus behind Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code,[6] a popularization of Jesus Seminar musings. According to Jesus Seminar founder Robert Funk, “The Christ of creed and dogma who had been firmly in place in the Middle Ages, can no longer command the assent of those who have seen the heavens through Galileo’s telescope.”[7] In other words, Funk and Brown and company seem to hold that contemporary science, which apparently follows the spirit of Hume’s argument, disallows reasonable belief in Jesus’ miracles—including Jesus’ resurrection.

Let’s get some additional clarity on Hume’s “everlasting check.”

Hume’s idea is that “the very nature of the fact” to which the testimony testifies contains the seeds of the testimony’s destruction as credible evidence. More specifically, the evidential value of miracle testimony implodes because of the miracle’s law-violating aspect. According to Hume, the law-violating aspect of a miracle makes it reasonable to weigh the evidence for the laws of nature, evidence that is super strong, against the evidence of any report that the laws were violated, even if this evidence were super strong too, thus rendering the rational persuasiveness of miracle testimony impotent.

A miracle “violates” the laws of nature in the sense that the miraculous event goes against what the regular course of nature would predict or lead us to expect. The laws governing the regular course of nature are extremely well established by humanity’s collective experience. This makes the laws always better established than the much more limited evidence for some particular miracle, such as Jesus’ resurrection. This means that the evidence for the laws of nature constitutes good grounds for thinking that the miracle is improbable in the extreme, even maximally improbable. So we should believe the miracle report is very probably untrue. Moreover, even if the miracle evidence were super strong (i.e., a “proof,” according to Hume), the also-super-strong evidence for the laws of nature would still weigh against the miracle evidence. So we should suspend belief concerning the miracle report. In either case, according to Hume’s argument, to believe a miracle report is not reasonable. Miracle reports should be dismissed.

 

Assessing Hume’s argument against miracle reports

Hume’s argument, however, makes three mistakes. So, contra Hume, miracle reports should not be dismissed.

(Note: I have provided my first two criticisms of Hume’s argument in previous articles.[8] In my assessment below I will set out those two criticisms only briefly plus set out yet another criticism but in greater detail.[9])

 

Mistake 1: Hume misconstrues the concept of miracle

First, Hume misconstrues the concept of miracle. Hume is mistaken in thinking that a miracle violates a law of nature. A miracle is better understood as having the following characteristics: (1) It is an event that is extraordinary or unusual with respect to the regular course of nature in the sense that the event's occurrence is wholly beyond nature’s capacity to produce; (2) it is an event that consists of an introduction or coming into being of complex specifically structured matter/energy; (3) it is directly caused by a very powerful, intelligent, and nature-transcending causal source of matter/energy, i.e., God or a God-like being; and (4) it is religiously significant. None of these characteristics involve a violation of a law of nature. Properly understood, a miracle does not violate any laws of nature.[10]

 

Mistake 2: Question-begging

Second, Hume’s argument is question-begging. Question-begging (a.k.a. circular reasoning) is a mistake in reasoning which occurs when an argument assumes as proven that which is at issue. The conclusion, which is the claim in dispute, is used/ assumed as a premise, which is provided as support for the claim in dispute—so the disputed claim is provided as support for itself.

Philosophers Brooke Noel Moore and Richard Parker provide a fun example in their book Critical Thinking:

Two gold miners roll a boulder away from its resting place and find three huge gold nuggets underneath. One says to the other, “Great! That’s one nugget for you and two for me,” handing one nugget to his associate.

“Wait a minute!” says the second miner. “Why do you get two and I get just one?”

“Because I’m the leader of this operation,” says the first.

“What makes you the leader?” asks miner number two.

“I’ve got twice the gold you do,” answers number one.[11]

The humour arises because having twice the gold is assumed as settled and offered as support for having twice the gold while that is the very issue in dispute.

Back to Hume’s argument. It assumes what is at issue. For Hume’s argument to work, it requires the assumption that the laws of nature express either all of the goings-on of a universe without God or, if God exists, all of God’s intentions concerning the universe; but the truth of this assumption must be put on hold when a miracle (whether actual or alleged) is supposed to be under investigation. By not putting this assumption on hold, Hume assumes as established that which is at issue when we are investigating an alleged miracle. He assumes the outcome of the investigation before the investigation takes place. He assumes that either God does not exist or, if God does exist, God’s intentions are wholly expressed by the laws of nature. But if we are investigating an alleged miracle, these assumptions are what the investigation is supposed to be about. In other words, Hume sneaks his conclusion into his premises.[12]

 

Mistake 3: Hume’s argument backfires

Third, Hume’s argument—his so-called “everlasting check”—backfires, especially if we take it seriously today. (That is the focus of this article.[13])

It turns out that when Hume’s argument is viewed against the background of contemporary science and moral philosophy, the logical implications of the miracle concept actually add to the plausibility of miracle reports—especially in the case of Jesus’ resurrection.

Recall that the strategy of Hume’s argument is to tease out of the miracle concept some logical implications that (allegedly, according to Hume) count against a miracle’s occurrence, thereby making it improbable. Hume thinks that a miracle “violates” (goes against the prediction of) a law of nature and so the evidence of nature’s law weighs heavily—as heavily as possible, probabilistically—against the miracle report. However, as we have seen (in mistake 1), Hume’s allegedly logical implications are based on a faulty understanding of miracles as law-violating, which they are not. Now we will see that the very concept of miracle, when properly understood, has implications for the world which, because of what we know of the world today, actually count in favour of a miracle’s occurrence. In other words, contra Hume’s “everlasting check,” the implications of the miracle concept enhance the plausibility of a miracle hypothesis.

Before we go on, it should be understood that to say a miracle hypothesis is “plausible” means that the hypothesis fits well with the facts—the historical facts pointing to the alleged miracle—and it unifies those facts, better than alternative hypotheses. Also, it should be understood that just as a theory gains scientific respectability when it fits with the facts it attempts to explain and when its implications/predictions are satisfied/ confirmed by other facts, so too a miracle hypothesis gains plausibility when (a) it fits with the historical facts it attempts to explain plus (b) its implications/ predictions are satisfied/ confirmed by the facts of the universe.[14]

In the case of Jesus’ alleged resurrection, we have some historical facts that strongly suggest a miracle has occurred, and, when the concept of miracle (properly understood) is employed in the hypothesis to account for these historical facts and their supernatural cause, we also have some logical implications/ predictions with which to contend.[15] This means that to show that Hume’s argument backfires in the case of Jesus’ resurrection requires three steps. First, we need to justify our use of the concept of miracle in the miraculous resurrection hypothesis in the case of Jesus. Second, we need to look at the implications/ predictions of that hypothesis. Third, we need to ask whether those implications/ predictions have been satisfied/ confirmed.

 

Step 1: Justifying the Miracle Concept in the Miraculous Resurrection Hypothesis. What allows us to appeal to miracle in a miracle hypothesis? Answer: It has very much to do with what we know about the relevant evidence.

When it comes to the notion of a resurrection, we have very good knowledge of what the relevant natural causes can and cannot do. Our universal experience (with the possible exception of Jesus’ case) over thousands of years is that dead people, when left to themselves, do not resurrect. (We are talking here about resurrection into a super-powered body, not a mere resuscitation.) Our knowledge of non-reversible cell necrosis (cell decay at death) is extremely strong: bodily decomposition starts within minutes after death and after a day or more without refrigeration renders a resuscitation, let alone a resurrection, physically impossible (on naturalistic assumptions). Moreover, as Francis Beckwith points out, resurrections are on naturalistic assumptions “more than presently inexplicable.”[16]  Beckwith adds, “they are prima facie not the sorts of events about which one could speculatively develop and propose ad hoc hypotheses on the basis of which one can reasonably imagine they would be explicable under a future, yet undiscovered, scientific [naturalistic] law.”[17]

To think that there are some previously unknown natural laws waiting to be discovered may be reasonable in some not well understood fields of investigation (say, a healing of cancer as an apparent answer to prayer) and so in those fields one must explain why one is not rash in saying those laws cannot be found (perhaps our bodies have built-in, non-miraculous healing powers which become activated when we exercise an attitude of faith).[18] However, the fact remains that it is not reasonable to think this way in the very well understood realm of human death. Stephen Evans explains: “we surely know enough about the natural order to know that it is most unlikely that there could be any natural explanation for a person who has been dead for three days being restored to life.”[19] We know that dead bodies, if left to themselves, stay dead and begin, irreversibly, to decay. We know that, on their own, dead bodies do not transform themselves into living bodies made with rejuvenated flesh and new powers. Moreover, and clearly, advances in science over the last few centuries serve only to underscore the fact that no naturalistic explanations are forthcoming.

Now, add to all of this the fact that, in the case of Jesus, we also have the resurrectee making claims that imply his deity, thereby suggesting supernatural involvement all the more.[20] Therefore, if a resurrection—Jesus’ resurrection—were to occur, it is reasonable to think that it would be a supernaturally caused resurrection, i.e., a miracle. Why? Because it satisfies the four conditions of what a miracle is. (1) The event would be extraordinary or unusual with respect to the regular course of nature in the sense that its occurrence is wholly beyond nature’s capacity to produce. (2) The event would consist of an introduction or coming into being of complex specifically structured matter/energy. (3) The event would be the result of very powerful, intelligent, and nature-transcending causal source of matter/energy, i.e., God or a God-like being. And (4) the event would be religiously significant. The evidence for Jesus’ alleged resurrection evidence, then, is theory-suggestive in a supernatural/ theistic direction, and so we should entertain the miracle concept in a hypothesis to explain that evidence. But this means we should also come to grips with what such a hypothesis logically implies/ predicts.

 

Steps 2 & 3: The $64,000 Question. The $64,000 question actually has two parts: What are the implications/ predictions of the miraculous resurrection hypothesis, and is it reasonable to think that there is good evidence which satisfies/ confirms the implications/ predictions of the miracle hypothesis?[21]

It turns out that the miracle hypothesis in Jesus’ case logically implies/ predicts several things. One implication/ prediction is that the universe is the universe created by the God who Jesus purports to be and whose creating activity is described in the Old Testament. This means that, as Genesis 1:1 makes clear, the universe is not eternal. In other words, the miracle hypothesis predicts (retrodicts) that the universe began. Question: Did it? Answer: Very apparently, yes. According to the reigning contemporary scientific theory of the universe’s origin—the Big Bang theory—the universe came into existence approximately 13.7 billion years ago.[22]

Another implication/ prediction is that the beginning of the universe was caused by a powerful universe-transcendent being. Question: Was it? Answer: Very apparently, yes. Because it is reasonable to think that whatever begins to exist has a cause for its beginning, it is reasonable to think that the universe’s beginning was caused. Because this cause produced the entire physical universe—i.e., all matter/ energy and space and time—it is reasonable to think that the cause of the universe is very powerful plus transcends space, time, and matter/ energy.[23]

Another implication/ prediction is that the universe’s cause is intelligent. Question: Is it? Answer: Very apparently, yes. Contemporary science also tells us that the universe’s initial conditions are exquisitely fine-tuned for life. Because life, especially human life, has value (more on this below), it is reasonable to think that the universe’s fine-tuning was purposeful. So it is reasonable to think that the very powerful and transcendent cause of the universe is an intelligent agent. Moreover, in view of the facts that the cell is chalk full of marvellously-complex molecular machines, that DNA contains a super-sophisticated code/ language, that the machines and code clearly smack of intelligent design, and that non-intelligent causes do a demonstrably poor job of accounting for the machines and code, the intelligent cause hypothesis is supported even more.[24]

Another implication/ prediction is that people have objective moral value. (By objective moral value I mean great intrinsic worth that’s real: it’s not a mere feeling or social construction.[25]) Part of the religious significance of Jesus’ resurrection is its affirmation that human beings are made in the image of God, where God is a Being who is of great (greatest) moral worth, and so people also have objective moral value/ real worth. Question: Do people have objective moral value/ real worth? Answer: Very apparently, yes. People have objective moral value and we know this via intuition (i.e., we are directly aware of it).[26] In fact, the thesis—that people have objective moral value and we know this via intuition—is used as a pre-theoretic check on ethical theorizing. That is, some ethical theories obviously have major moral flaws and we recognize the obviousness of these moral flaws because we know that people have real value (great intrinsic worth) and thus people should not be violated or destroyed. (Consider moral relativism, utilitarianism, contractarianism, survivalist/ evolutionary ethics.)[27]  Moreover, the thesis—that people have objective moral value and we know this via intuition—is assumed as foundational for some major ethical theories and we know this, too. (Consider the golden rule, Kantian ethics, natural law theory, vital needs human rights.)[28] Thus, it is reasonable to think that human beings have objective moral value (great intrinsic worth) and we know this via intuition. Our assessments of the above theories show us that we know this.[29]

Thus, the implications of the miracle hypothesis are satisfied, i.e., the predictions of the miracle hypothesis are confirmed—thereby adding to a miracle’s plausibility. But this means that when the logical implications/ predictions of the miracle concept are taken into account in the context of contemporary science and moral philosophy, Hume’s “everlasting check” not only fails but also backfires: the consequences count in favour of the miracle hypothesis, not against.

 

Conclusion

According to Scottish philosopher David Hume, no matter how good the historical evidence is for a miracle such as Jesus’ resurrection—even if the miracle actually occurred—the evidence is never good enough. According to Hume, such miracle reports should be dismissed at the get-go.

But, as we have seen, Hume’s argument makes three mistakes. First, it misconstrues the concept of miracle. Second, it engages in question-begging. Third, it backfires. In effect, not only does Hume’s argument fail, but also our assessment of its failure shows us that the evidential value of miracle reports for Jesus’ resurrection is strengthened. Hume’s idea was that “the very nature of the fact” to which the testimony testifies contains the seeds of the testimony’s destruction as credible evidence, but in fact, in the case of Jesus’ resurrection, the very nature of the fact to which the testimony testifies contains the seeds of the testimony’s enhancement as credible evidence.

Hume’s argument against miracle reports has been turned onto its head. And so the miracle reports concerning Jesus’ resurrection should be taken seriously and investigated, not dismissed at the get-go.[30, 31]

 

Notes

1. Hume’s argument is in Part 1 of “Of Miracles,” which is Section 10 of David Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford Philosophical Texts, edited by Tom Beauchamp (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Hume’s argument from Part 1 of “Of Miracles” is, it seems to me, Hume’s most significant and influential philosophical argument against miracle reports. Hume also sets out other, less significant arguments in Part 2 of “Of Miracles.” For my assessments of the latter arguments, see Hendrik van der Breggen, “Hume’s Scale: How Hume Counts a Miracle’s Improbability Twice,” Philosophia Christi 4:2 (2002): 443–453; and see the section “Hume’s Four Others Arguments” in Hendrik van der Breggen, The Seeds of Their Own Destruction: David Hume’s Fatally Flawed Arguments against Miracle Reports, Christian Research Journal 30:01 (January/ February 2007): 30–38. For a careful reading of Hume’s overall argument, see Hendrik van der Breggen, Hume, Miracle Reports, and Credibility (M.A. thesis, University of Windsor, 1994).

2. Hume, Enquiry, 173.

3. Hume, Enquiry, 169.

4. A. C. Grayling, The Meaning of Things (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001), 126.

5. Chris Horner & Emrys Westacott, Thinking Through Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 239.

6. Dan Brown, The Da Vinci Code (New York: Anchor Books, 2003). The cover of my copy of Brown’s book says that the book is a “#1 Worldwide Bestseller” and that, according to the Washington Post Book World, we should “Read the book and be enlightened.” In 2006 the book came out as a movie with the same title, starring Tom Hanks, Audrey Tautou, and Sir Ian McKellen, and directed by Ron Howard. According to Wikipedia, The Da Vinci Code was in 2006 the second-highest-grossing film worldwide. All this to say, the impact of Hume’s argument seems to be wide-ranging.

7. Robert Funk, Roy Hoover, & The Jesus Seminar, The Five Gospels (New York: Scribner, 1993), 2. Included in the creeds (dismissed by Funk and company) would be Jesus’ miraculous resurrection.

8. See my articles: Do Jesus’ miracles violate the laws of nature? No, they don’t APOLOGIA (blog), April 3, 2014; and Easter and philosophy: David Hume’s argument against miracle reports, APOLOGIA (blog), April 8, 2010.

9. The additional criticism that follows is based on my PhD dissertation. See Hendrik van der Breggen, Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science (PhD dissertation, University of Waterloo, 2004).

10. For an exploration of the concept of miracle and a defence of the definition of miracle I have set out (which does not include the notion of “violating” a law of nature), see chapter 1 “Miracle” in van der Breggen, Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science. Also, see my blog article Do Jesus’ miracles violate the laws of nature? No, they don’t.

11. Brooke Noel Moore & Richard Parker, Critical Thinking, 10th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012), 227–228.

12. For further discussion of Hume’s question-begging, see my blog article Easter and philosophy. For further insight into the fallacy of question-begging, see Hendrik van der Breggen, Question-begging, golden nuggets, and Jesus’ resurrection, APOLOGIA (blog), February 6, 2016; and Hendrik van der Breggen, Question-begging fallacy, God’s Word, and apologetics, APOLOGIA (blog), October 22, 2009.

13. As mentioned, this is also the topic of my PhD dissertation. See van der Breggen, Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science.

14. For further discussion of the notion of plausibility, see “A Plausibility Structure for Miracles” which is chapter 5 of van der Breggen, Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science. See especially the section “Clarifying Plausibility” on pages 310–316.

15. For a list of recommended resources on the historical facts concerning Jesus’ resurrection (and failed attempts at explaining them in terms of non-resurrection hypotheses), see second last note of the present article.

16. Francis Beckwith, “Theism, Miracles, and the Modern Mind,” in The Rationality of Theism, edited by Paul Copan & Paul Moser (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 225.

17. Beckwith, “Theism, Miracles, and the Modern Mind,” 225.

18. About prayer and healing, see: Craig S. Keener, Miracles Today: The Supernatural Work of God in the Modern World (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2021); J. P. Moreland, A Simple Guide to Experience Miracles: Instruction and Inspiration for Living Supernaturally in Christ (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2021); Lee Strobel, The Case for Miracles: A Journalist Investigates Evidence for the Supernatural (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2018).

19. C. Stephen Evans, The Historical Christ and The Jesus of Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 160. In the case of Jesus we are talking not of 3 full days but of 1.5 days.

20. On Jesus’ self-understanding, see William Lane Craig, “The Self-Understanding of Jesus,” in Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd edition (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 2008), 287–332.

21. This is discussed in much greater detail in my PhD dissertation.

22. See “The Big Bang” (chapter 3) in van der Breggen, Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science.

23. Van der Breggen, “The Big Bang.” And see my articles Kalam cosmological argument, APOLOGIA (blog), September 24, 2009, and Stephen Hawking, the Big Bang, and the North Pole, APOLOGIA (blog), November 19, 2009, plus see related chapters in my book APOLOGIA: The Columns: A Defence of Mere Christianity (Amazon KDP, 2023) in which I deal with objections and provide updated readings.

24. See relevant chapters on intelligent design in my book APOLOGIA. And see “Intimations of Design” (chapter 4) in my dissertation Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science. See, too, my blog articles:

• DNA and Intelligent Design, APOLOGIA (blog), March 26, 2009;
• Who Designed the Designer? Debunking Dawkins’ Objection, APOLOGIA (blog), November 24, 2016; 
• God-of-the-gaps objection, APOLOGIA (blog), March 17, 2012;
• Universe’s Fine-Tuning vs. Multiple Universe Theory, APOLOGIA (blog), November 5, 2009;
• Universe’s Fine-Tuning vs. Anthropic Objection, APOLOGIA (blog), October 9, 2009.

25. For my replies to J. L. Mackie’s objections to moral realism, see my blog article Is moral realism odd? APOLOGIA (blog), November 28, 2014. See too “Is moral realism odd?” which is chapter 59 in my book APOLOGIA (my book has additional explanatory notes, references, and suggestions for further reading).

26. See relevant chapters on ethics in my book APOLOGIA. For a summary of how those chapters provide grounds for thinking that people have objective moral value and we know (intuit) this, see “People have objective moral value: An argument from ethics for God’s existence” (chapter 106). See, too, van der Breggen, “Moral Philosophy” (chapter 2) in van der Breggen, Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science.

27. On moral relativism, see chapters 50–53 of my book APOLOGIA. Or see Assessing Moral Relativism, APOLOGIA (blog), January 16, 2010. (My book has additional explanatory notes, references, and suggestions for further reading.) On utilitarianism, see chapter 57 of my book APOLOGIA. Or see On Utilitarianism, APOLOGIA (blog), November 15, 2012. On contractarianism, see chapter 56 of my book, or see Morals By Agreement? APOLOGIA (blog), February 12, 2010. On survivalist evolutionary ethics, see chapters 54–55 of my book, or see Atheistic Darwinian Evolution and Ethics, APOLOGIA (blog), March 12, 2010, and Criticisms of Atheistic Neo-Darwinian Ethics, APOLOGIA (blog), March 27, 2010.

28. On the golden rule, see chapter 61 of my book APOLOGIA. Or see The Golden Rule, APOLOGIA (blog), February 4, 2016. (My book has additional explanatory notes, references, and suggestions for further reading.) On Kantian ethics, see my PhD chapter 2, “Moral Philosophy,” 145–146. See too “It’s Your Duty: Kantian Ethics” in Steve Wilkens, Beyond Bumper Stick Ethics: An Introduction to Theories of Right and Wrong, 2nd edition (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2011). On natural law theory, see my PhD chapter 2, “Moral Philosophy,” 147. See too “Doing What Comes Naturally: Natural Law Ethics,” in Wilkens, Beyond Bumper Sticker Ethics. On vital needs human rights, see my PhD chapter 2, “Moral Philosophy,” 147–152.

29. See van der Breggen, “Moral Philosophy,” 153–154. For objections to my view and my replies, see 154–166.

30. For more—much more—about the historical facts concerning Jesus’ resurrection, see the following:

• Bauckham, Richard. Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony. Grand Rapids, Michigan/ Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2006.
• Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd edition. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 2008. (See chapter 8: “The Resurrection of Jesus.”)
• Craig, William Lane. On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and Precision. Colorado Springs, Colorado: David C. Cook, 2010. (See chapter 9: “Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?”)
• Groothuis, Douglas. Christian Apologetics: A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith, 2nd edition. Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2022. (See chapter 27: “The Resurrection of Jesus: The Evidence.”)
• Habermas, Gary R. & Benjamin C. F. Shaw. “An historical case for the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.” In Christianity Contested: Replies to Critics’ Toughest Objections, edited by Paul Copan & Stewart E. Kelly, 148–167. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock/ Cascade Books, 2024. (Habermas is well-known for setting out the “minimal facts approach” for Jesus’ resurrection. That is, he sets out a relatively small number of historical facts each of which is “supported by multiple lines of historical evidence” and “widely accepted by virtually all critical scholars in relevant disciplines from diverse theological backgrounds” [Habermas & Shaw, p. 149; italics in original.] The benefit of this approach is its succinctness and convenience in an otherwise large and difficult subject. This article by Habermas and Shaw is a helpful introduction to Habermas’s magnum opus on Jesus’ resurrection, that is, his 4-volume On the Resurrection. Two volumes of On the Resurrection have been published thus far: Volume 1 Evidences, Volume 2 Refutations. Forthcoming volumes: Volume 3 Scholarly Perspectives, Volume 4 title to be determined.)
• McDowell, Sean. The Fate of the Apostles: Examining the Martyrdom Accounts of the Closest Followers of Jesus, 2nd edition. London & New York: Routledge, 2024. (Note: In this 2024 second edition, McDowell sets out some updates and helpfully deals with some new objections.)
• McGrew, Lydia. Hidden in Plain View: Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels and Acts. Chillicothe, Ohio: DeWard Publishing Company, 2017. (McGrew’s book helps us keep in mind that the evidence for Jesus is not limited to the “minimal facts” to which other apologists, such as Craig, Habermas, and Strobel, typically reference. The minimal facts, about which many or most scholars agree, are helpful time-wise in presenting evidences, but the evidences can be set out even more strongly, as McGrew does, which is hugely significant.)
• McGrew, Timothy & Lydia McGrew. “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.” In The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, 593–662. Malden, Massachusetts and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
• Pitre, Brant. The Case for Jesus: The Biblical and Historical Evidence for Christ. New York: Image, 2016. (In his case for Jesus’ resurrection, Pitre includes Jesus’ self-proclaimed fulfillment of Scripture—Jesus’ fulfillment of “the sign of Jonah”—which includes Jesus’ resurrection and the repentance of Gentiles. Scribes and Pharisees demanded a sign/miracle from Jesus, and Jesus says the only sign to be given them is the sign of Jonah, yet “now one greater than Jonah is here.” [Matthew 12:41] According to Pitre, in the story of Jonah the miracle included the repentance/ conversion of the Ninevites, not just Jonah’s return from the belly of a great fish. Pitre writes: “According to Jesus, it is not just his resurrection from the dead that will be a reason for believing in him. It is also the inexplicable conversion of the pagan nations of the world—the Gentiles.” [Brant, 189; italics in original.] Pitre adds: “Jesus of Nazareth was right. The Son of Man was crucified. The Son of Man was buried. The Son of Man was raised on the third day. The tomb was empty. It still is. And the Gentiles turn to the God of Israel in droves. Because something greater than Jonah is here.” [Pitre, 191; italics in original.] My question/ thought: Could it be that a personal epistemological-metaphysical “risk” of seriously considering Jesus’ historical resurrection is that one encounters more than merely historical evidence?)
• Strobel, Lee. The Case for Easter: A Journalist Investigates the Evidence for the Resurrection. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2003. (This is a very short yet very helpful beginner-level book.)
• Swinburne, Richard. The Resurrection of God Incarnate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
• Wright, N. T. The Resurrection of the Son of God. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003.
• Wright, N. T. & Mike Bird. Easter Special: NT Wright on the Resurrection: History, Theology & Why It Still Matters. Premier Unbelievable? April 20, 2025. (34 minute video.)

Also, an excellent video series (still in progress), which I highly recommend (thus far), is Can I Trust the Bible? by Apologetics Canada, featuring Wes Huff and Andy Steiger:

• Can I Trust the Bible - Episode 1: The Right Books (19 minutes)
• [Q&A] Can I Trust the Bible? - Episode 1 (27 minutes)
• Can I Trust the Bible - Episode 2: The Right Text (19.5 minutes)
• [Q&A] Can I Trust the Bible? - Episode 2 (28 minutes)
• Can I Trust the Bible - Episode 3-4 Coming Soon... (1.5 minute trailer)

31. A very recently published book on David Hume’s essay “Of Miracles” is Robert A. Larmer, Hume’s Counterfeit Check: An Appraisal of Hume’s “Of Miracles” (Lausanne, Switzerland: Peter Lang Group AG, 2025). I have not yet read Larmer’s new book (it’s very expensive), but I am confident it is excellent. Larmer is chair of the philosophy department at the University of New Brunswick, and I have read much—and have been long-time admirer—of Professor Larmer’s work on miracles. In the late 1980s I discovered and delighted in his book Water into Wine? An Investigation of the Concept of Miracle (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988). Before my retirement in 2019, I taught a course titled Special Studies in Philosophy: Miracles. My required textbooks included Larmer’s Dialogues on Miracle (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2015) and his The Legitimacy of Miracle (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington, 2014). Larmer’s latest book is also endorsed by Tim McGrew who is a highly respected philosopher (like Larmer) as well as professor and chair of the philosophy department at Western Michigan University. Thus, I recommend and look forward to reading Larmer’s latest book on Hume. And if any librarians are reading this note, I hope you will order Robert Larmer’s books for your library—along with the books on Jesus’ resurrection listed in the previous note.

 

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Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is a retired philosophy professor who lives in Steinbach, Manitoba, Canada. 

The Case for Miracles

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, May  17, 2018

The Case for Miracles

What is a miracle? Have miracles happened? Do they occur today? Should we believe miracle reports?

If you have seriously wondered about these sorts of questions, then I recommend Lee Strobel's new book: The Case for Miracles: A Journalist Investigates Evidence for the Supernatural (Zondervan 2018).

Strobel, a former atheist but now Christian, begins the book by interviewing Michael Shermer, a former Christian but now skeptic. Shermer has degrees in psychology and biology, plus a doctorate in the history of science, and is publisher of Skeptic magazine. Shermer argues against miracles.

At first, Shermer's arguments seem strong. But then Strobel takes an investigative journey (like he does in his other “Case for…” books) to talk with experts who disagree.

Here are some highlights.

Concerning Shermer's appeal to a famous argument against belief in miracles by Scottish skeptical philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), Strobel interviews New Testament scholar Craig Keener, author of the massive two-volume Miracles (Baker Academic 2011).

It turns out Hume's argument is question-begging: it assumes as established what is at issue—it sneaks the conclusion into the premises. Hume assumes miracles are maximally improbable, so all miracle reports are always unbelievable. But, unnoticed by Hume, whether miracles are improbable and whether miracle reports are credible are issues only open-minded investigation can resolve.

In other words, Hume's argument fails—miserably. (I can attest to the correctness of this verdict, since I studied Hume's argument for my master's and doctoral degrees in philosophy.)

Significantly, Hume's (and Shermer's) claim that there aren't well-attested-to miracles is simply false. In Strobel's interview with Keener, Keener sets out a wonderful summary of his aforementioned two-volume study. There is in fact much good evidence—sometimes excellent evidence—that miracles have occurred in the past and even today.

Concerning Shermer's appeal to a so-called “gold standard” prayer study that allegedly debunks the effectiveness of prayer, Strobel interviews Candy Gunther Brown, who has three degrees from Harvard and is professor of religious studies at Indiana University.

It turns out that the study touted by Shermer is faulty. The people praying included a group that “doesn't believe in miracles, doesn't believe in a personal God outside of us who intervenes in people's lives, and doesn't believe it's even appropriate to ask for supernatural help.”

According to Gunther Brown, two other studies that include prayers from actual believers contradict Shermer's favoured but flawed study. In these studies healings seem very much to take place in answer to prayer, especially if the prayers follow the pattern set out by the New Testament. Gunther Brown's conclusion: “Something is going on, and it surely warrants further investigation.”

In a chapter on dreams and visions, Strobel interviews Tom Doyle, a missionary to Muslims. Many Muslims today are having “high-definition Jesus dreams” that draw them to accepting Jesus as Lord.

When asked whether it's more reasonable to believe that these dreams are mere coincidence and not supernatural, Doyle responds, “That would take a lot more faith to believe.”

Strobel also looks at the universe as a miracle writ large. In an interview with University of Oklahoma physicist Michael Straus, Straus makes the case that the big bang beginning of the universe coupled with its fine tuning points to God. Straus addresses the objection that multiverse theory explains the fine tuning (it doesn't because it lacks evidence) and the objection “Who made God?” (nobody did).

On the resurrection of Jesus, Strobel interviews J. Warner Wallace, a former atheist and cold-case detective. Wallace argues that the evidence for Jesus' miraculous resurrection is strong. Even compelling (if one doesn't question-beg à la Hume).

Another chapter is titled “When Miracles Don't Happen.” Strobel interviews Denver Seminary philosopher Douglas Groothuis, whose wife has dementia. This is a tough chapter to read, because both Groothuis and his wife are suffering terribly, and God seems silent.

Nevertheless, Groothuis holds that the positive evidence for Jesus' miraculous resurrection is strong—and gives hope to him and Becky.

In sum, Strobel's book well handles positive evidence for miracles and tough objections. I commend it to believers and skeptics alike.

Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Providence University College. The views expressed in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.

Did the Easter miracle happen?

Note: The following article was published in 2004 in The Record (a Kitchener-Waterloo newspaper) and I post it here to make it available to interested readers. The article was the 2005 winner of the General Readership category (newspaper article) awarded by The Word Guild.

A scene from the 2004 film The Passion of The Christ, directed by Mel Gibson

Did the Easter miracle happen?

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Record, April 10, 2004

Think of Easter and immediately bunnies and coloured eggs come to mind. However, as Mel Gibson's film The Passion of the Christ has reminded us, Easter has more to do with Jesus and the Christian gospel than it has to do with chocolate.

The traditional Christian gospel or good news is that God (God the Son) came to Earth in the man Jesus, He took our punishment for sin onto Himself by suffering and dying on a cross, and then God (the Father) raised Jesus from the grave (tomb). Jesus' resurrection, that is His return to life in the same body but somehow wonderfully renewed, is said to be a glorious sign to help us believe—accept by faith—the good news.

Of course, this begs the question: Is it reasonable to believe that Jesus actually resurrected?

In the little book The Case for Easter: A Journalist Investigates the Evidence for the Resurrection (Zondervan 2003), former journalist and former spiritual skeptic Lee Strobel argues that, yes, it is reasonable to believe that Jesus actually resurrected.

Strobel makes his case for Jesus' resurrection by appealing to, and defending, three historical facts:

○ Jesus was actually killed by crucifixion;

○ The tomb in which Jesus' dead body was placed was found empty a couple days later;

○ And Jesus was subsequently seen alive and well for several weeks in various locations, not only by a skeptic who touched Him to make sure He wasn't a ghost, but also by other individuals and variously sized groups of people, many of whom engaged Jesus in conversation and had meals with Him—and would later endure torture and death rather than recant their testimony.

THERE ARE OTHER EXPLANATIONS

Strobel also considers alternative, non-resurrection explanations—such as Jesus didn't really die, the witnesses hallucinated, a conspiracy occurred or it's all legend—but argues that they are all weak. Strobel's arguments are, I believe, strong, but because of space limitations I won't discuss those arguments here. I recommend that anyone who is interested in the problems with the non-miracle theories check out Strobel's book.

What I find interesting is that the alternative non-resurrection explanations, even the most outlandish ones which haven't a shred of evidence in their favour, such as Jesus has an unknown twin who pretended to be the resurrected Jesus after Jesus died, tend to be set forth by many—and clung to—primarily because of a philosophical reason.

How so? The proponents of the far-fetched have been infected by a skeptical philosophical view that has been transmitted to us from the Scottish philosopher David Hume.

If your son or daughter goes to university today and takes an introductory philosophy class, he or she will probably run into David Hume. Well, not David Hume in person, but a philosophy professor who is a kindred spirit.

Hume lived from 1711 to 1776. He is famous, rather notorious, for, among, other things, his argument against miracles. According to Hume, no matter how good the historical evidence is for a miracle such as Jesus' resurrection—even if the miracle actually occurred—the evidence is never good enough.

Hume argues that a miracle is a violation of a law of nature and that the laws of nature are very well established. The result, according to Hume, is that a miracle's occurrence is maximally improbable, and this maximal improbability counts against any good testimony for a miracle, either balancing the testimony (thereby providing grounds to suspend belief) or outweighing it (thereby providing grounds for disbelief). In reality, Hume thinks the latter is the case. Either way, though, Hume would have us dismiss miracle testimonies as unreasonable to believe.

CIRCULAR REASONING

Having studied Hume's argument for my master's thesis in philosophy at the University of Windsor and for my PhD dissertation in philosophy at the University of Waterloo, I have come to conclude that Hume's argument fails.

His argument fails because it begs the question. It “begs the question” in the sense that it engages in circular reasoning, it assumes as proven that which is at issue, and it sneaks the conclusion into the premises.

As mentioned, Hume takes the violation-of-law-of-nature aspect of a miracle to be sufficient grounds for counting the violated laws of nature wholly and destructively against miracle testimony—to judge the miracle to be maximally improbable.

Interestingly, in the case of Jesus' resurrection, such an event is maximally improbable, given the laws of nature and given that there is no intervention from outside the physical system. Significantly, this brings to light the fact that Hume makes the assumption that to make a probability judgment all that is needed is our knowledge of the relevant laws of nature.

But, it should be emphasized, we are supposedly talking about a miraculous resurrection (as suggested by the evidence), and so, although we are given the laws of nature, we are not given that there is no intervention from outside the system.

So in assuming that all that is needed is our knowledge of the relevant laws of nature and nothing about any possible intervention from outside of nature, Hume is, in effect, assuming that either God does not exist (and so God never intervenes via miracles) or, if God does exist, God's intentions concerning nature are shown to us wholly by the laws of nature (and so God never intervenes via miracles).

But if, as Hume assumes for the sake of argument, there is good evidence for what seems very much to be a miracle—Hume even allows it to be a real miracle—then Hume's assumption about the background knowledge is at issue.

In other words, in order for Hume's argument to work, it requires the assumption that the laws of nature express either all the goings-on of a universe without God or, if God exists, all of God's intentions concerning the universe. But the truth of this assumption must be put on hold when a miracle (whether actual or alleged) is supposed to be under investigation.

Indeed, for one's mind to be actually open to the possibility of the occurrence of an occasional real miracle—a possibility Hume allows, at least for the sake of argument—requires that the assumption Hume makes be suspended—at least when one is purportedly investigating the evidence for a miracle.

In other words, Hume's argument works only if we assume that there is no God who on rare occasions intervenes in nature, but this assumption is at issue when we are considering any alleged evidence for miracles.

LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE

Thus, by assuming the above-described background knowledge, Hume mistakenly begs the question which only the (alleged) miracle evidence can answer.

Hume's mind is already made up then, and not open to what the evidence suggests.

The upshot is that if your mind is not already closed to the possibility of a God who occasionally does a miracle, that is, if your mind is open to the possibility of God's existence and the possibility of this God intervening in nature, then the facts surrounding Jesus' alleged resurrection may make a miraculous resurrection explanation plausible, and even reasonable to believe.

If you weren't a believer in the past, Easter might now take on a whole new meaning.

Postscript (September 17, 2016): The notion of God “intervening” in nature can also be understood as God engaging in a special act vis-à-vis God's ongoing act of sustaining the creation. Space limitations in a newspaper article are not conducive to adding philosophical-theological nuance.

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Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is associate professor of philosophy at Providence University College.