William James (1842-1910) |
APOLOGIA
By
Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, March 31, 2016
William James
In “The
Will to Believe” psychologist-philosopher William James (1842-1910) famously
argues that under certain conditions (which James specifies) religious belief
can be reasonable in the absence of evidence.
Let’s
clarify James’s view (in part by contrasting it with the views of others) and
then assess.
For contemporary
philosopher Alvin Plantinga, if God exists, belief can be rational even if not
supported by evidence or argument because we have some “properly basic beliefs”
(which are part of our properly functioning faculty for knowing). If God
exists, we have a sensus divinitatus,
i.e., a sense or knowledge of the divine given to us by God. No argument needed.
In contrast, James doesn’t assume God’s existence, but we can still be rational
in choosing or willing to believe.
According
philosopher William Clifford (1845-1879), it’s always irrational to believe
anything without sufficient evidence (though Clifford apparently didn't notice
he was believing this without evidence), and because there isn’t sufficient
evidence for God, we ought not believe. In contrast, James doesn’t argue that
there is sufficient evidence for God (he thinks there isn't), but James still holds
one can be reasonable believing without evidence (and without Plantinga's basic
belief).
How so? According
to James, to be reasonable in willing or choosing religious belief without
evidence one must be facing what James calls a “genuine option” for belief. A
genuine option is a religious belief that satisfies three conditions.
(a) It
must be a live hypothesis—it’s a real
possibility for you. A present-day world religion may be a real possibility for
you, depending on where you live. The gods of Olympus would not be a live
option for you.
(b) It
must be a forced option—there’s no avoiding
it. You must choose for or against it. Postponing, say, a marriage proposal until
you are 100% sure is in effect to say No.
(c) It
must be a momentous option. The implications
of risking a false belief are better than having no belief or remaining
agnostic. There is an underlying gamble for “the best things.”
Think of
a mountain climber stranded in a storm. He hears a voice telling him to jump to
safety. He can stay put (and freeze to death) or jump (and possibly live).
Better to jump.
According
to James, willing to believe is reasonable if the option is live, forced, and
momentous.
Okay, so
is it reasonable for us to choose or will to agree with James?
I have
concerns.
I think the
momentousness of the gamble may also be a reason for resisting the will/urge to believe. If the stakes are high—really
high—perhaps I should be more careful in my gamble. And especially if there is
a plurality of live options.
If I am a
stranded mountain climber and there are competing voices—some from climbing
experts, some from novices, perhaps some from persons who wish me dead—telling
me to do different things to get off the mountain, I should pause (at least
briefly) to assess.
Moreover,
the plurality of live religious options also works against the forced aspect of
the option. It’s not just yes to one or the other; it’s yes to one or the other
or the other or the other, etc. If I’m
deciding which one woman I should marry and I have several “live options,” I should
take time to get counseling!
Also, what
if the “live option” is a religion that uses cult techniques (misinformation
and emotional manipulation) to make it live
for you?
Surely,
as contemporary philosopher Patrick Quinn points out, such considerations
suggest “the need for a more reasonable approach to religious faith and not one
that is based on the will alone but rather the ‘informed’ will.”
To
arbitrate between competing religious options, then, we need to test the
spirits and “spiritualities” for truth. Enter careful investigation of evidence
and the humble use of good reasoning.
That's
why I take Easter seriously.
(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, teaches
philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)
No comments:
Post a Comment