Thinking People Who Support Democracy Should Support Motion M-312

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, September 12, 2012

Thinking People Who Support Democracy Should Support Motion M-312

The Criminal Code of Canada presently states that a child isn’t a human being until after it’s completely born. But large numbers of Canadians think a child is a human being before it's born.

In the spirit of democratic political process, MP Stephen Woodworth has set forth Motion M-312 which requests that the Canadian government appoint a special committee that will investigate (using current medical science) whether it’s true that the pre-born child isn’t a human being. The committee will also study the legal implications for the rights of the child based on the findings of this investigation and then report its findings to Parliament.

I fully support motion M-312. Why? At the very least because there is a desperate need for good, careful thinking on whether or not the unborn child is a human being.

But don’t take my word for it. Here are a couple of arguments I read earlier this summer in a CBC News comment section. These arguments are popular and show the sad state of thinking about the unborn child. My critical assessment follows.

Argument 1. A fetus does not become a human being until live birth just as a caterpillar does not become a butterfly until it emerges live from the cocoon, therefore the fetus isn’t a human being.

Argument 2. From the same CBC commenter: "A tadpole ain't a frog. A fetus ain't a human. It's a 'maybe can become' but until it does become, it ain't." Therefore (again), the fetus isn’t a human being.

My verdict: These arguments both commit the fallacy of faulty analogy (i.e., the mistake of making faulty comparisons). Please bear with me as I present my reasons.

According to the first argument, a fetus does not become a human being until live birth just as a caterpillar does not become a butterfly until it emerges live from the cocoon. This comparison, however, confuses the categories of developmental stage (a step in growth or maturation of an organism) and ontology (what the organism is in its essential nature or being).

The argument asserts that an early developmental stage (fetus) doesn't become an instance of a type of being (human being) until birth, and then, in defence of this assertion, the argument uses the analogue that an early developmental stage (caterpillar) doesn't become a later developmental stage (butterfly) until emergence from the cocoon; and so a fetus isn't a human being.

However, a better—i.e., more accurate—analogy would be this: An early developmental stage (fetus) doesn't become a later developmental stage (e.g., post-birth infant) until birth, just as an early developmental stage (caterpillar) doesn't become a later developmental stage (butterfly) until emergence from the cocoon. But, and significantly, when we remove the conceptual conflation between developmental stage and ontology or type of being, the original argument doesn't support the conclusion that the fetus isn't a human being!

The second argument—that because the tadpole isn't a frog therefore the fetus isn't a human being—continues with the same faulty analogy.

Yes, a tadpole (early developmental stage) isn't a mature frog (later developmental stage), but from this it doesn't follow that the tadpole isn't a frog being per se (i.e., an instance of the ontological category or type of being that a frog is). Nor does it follow that a fetus (early developmental stage) isn't a human being (i.e., an instance of the ontological category or type of being).

My point: Particular developmental stages and instances of ontological kinds are wholly different categories, but the categories get blurred in the above arguments from analogy. Thus, the arguments commit the fallacy of faulty analogy and their conclusion—that the fetus isn’t a human being—does not follow logically.

(Don't they teach logic at school anymore these days?)

Back to M-312: I think Stephen Woodworth's motion M-312 is truly important. It asks that we investigate a law which says a child isn't a human being until after it's born when contemporary science and good reasoning seem very much to tell us that a child is a human being before it's born.

Significantly, as Don Hutchinson (a lawyer for the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada) observes, the question M-312 addresses is “bigger than abortion” (which is a big issue, to be sure, because Canadian law at present allows abortion during the full nine months of pregnancy). Mr. Hutchinson explains: “As a matter of simple bioethics, the status of the child in the womb is important to medical considerations and scientific experimentation (including eugenics, sex selection, assisted reproduction and legal debates over stored genetic materials).”

Surely, the investigation for which Motion M-312 calls is a reasonable thing to do in a democracy that seeks to recognize as human beings all those human beings who are in fact human beings.

Thinking people who favour democracy should support motion M-312.

P.S. The caterpillar-isn't-a-butterfly argument and the tadpole-isn't-a-frog argument are new versions of the old acorn-isn't-an-oak-tree-so-the-fetus-isn't-a-human-being fallacy, which was debunked in this column four years ago. See Apologia, October 2, 2008.

P.P.S. On the question—Is the fetus a human being?—see Apologia, May 10, 2012.

(Hendrik van der Breggen, Ph.D., teaches philosophy at Providence University College. The views in this column do not always reflect the views of Providence.)