APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(The Carillon, December 11, 2008)
Who designed the designer? (Part 2)
The question—Who designed the designer?—is set out by Richard Dawkins (in The God Delusion) as an objection to God’s existence.
According to Dawkins, explaining nature’s improbable complexity (that is, nature’s apparent design) by appealing to a designer is to appeal to something more improbable than nature, because the designer would have to be more complex than what it explains. Moreover, the designer would have to be explained by the designer’s designer, and so on. Thus, according to Dawkins, God’s existence is highly improbable.
Here is another reason for thinking that this objection fails: it’s based on a false assumption.
Dawkins assumes that the complexity of a designer makes a designer hypothesis improbable. But consider this: Intelligent cause/designer explanations are accepted in science even if the designer is complex—e.g., in archeology (to explain cave paintings and arrowheads), in cryptography (to explain codes), and in forensic science (to explain whodunnit). In fact, in these sciences the designer is even more complex than the objects or phenomena explained, yet the designer hypothesis is legitimate.
If (for argument’s sake) we were to accept Dawkins’ assumption as true, then, to be logically consistent, the aforementioned explanations would not be legitimate. But they are legitimate. So Dawkins’ assumption—that the complexity of a designer makes a design hypothesis improbable—is false.
At this juncture, Dawkins might object (as he does in The God Delusion) that it is not reasonable to make a design inference in a more general or ultimate way, i.e., from the evidence of the physical universe to an intelligent designer such as God.
Why not? Because, according to Dawkins, ultimate causes should be simple and non-intelligent, as in neo-Darwinian evolution, where causes are non-intelligent as well as simpler than their complex effects.
Significantly, however (and unnoticed by Dawkins), this is in effect to assume that simple unintelligent causes constitute what is ultimately real. But if we are actually trying to let the universe’s evidence of apparent design (instead of our assumptions) tell us whether or not there is an ultimately real intelligent designer, then Dawkins’ assumption is at issue!
In other words, Dawkins incurs the fallacy of question-begging (a.k.a. circular reasoning): he assumes as proven that which is at issue, and he unwittingly sneaks this assumption into his argument.
Dawkins, then, assumes the outcome of his investigation right from the start, instead of letting the evidence of the investigation decide the outcome. God or no God, this is a logical sin.
(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.)
Who designed the designer? (Part 2)
The question—Who designed the designer?—is set out by Richard Dawkins (in The God Delusion) as an objection to God’s existence.
According to Dawkins, explaining nature’s improbable complexity (that is, nature’s apparent design) by appealing to a designer is to appeal to something more improbable than nature, because the designer would have to be more complex than what it explains. Moreover, the designer would have to be explained by the designer’s designer, and so on. Thus, according to Dawkins, God’s existence is highly improbable.
Here is another reason for thinking that this objection fails: it’s based on a false assumption.
Dawkins assumes that the complexity of a designer makes a designer hypothesis improbable. But consider this: Intelligent cause/designer explanations are accepted in science even if the designer is complex—e.g., in archeology (to explain cave paintings and arrowheads), in cryptography (to explain codes), and in forensic science (to explain whodunnit). In fact, in these sciences the designer is even more complex than the objects or phenomena explained, yet the designer hypothesis is legitimate.
If (for argument’s sake) we were to accept Dawkins’ assumption as true, then, to be logically consistent, the aforementioned explanations would not be legitimate. But they are legitimate. So Dawkins’ assumption—that the complexity of a designer makes a design hypothesis improbable—is false.
At this juncture, Dawkins might object (as he does in The God Delusion) that it is not reasonable to make a design inference in a more general or ultimate way, i.e., from the evidence of the physical universe to an intelligent designer such as God.
Why not? Because, according to Dawkins, ultimate causes should be simple and non-intelligent, as in neo-Darwinian evolution, where causes are non-intelligent as well as simpler than their complex effects.
Significantly, however (and unnoticed by Dawkins), this is in effect to assume that simple unintelligent causes constitute what is ultimately real. But if we are actually trying to let the universe’s evidence of apparent design (instead of our assumptions) tell us whether or not there is an ultimately real intelligent designer, then Dawkins’ assumption is at issue!
In other words, Dawkins incurs the fallacy of question-begging (a.k.a. circular reasoning): he assumes as proven that which is at issue, and he unwittingly sneaks this assumption into his argument.
Dawkins, then, assumes the outcome of his investigation right from the start, instead of letting the evidence of the investigation decide the outcome. God or no God, this is a logical sin.
(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence College, Otterburne, Manitoba.)
10 comments:
Hi Hendrik,
Here is another reason for thinking that this objection fails: it’s based on a false assumption.
Nope, it is not.
Dawkins assumes that the complexity of a designer makes a designer hypothesis improbable. But consider this: Intelligent cause/designer explanations are accepted in science even if the designer is complex—e.g., in archeology (to explain cave paintings and arrowheads), in cryptography (to explain codes), and in forensic science (to explain whodunnit). In fact, in these sciences the designer is even more complex than the objects or phenomena explained, yet the designer hypothesis is legitimate.
Because those designers can be explained without appeals to unnatural causes.
If (for argument’s sake) we were to accept Dawkins’ assumption as true, then, to be logically consistent, the aforementioned explanations would not be legitimate. But they are legitimate. So Dawkins’ assumption—that the complexity of a designer makes a design hypothesis improbable—is false.
Only taken out of context, as you pretend to do here.
At this juncture, Dawkins might object (as he does in The God Delusion) that it is not reasonable to make a design inference in a more general or ultimate way, i.e., from the evidence of the physical universe to an intelligent designer such as God.
I do not know if Dawkins does this, but your argument fails because there is no explanation for your ultimate designer.
Why not? Because, according to Dawkins, ultimate causes should be simple and non-intelligent, as in neo-Darwinian evolution, where causes are non-intelligent as well as simpler than their complex effects.
I do not think this is what Dawkins states. I have not read the God delusion, but now I should. However, I have not heard the guy say anything like that. My point would be that designers above are naturally explained, while your God designer looks more like a figment of your imagination.
Significantly, however (and unnoticed by Dawkins), this is in effect to assume that simple unintelligent causes constitute what is ultimately real. But if we are actually trying to let the universe’s evidence of apparent design (instead of our assumptions) tell us whether or not there is an ultimately real intelligent designer, then Dawkins’ assumption is at issue!
Again, only if you ignore the whole context whereby there is lots of evidence that point to Dawkins being correct. Our ignorance might have lead us to believe that there was a designer to begin with. But, as our knowledge has increased we have found that assumption to be unnecessary.
In other words, Dawkins incurs the fallacy of question-begging (a.k.a. circular reasoning): he assumes as proven that which is at issue, and he unwittingly sneaks this assumption into his argument.
Again, you are ignoring lots of context. He does not assume as proven what is at issue, he knows the evidence, and thus he is not inserting something that is at issue. It is ID which ignores the evidences and question begs.
Dawkins, then, assumes the outcome of his investigation right from the start, instead of letting the evidence of the investigation decide the outcome. God or no God, this is a logical sin.
Nope, Dawkins comes to these realizations with a stronghold of his whole career in biological research and his determination for knowledge wherever it leads, while IDers come to their conclusions after stubbornly rejecting any evidence presented.
G.E.
Hello again G.E. ,
Thanks for your comments. I will again set out your comments (including quotes from me) and I will again reply to your comments in piecemeal fashion. I hope our discussion will be helpful in getting us closer to what’s true and reasonable to believe.
G.E. wrote:
Hi Hendrik,
Here is another reason for thinking that this objection fails: it’s based on a false assumption.
Nope, it is not.
Dawkins assumes that the complexity of a designer makes a designer hypothesis improbable. But consider this: Intelligent cause/designer explanations are accepted in science even if the designer is complex—e.g., in archeology (to explain cave paintings and arrowheads), in cryptography (to explain codes), and in forensic science (to explain whodunnit). In fact, in these sciences the designer is even more complex than the objects or phenomena explained, yet the designer hypothesis is legitimate.
Because those designers can be explained without appeals to unnatural causes.
Hendrik’s reply:
I think you miss a couple of important points.
First, the point remains that the complexity of a designer doesn’t always make a designer hypothesis improbable. This cuts at the heart of Dawkins’ argument (because, as I also argue, but you apparently missed, the nature of a cause is not relevant to discerning design).
Second, as I argued when I addressed Dawkins and SETI in my previous column (which you seem to have missed), the point remains that the issue of the complexity and origin—i.e., the nature—of a designer is simply not relevant to discerning design and the application of the design hypothesis. An intelligent cause’s origin or nature, as in the case of whatever ET’s origin or nature might be, doesn’t count against the discernment of an intelligent designer. Whether ET (an intelligent cause) is natural or not, or caused or not, has no bearing on whether the intelligent cause hypothesis makes sense of evidence of ET’s communication. This applies to all intelligent causes. And this too cuts at the heart of Dawkins’ argument. [For more on this second point, see my column, Who designed the designer? (Part 1).]
G.E. wrote:
If (for argument’s sake) we were to accept Dawkins’ assumption as true, then, to be logically consistent, the aforementioned explanations would not be legitimate. But they are legitimate. So Dawkins’ assumption—that the complexity of a designer makes a design hypothesis improbable—is false.
Only taken out of context, as you pretend to do here.
Hendrik’s reply:
With all due respect G.E., I think you’re a bit too quick here in making a judgment about my personal motives. I “pretend” to take Dawkins’ assumption out of context? Couldn’t I merely be making an honest mistake? For the record, I am not pretending anything here (at least not as far as I am aware); rather, I believe that I am simply trying my best to reason carefully and honestly. Perhaps I’ve made a mistake in the argument of my column, but I haven’t seen any good reasons for thinking so (at least not yet).
G.E. wrote:
At this juncture, Dawkins might object (as he does in The God Delusion) that it is not reasonable to make a design inference in a more general or ultimate way, i.e., from the evidence of the physical universe to an intelligent designer such as God.
I do not know if Dawkins does this, but your argument fails because there is no explanation for your ultimate designer.
Hendrik’s reply:
You claim that my argument for an ultimate designer fails because there isn’t an explanation for the ultimate designer. I think that this is a very odd claim to make, philosophically, for at least two reasons.
First, the claim assumes that for an explanation to be reasonable, it too requires an explanation. You’re in effect saying that all explanations require explanations. But this is false. We can have explanations—reasonable explanations—even if we don’t have an explanation for the explanation. We wouldn’t be reasonable to dismiss, say, an actual communication from ET just because we didn’t have an explanation for ET’s origin/nature. Yet the intelligent cause hypothesis would make good sense of the (alleged) communication. Similarly, we wouldn’t be reasonable to dismiss evidence of a designer—ultimate or not—just because we didn’t have an explanation of this designer’s origin/nature. Again, the intelligent cause hypothesis would make good sense of the (alleged) evidence. As I argued in my previous column, the question of rationally and empirically determining whether or not there is a designer depends on evidence of design, not on whether we can explain the designer.
Second, to dismiss an ultimate designer because we haven’t got an explanation for it would mean that we are dismissing what’s ultimate because it’s ultimate. Surely that’s an odd philosophical move to make. If X is ultimate, then X just is, period.
G.E. wrote:
Why not? Because, according to Dawkins, ultimate causes should be simple and non-intelligent, as in neo-Darwinian evolution, where causes are non-intelligent as well as simpler than their complex effects.
I do not think this is what Dawkins states. I have not read the God delusion, but now I should. However, I have not heard the guy say anything like that. My point would be that designers above are naturally explained, while your God designer looks more like a figment of your imagination.
Hendrik’s reply:
We have a point of agreement: Yes, you should read Dawkins’ The God Delusion, especially before you criticize a criticism of the book.
I have an article on Dawkins’ The God Delusion that will hopefully get published this coming February in an academic journal. In the article I make the various page references to The God Delusion to connect my argument (expressed succinctly in my two columns) to Dawkins’ book. I’ll see about posting the article here when it’s published. In the meantime, G.E., I encourage you to take a look at Dawkins’ “central argument” (Dawkins’ words) near the end of chapter 4 of The God Delusion.
G.E. wrote:
Significantly, however (and unnoticed by Dawkins), this is in effect to assume that simple unintelligent causes constitute what is ultimately real. But if we are actually trying to let the universe’s evidence of apparent design (instead of our assumptions) tell us whether or not there is an ultimately real intelligent designer, then Dawkins’ assumption is at issue!
Again, only if you ignore the whole context whereby there is lots of evidence that point to Dawkins being correct. Our ignorance might have lead us to believe that there was a designer to begin with. But, as our knowledge has increased we have found that assumption to be unnecessary.
In other words, Dawkins incurs the fallacy of question-begging (a.k.a. circular reasoning): he assumes as proven that which is at issue, and he unwittingly sneaks this assumption into his argument.
Again, you are ignoring lots of context. He does not assume as proven what is at issue, he knows the evidence, and thus he is not inserting something that is at issue. It is ID which ignores the evidences and question begs.
Hendrik’s reply:
G.E., I think that we’ll have to agree to disagree. Also, I will let our readers decide who’s doing the ignoring here. Yes, of course, I could be missing something important; yes, I could be neglecting something important. I know that I make mistakes (and I have made quite a few in my life). But at least I have in fact carefully read Dawkins’ book The God Delusion, which is the book under discussion. By carefully reading Dawkins’ book, I—along with quite a few respectable thinkers, whether atheist or Christian, who have also read the book—have come to the reasonable conclusion that Dawkins has made some serious philosophical mistakes in his book.
G.E. wrote:
Dawkins, then, assumes the outcome of his investigation right from the start, instead of letting the evidence of the investigation decide the outcome. God or no God, this is a logical sin.
Nope, Dawkins comes to these realizations with a stronghold of his whole career in biological research and his determination for knowledge wherever it leads, while IDers come to their conclusions after stubbornly rejecting any evidence presented.
Hendrik’s reply:
Again, I (and others who have read The God Delusion) do think that in The God Delusion Dawkins (unwittingly) decides the outcome of his investigations by philosophically disallowing, right at the start, the possibility of an intelligent designer. He rules out the possibility (i.e., makes it improbable in the extreme) via his who-designed-the-designer argument/objection, which is philosophically faulty.
Also, I think that you’re being unfair to the ID folks here. From my readings of their work and in having seen some of them in debates and lectures, I find that they’re generally very careful thinkers, very well educated, and quite open to the evidence—whether it points to ID or not. At least they allow the possibility of the ID hypothesis in science, unlike many of their opponents. The ID folks seem much more open minded to me, and freer to explore the evidence wherever it leads.
Closing comments from Hendrik:
It seems to me that if we define science as a truth-seeking enterprise that’s done on the basis of empirical evidence, then science shouldn’t just be an attempt to always explain everything via non-intelligent causes regardless of which way the evidence points. Science as a truth-seeking enterprise should at least be open to considering intelligent cause explanations, whether natural or not. Also, whether an intelligent cause should be used in an explanation should be decided on the basis of evidence, not a prior philosophical ruling-out of that type of cause before the investigation occurs.
Thanks again, G.E., for your comments. I hope that in my comments and criticisms I haven’t unwittingly (or wittingly) communicated disrespect for you as a person. I think it’s important that we model to others (especially the younger generation) how reasonable people can have deep disagreements yet argue in such a way that we show respect to those with whom we disagree.
Wishing you only the best for 2009,
Hendrik
Hi Hendrik,
Sorry that my post did actually sound quite harsh. A style I have acquired after discussing too much with presuppositionalists. I will be more careful. I apologize. Please feel free to be clear in your comments back, as I am not too sensitive as long as there is a point to understand.
Yep, I should read the book. I have to add that Dawkins is not my favorite anything. Yet, it still seems like the critique to one argument alone out of the context of the whole book (I know his arguments because of the lectures he has given) is unfair. Though I do not mean that you do this on purpose.
The "who designed the designer" is not a powerful argument to me either, but for reasons different to yours. To me it is clear that theists think of God as the ultimate cause, and thus a "who designed the designer" does not make a lot of sense to them.
Yet, again, from the point of view of an atheist a designer requires explanation. And this is what you seem to miss. The other side's point of view.
I understand that your point is that you can decide something was designed without thinking about the complexity of the designer. However, Dawkins points (as it seems from his lectures) is rather that if we just claim that life on earth was designed we now have to explain the origin of the designer, and that thus assuming intelligent design for life, means we have explained nothing. Apparently easy for theists, but in the end, being easy to say (it was God) does not mean it is true.
I agree that not everything has to have a cause. But I have to insist that ultimate causes do not have to be supernatural. In that sense, I would agree, with Dawkins, that if we were to claim that life on Earth was designed, that only puts the problem of the origins of life outside Earth, but not necessarily outside nature. If so, then we still need to find how that designer came to be, and we are where we started. In that very sense Dawkins point is not philosophically faulty. It just seems incomplete if not properly understood (out of context for whichever reason).
Hendrik, I have found you a very reasonable person. I expect we will have interesting conversations.
G.E.
If I might add something here.
I did read your SETI post. Actually, the problem is very very hard, but it is not the same intelligent designer argument as that for the origins of life, or of life's complexity. Anyway, the problem is so hard that in fiction they come to finding only one thing that might imply intelligence in some form of transmission, and that was the series pf prime numbers.
Interesting stuff.
Anyway, this was not an argument but an observation that distinguishing intelligence from otherwise patterned noises is a very hard problem.
G.E.
I know I'm late to the party; but let me throw in my perspective anyway. If one assumes that anything sufficiently complex necessarily requires a designer, then one gets an infinite regress. Each designer, in turn, is more complex than previous considerations, and so requires its own designer. If one rejects that assumption, it makes a designer for the world we see unnecessary. It doesn't rule out the possibility. It just means that there doesn't have to be one. If your god can be uncaused, the universe can, as well.
Get education:
I have seen a different series used.
1 3 7 12 18 26 35 45 56 69 83 98 ...
I don't remember where I saw it anymore. Can you guess the significance of that series?
Pvblivs,
Thanks for your argument above (having to do with the rejection of the infinite regress of designers and the conclusion that if God can be uncaused, then the universe can be as well). It's an important argument. I will give it some careful thought, and I will try to respond to it more directly in the near future.
Cheers,
Hendrik
Hello again Pvblivs,
I’ll set out your argument, which, as I mentioned above, is an important one; then I’ll assess it in my reply.
Pvblivs wrote:
I know I'm late to the party; but let me throw in my perspective anyway. If one assumes that anything sufficiently complex necessarily requires a designer, then one gets an infinite regress. Each designer, in turn, is more complex than previous considerations, and so requires its own designer. If one rejects that assumption, it makes a designer for the world we see unnecessary. It doesn't rule out the possibility. It just means that there doesn't have to be one. If your god can be uncaused, the universe can, as well.
Hendrik’s reply:
I think that your argument is an important one because it (in slightly different versions) has been held by quite a few influential philosophers (e.g., David Hume) and scientists (e.g., Paul Parsons). So you are in good company. Nevertheless, I think that the argument is faulty. (I realize that I might come across as sounding arrogant in saying that I disagree with an argument that’s held by some influential philosophers and scientists; please know that my intent is not to be arrogant or “uppity” in any way. Rather, I’m just trying to do my best to follow evidence and good reasoning in whatever direction it points. Of course, I could be mistaken in my understanding of the evidence and of the reasoning.)
Let me begin to address your objection by addressing a slightly different objection. (Note: I’m not trying to misrepresent or sidestep your argument. I want to take a slightly different approach to your argument which, I think, will end up revealing an unnoticed and problematic assumption in your argument. It will also save me from having to rehash my arguments vis-à-vis Dawkins. Since you are in fact, as you say, “late to the party,” I think it’s okay that I ask you to be a bit patient with me here.)
Consider this objection: If there’s no need to ask how God came about (i.e., God can be uncaused), then there’s no need to ask about how the universe came about (i.e., the universe can be uncaused).
Okay. Let’s assume that there’s no need to ask how Bill Gates came about. (For the sake of argument, assume Bill Gates is God, and assume Microsoft is the universe.) In other words, the above objection is this: If there’s no need to ask how Bill Gates came about, then there’s no need to ask how Microsoft came about.
Surely, this objection is odd. And it’s especially odd if there’s good evidence for thinking that Mircosoft hasn’t been around for ever. In other words, it’s especially odd if there’s good evidence for thinking that Microsoft displays not only design (which it does), but also contingency—i.e., it also displays evidence of having begun.
The case, it seems to me, is similar with the universe: Not only does the universe display design, it also displays contingency—i.e., it also displays evidence of having begun (think of the Big Bang beginning of the universe).
Therefore, just as the apparent design evidence in Microsoft points to an intelligent cause such as Bill Gates (whether Bill Gates began or not, or whether Bill Gates has a designer or not), so too the apparent design evidence in the universe (fine-tuning, DNA, etc.) points to an intelligent cause such as God (whether God began or not, or whether God has a designer or not).
The point: The possibilities that Bill Gates/God might or might not have an intelligent cause are interesting possibilities, but those possibilities are not relevant to the judgment that Microsoft/universe doesn’t need a cause. So, Pvlivs, your argument seems very much to contain an assumption that mistakenly takes what’s irrelevant as relevant.
Allow me to try another approach.
The astrophysicist Paul Parsons argues as follows: “If there exists a creator, then what created the creator? And so on [i.e., we end up with an infinite regression]. Deciding, ad hoc, that the creator requires no creator is groundless. Why not simply say that the Universe requires no creator?” (Paul Parsons, The Big Bang: The Birth of Our Universe [New York: DK Publishing, 2001], 32.)
In response it should be noted that Parsons’ (and Pvblivs’s) questions can be asked, but they are simply not a relevant concern. Indeed, there seems to be no context-related reason to raise the questions. The evidence for the Big Bang gives us a universe that has a beginning for its existence. What is philosophically interesting is that our universe began. It is interesting because we usually think that whatever begins to exist has a cause for its beginning. In other words, we are interested in the cause of the universe's beginning because we have pretty good evidence that the universe does in fact have a beginning and so (if we accept the principle whatever begins has a cause for its existence) it seems reasonable to infer that the universe has a cause for its beginning. Now, and this point some thinkers such as Parsons seem to miss: We have no evidence whatsoever that the universe's cause has a beginning, so, although we can ask the question of when or if it began to exist, we have no evidence for thinking that it did—unlike the situation with the universe. And it should be added: Even if the universe's cause, be it God or a god-like being, began to exist and has a cause (or causes), so what? At the moment we simply are not interested in the cause of the universe's cause's beginning, even if it (the universe's cause) did have a beginning. Why not? Because we have no evidence for its beginning. However, we are interested in the fact that the universe may have a cause, because the universe gives us evidence for thinking that the universe began. So it is reasonable to ask: Does the universe have a cause and is this cause intelligent? In view of some good reasons for thinking that whatever begins to exist has a cause for its beginning, it is reasonable think that the universe does have a cause. In view of the design characteristics found in the universe, it is also reasonable to think that this cause is intelligent. So it’s reasonable not to stop with the universe, but to stop with an intelligent cause for the universe, whether that cause has an intelligent cause or not.
(For more details on whether the universe has a cause for its beginning, see chapter 3 of my PhD dissertation, the link to which is on the right of my blog. The full title for chapter 3 is “The Big Bang: A finding from contemporary science as a clue for thinking that there is a very powerful, transcendent cause which/who can produce physical stuff.” For more details on whether this cause is intelligent, see chapter 4 of my PhD dissertation. The full title for chapter 4 is “Intimations of Design: Some findings from contemporary science as clues for thinking that there is a very powerful, transcendent, intelligent cause.”)
In short, Pvlivs, I think that your argument fails to account for the known contingency of the universe and its design. Sure, the universe might be uncaused (i.e., it’s a logical possibility). However, the evidence of the universe, i.e., it’s contingency and apparent design, coupled with the generally accepted principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause—these reasonable considerations make a powerful case for thinking that the universe is not uncaused. So the thesis that the universe is uncaused is a logical possibility, but has weak grounds (i.e., it’s not epistemically plausible). The evidence, it seems to me, points to an intelligent cause.
(For a sustained defence of the principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause for its existence, see pages 177-208 of chapter 3 of my PhD dissertation, a link to which is located on the right of this blog. I apologize for making all these references to my dissertation. I just happen to think that readers interested in more detailed responses should know that such answers are available. Also, I don’t want to rewrite a nearly 400 page work!)
Thanks again, Pvblivs, for setting out your important argument.
With best regards,
Hendrik
Dr. V:
The world we see appears to have begun in a "big bang" event. However, as this world may well just be a sort of bubble in a larger mindless universe, my objection still stands. Furthermore, the only thing that I see taken as "evidence of design" in the world we see is the sheer complexity. I have no reason to believe that the world we see is designed. It has no apparent function. Sure, there might be a designer. But one is unnecessary.
Pvblivs,
Thanks for your additional comment. If you have some spare time, take a look at my dissertation, the link to which is located at the right side of my blog. I argue in chapter 2 that it’s reasonable to believe that human beings actually do have objective moral value/intrinsic moral worth (in a footnote somewhere, I also allow for, but don’t defend, the objective moral value of our planet in general). I argue in chapter 3 that it’s reasonable to think that the big bang was brought about by a very powerful cause that produced all the matter/energy, space, and time which constitutes our universe (so the cause is a very powerful universe-transcendent cause). I argue in chapter 4 that the world’s (what you describe as) “sheer complexity” can be taken as evidence of design because this complexity very much seems to have a purpose: it serves to instantiate that which has objective moral value (i.e. intelligent human beings, among other things). So, as I argue, there seems very much to be a function for the complexity—so it isn’t mere complexity—and this function points to intelligent design.
In chapter 4, I also take a brief look at multiple universe theories (including “bubble” universes), so you might want to have a look at what I’ve written there (see pages 257-268). I set out some general and specific criticisms of the major multiple universe theories, plus I concede multiple universe theory for the sake of argument to examine the consequences for my overall position.
For the sake of clarity, let me point out that I argue neither that there merely might be a designer nor that one is necessary; rather, I argue that a designer makes reasonable sense of some findings from contemporary science and from moral philosophy.
For the sake of the record, I believe that reasonable people can disagree on this topic—and I will defend, with all the strength of my being, their right to do so (as long as the disagreement involves the showing of respect for those with whom one disagrees). Nevertheless, from the work that I’ve done on this topic, I have come to the conclusion that the case for an intelligent designer is stronger than the case to the contrary.
Pvblivs, I hope that you’ll take a look at my work. If we end up still disagreeing, that’s fine. In the words of that famous contemporary singer Avril Lavigne, “Life’s like that.”
With best regards,
Hendrik
P.S. Maybe Avril Lavigne didn’t sing those words. Johnny Cash? Avril or no Avril, I think the point is a good one. (Also, this was a wee attempt at humor…)
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