tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9189981194016418049.post6175958021374296441..comments2024-03-08T16:52:11.999-06:00Comments on APOLOGIA: Pragmatic theory of truth...is falseHendrik van der Breggenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04149481975577863835noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9189981194016418049.post-36172991738300658292011-06-29T20:38:33.658-05:002011-06-29T20:38:33.658-05:003. How can people who agree with the correspondenc...3. How can people who agree with the correspondence theory of truth (e.g., Ayn Rand, Aristotle, many others) end up with different views of the supernatural? My answer: It's probably due to many of the same reasons why people disagree about lots of stuff. People disagree as a result of (a) differences in available information, (b) believing false instead of true premises, (c) engaging in faulty reasoning, (d) subscribing to unnoticed presuppositions, (e) question-begging, (f) etc. Or the disagreement is due simply to misunderstanding and misrepresenting another's view. For example, think of how you misunderstood and misrepresented the correspondence theory of truth (above); this would lead to further disagreement between us if this were not checked. I know of some atheists who misrepresent intelligent design arguments and the kalam cosmological argument, and these misrepresentations account for their dismissal of the supernatural. (Of course, there may be other reasons that have to do with the heart, e.g., some folks seem to have a "hate on" for anything that smacks of God and the supernatural, but I think it's wise to let God be the judge of those reasons.)<br /><br />4. Please know that I am the first to admit that I make mistakes and I make assumptions. However, I think that such an admission needn't end in an epistemological dead-end or paralysis. I think that the fact that one makes mistakes and assumptions isn't sufficient grounds to give up careful reasoning, and it isn't sufficient grounds for thinking one can't get at knowledge of truth. Mistake/ assumption-prone or not, I think we can discern that some arguments are better than others. Mistake/ assumption-prone or not, I think we can know some truths, including truths about the supernatural. (Of course, we do not know these truths exhaustively or infallibly.) Think of it this way: Yes, our courts sometimes convict mistakenly, and this is not good, but this isn't grounds for giving up the legitimacy of our court system as an adjudicator of truth claims—it's grounds, rather, to make more efforts to be careful in our thinking. So, yes, I'm assumption-prone and mistake-prone, but that doesn't preclude my knowledge of reality—it means I need to be careful.<br /><br />I hope that the above is helpful. <br /><br />Best regards,<br />HendrikHendrik van der Breggenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04149481975577863835noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9189981194016418049.post-82506071639443142372011-06-29T20:35:20.356-05:002011-06-29T20:35:20.356-05:00Hello Kane,
1. I'm glad that we agree that th...Hello Kane,<br /><br />1. I'm glad that we agree that the correspondence theory of truth "rings much clearer and louder" than the pragmatic theory. That's important common ground.<br /><br />2. You ask: "as you've defined the correspondence theory of truth (CToT) -- 'what is the case <i>is</i> the case' -- how is this any different than the law of identity, or A is A and not ~A?" In other words (mine): How is the correspondence theory of truth different from the law of identity (A is A)? First, I should point out that in the way you've asked your question you misrepresent my definition of the correspondence theory of truth. I do not define it merely as "what is the case <i>is</i> the case"; rather, I define it as "a condition or state of affairs which exists when a statement of what is the case <i>is</i> the case." If we accept your misrepresentation—"what is the case <i>is</i> the case"—which is pretty much the same as "what is the case is what is the case," then, yes, we would have a restatement of the law of identity, i.e., A is A, and so there wouldn't be a difference. But this move requires your misrepresentation of the correspondence theory of truth. Of course, to misrepresent a position (even in a question) is a serious mistake—a philosophical sin! :-)<br /><br />Your question shows that you don't understand the difference between the correspondence theory of truth and the law of identity, so perhaps the following will be a help.<br /><br />(a) The correspondence theory of truth has to do with a claim about something and this claim's relation to that something such that the claim accurately represents/describes the thing. So the correspondence view has to do with a <i>relation</i> between a claim (proposition/ idea) and reality—a relation of correspondence. E.g., the claim "the dog has my foot in his mouth" is true if and only if there is a real dog that really has my foot in his mouth. The claim is <i>about</i> reality, and reality makes the claim true (or false). <br /><br />(b) The law of identity—A is A—has to do with the nature of reality per se, not with the relationship between [i] a claim about reality and [ii] reality. The law of identity attempts to articulate the insight that reality is what it is, not something else. The dog is the dog. My foot is my foot. The dog is not the neighbour's cat, or automobile, or garage, etc. My foot is not the computer, or telephone, or ice cream, etc.<br /><br />Do you get the distinction? The correspondence relation isn't the identity relation. Again: Correspondence has to do with the relationship between a proposition and what it's about, whereas identity has to do with the nature of reality itself. (I'm pretty sure that I teach this distinction in my Intro to Philosophy courses. Did you miss that day? Or maybe it was during one of those awful 8:30 Monday morning classes when most students are only half awake?)<br /><br />Continued...Hendrik van der Breggenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04149481975577863835noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9189981194016418049.post-85950362297844738472011-06-29T01:53:03.021-05:002011-06-29T01:53:03.021-05:00I agree that the correspondence theory of truth ri...I agree that the <i>correspondence theory of truth</i> rings much clearer and louder than your other chosen example, the <i>pragmatic theory of truth</i>.<br /><br />My first question is this then: as you've defined the correspondence theory of truth (CToT) -- "what is the case <i>is</i> the case" -- how is this any different than the law of identity, or A is A and not ~A?<br /><br />My second question is this: given your definition of CToT, someone like, say, Ayn Rand or Aristotle would nod in your direction. However, when they applied the CToT, they ended up with a very different view of the supernatural than you currently hold. How can this be so? Are there certain presuppositions at play here? Are there hidden premises in everyone's positions?<br /><br />Cheers!<br />KaneKane Augustushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06365182037573315451noreply@blogger.com